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This thesis seeks to provide an assessment of the Shchekino 
experiment and a number of other experimental initiatives 
which have been introduced into the USSR since the late 
sixties. The argument presented is that these initiatives 
represent the response of the Soviet ruling group to an 
inter-connected series of problems that have given rise to 
deteriorating economic performance and declining rates of 
economic growth. The cause of these problems is located in 
the antagonistic nature of the social relations of 
production in the USSR and the specific effects these 
relations have on the process of surplus extraction. It is 
argued that the Soviet ruling group attempted to assert 
control over the Soviet labour process, via these 
experimental initiatives. Their intention was to raise the 
rate of exploitation and thereby secure a growing relative 
surplus.
The thesis considers the specific experience of the 
Shchekino enterprise and offers an explanation for its 
initial successes that is different from both the usual 
western and Soviet interpretations. The explanation 
provided suggests that the experiment worked in the 
short-run because worker security was reduced. However, 
this explanation suggests that the experiment will have 
declining effectiveness over time at the individual 
enterprise.
The inability of the ruling group to successfully 
generalise the experiment is also considered. It is 
suggested that the reason for this is that the logic of the 
experiment is at odds with the principles of the planning 
mechanism and the implementation of the experiment 
ultimately undermines enterprise performance. Other 
experimental initiatives are considered which have 
attempted to introduce complementary changes. From a survey 
of the experience of these initiatives, it is suggested 
that a similar range of problems and pattern of growth and 
decline can be identified.
Finally, it is suggested that the experiments could only 
operate successfully if further complementary reforms were 
introduced. Specifically this would require the 
re-emergence of unemployment and a mechanism to 
unambiguously identify enterprise failure. As a consequence 
it is suggested that the experiments are not in the 
immediate interests of either enterprise management nor the 
industrial workforce. If this is the case then it calls 
into question the possibility of a transition to a market 
socialist solution for the Soviet economy.
ix
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to assess the operation of the 
Shchekino experiment. The intention is to evaluate the 
reasons for its implementation, its initial apparent 
successes, the attempted generalisation of the experiment, 
the number of variants that emerged and its overall impact 
upon the Soviet economy. The argument to be developed is 
that the problems facing the ruling group in the USSR in 
the 1960 's necessitated, from their point of view, the 
implementation of a package of economic reforms and the 
Shchekino experiment was part of that general movement.(1) 
Moreover, it will be argued that the experiment was in fact 
a most important attempt at reform as it sought to resolve 
a central contradiction of the Soviet system. This will be 
elaborated upon in the first two chapters.
From 1965 onwards the general thrust of the reforms has 
been interpreted by western commentators as economic, (2) 
directed at specific problems connected with the efficiency 
of the resource allocation mechanism. Indeed, from 
Liberman's articles onwards (3), the belief, shared by both 
western pro-market reform economists and their Soviet 
counterparts (4), was that by resolving microeconomic 
inefficiencies a way could be found to resolve the 
macroeconomic problems, specifically the decline in 
economic growth. This was to be achieved by the technical
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manipulation of the "mix" between planning and the role of 
market forces. The effort was directed particularly at the 
relationships between enterprises, ministries and central 
planners and between enterprises themselves. This was seen 
to be particularly important in the face of growing 
consumer demands and discontent and the increasing resource 
needs of industrial, space and military sectors. If a 
renewal of high growth rates could be achieved then the 
ruling group would be able to assuage domestic discontent 
and maintain and reproduce their own socio-economic 
position.
However, this is a partial view of the problems which 
cannot be described simply as technical and economic, 
amenable to resolution through better systems of material 
supply or more elaborate incentive systems but 
socio-economic and systemic. The argument to be developed 
is that the nature of the Soviet society and economy makes 
it necessary for the Soviet ruling group to adopt 
piece-meal, market orientated reforms in an attempt to gain 
some control and predictability over the magnitude and 
quality of the socially produced surplus. The process of 
surplus extraction is not regulated and equilibriated in 
the same way as the labour process under the capitalist 
mode of production but is subject to its own contradictory 
dynamics. As a consequence the ruling group has sought to 
assert control over the labour process and the Shchekino 
experiment and a number of other experimental initiatives,
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are part of their attempt to control the Soviet industrial 
workforce. Whilst this thesis is primarily focused on the 
Shchekino experiment a number of the other experimental 
initiatives, particularly the brigade form of labour 
organisation, will be outlined and evaluated.
It will be argued however, that the antagonisms and 
contradictions that make these initiatives necessary for 
the ruling group also modify and eventually undermine such 
attempted experimentation. Furthermore, it will be 
suggested that the failure of these experimental 
initiatives illustrates the impossibility of grafting 
piece-meal market reforms onto the Soviet economy because 
it is no more regulated by the law of value than it is 
regulated by the law of planning. The central reason for 
this is that market relations are not simply technical 
relations, parts of which can be accepted or rejected at 
will as some authors suggest (5), but are expressions of 
the underlying social relations of production of particular 
modes of production. The consequence is that an economy 
unregulated by the law of value will ‘ of necessity reject 
partial market reforms unless the whole social relations of 
production are changed. In the Soviet instance this would 
imply the restoration of capitalism, the whole panoply of 
market forms and the complete reintegration of the Soviet 
economy into the world market and the world division of 
labour. In order to explain this, it will be necessary to 
outline a preliminary view of the political economy of the
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USSR and place the pressure for reforms, like the Shchekino 
experiment and the brigade system, into some form of 
context. This will serve a twofold purpose of explaining 
the centrality of these experiments and secondly, it will 
provide a theoretical perspective for the thesis. The 
adequacy of the political economy provided can be g_auged by 
its ability to explain and evaluate the latter sections on 
the Shchekino experiment, the brigade system and the other 
experimental initiatives.
The early chapters seek to establish a conceptual 
framework, based upon contemporary socio-economic 
problems, which can then be elucidated further by a 
consideration of the experimental initiatives. The 
motivation for this approach is that the theory, based upon 
some empirical knowledge, can be developed through 
application to more specific questions (6). This approach 
seeks to avoid the mechanical transposition of a particular 
theoretical viewpoint onto the Soviet Union, so common 
within both western Marxist and'more orthodox writings on 
the USSR (7). It is insufficient to develop either 
theoretical formulations in isolation from the empirical 
realities of the USSR (8), or to produce empirical material 
for its own sake (9). Attitudes towards these fundamental 
questions of political economy colour all academic work and 
whilst this thesis does not intend to tread the well-worn 
path of comparing and criticising the various theoretical 
perspectives on the USSR, initially it is necessary to
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outline theoretical and conceptual origins.
The conceptual basis of the thesis reflects three 
particular theoretical trends. Firstly, it reflects the 
work that has accompanied the resurgence of interest in the 
capitalist labour process evident over the last decade 
(10). The argument being that these debates have provided 
theoretical insights in their analysis of capitalism that 
allow a significant comparison to be made with the Soviet 
Union and provide the basis, with suitable adaptation, for 
understanding the Soviet labour process. Writers in this 
tradition have had little to say on the Soviet Union and 
when they have, it has been coloured by their superficial 
knowledge of the political economy of that system. For 
example Braverman argues, "that the organisation of labour 
in the Soviet Union differs little from the organisation of 
labour in capitalist countries" (11). On one level the 
surface phenomena are supportative of this conclusion; the 
replication of the technical division of labour experienced 
under capitalism, the hierarchical nature of factory 
relations, similar forms of payment by time and by piece, 
etc., could all be said to lead to such a conclusion. 
However, a hierarchically structured, technical division of 
labour also existed during the building of the pyramids but 
this would in no way lead Braverman and others, to conclude 
that this is evidence of the existence of capitalism. Yet 
this is precisely the type of conclusion they draw with 
respect to the USSR. It is not solely the appearance of
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these similar elements that is significant but it is their 
interaction within the political economy of the USSR that 
defines the specific nature of that system and it is the 
specific nature of the USSR that invests these apparent 
similarities with their unique properties.
Secondly, the thesis rests heavily on the theoretical work 
connected with the journal Critique and particularly the 
work of H.H.Ticktin (12). The argument to be developed is 
that the methodology of Marxist political economy can 
provide the basis for understanding non-capitalist social 
formations. This differs from the view adopted by more 
orthodox western academics who argue, usually on the basis 
of an inadequate appreciation of the methodology of Marxist 
political economy, that it has no explanatory value in the 
context of the USSR (13). Finally, the view adopted 
throughout, is that aspects of reality are impossible to 
comprehend within the watertight boundaries of academic 
disciplines. Consequently, the false divide between the 
economic, the political and the sociological, as much in 
evidence in Soviet academic work as in western, is avoided.
The thesis can be sub-divided into three parts. The first 
part, is comprised of two chapters. The first of which 
considers the general methodological problem of explaining 
the political economy of any socio-economic system and 
outlines the salient features of the capitalist mode of 
production in order to evaluate the peculiarities of the
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USSR. The second chapter presents a critique of Soviet and 
western functionalist views of the political economy of 
labour and work in the USSR, before proceeding to outline 
an alternative political economy, based upon existing 
socio-economic problems. This provides an explanation of 
the motivation for the implementation of the Shchekino 
experiment, its variants and the parallel experiments it 
spawned.
The second part of the thesis is also comprised of two 
chapters. The first of which reassesses the early years of 
the Shchekino experiment, outlining the initial operation 
of the experiment and presenting an idealised model of its 
operation. The initial results of the experiment are 
reconsidered and an alternative explanation for these 
results is presented. The chapter also includes an account 
of the variants adopted at a number of locations, which 
sought to resolve specific problems in the operation of the 
experiment, and the problems they encountered. The second 
chapter in this section considers the attempts to 
generalise the experiment and the problems encountered both 
at .the level of the plant itself and within the context of 
the economy as a whole. It also deals with the criticisms 
levelled at the experiment by Soviet commentators and 
details the attempts made, by the ruling group to 
reinvigorate the experiment by legislative changes.
The third part of the thesis, is comprised of two chapters.
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The first of which deals with a number of alternative 
experimental initiatives introduced by the ruling group, 
particularly the brigade form of labour organisation. It 
traces its introduction into the construction industry and 
the attempts to generalise it throughout Soviet industry. 
The chapter also considers the experiments at the Aksai, 
Dinamo and Volga plants. The final chapter attempts to draw 
conclusions from the material presented with regard to the 
likely future prospects for these and other experimental 
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CHAPTER 1: THE SURPLUS AND CLASS STRUCTURE.
The aim of political economy is to explain the predominant 
mode of production within the socio-economic system under 
consideration; to explain how it has developed, how it 
presently functions and how it may develop in the future. 
It is therefore, an attempt to comprehend a dynamic process 
which is neither finished nor static but characterised by 
motion and change. Furthermore, the subject matter is 
often contradictory and complex, with superficial 
similarities to other periods of time and other social 
systems. It is for this reason that the mechanical 
transposition of categories from one social system to 
another, on the basis of little or one-sided empirical 
knowledge, as already noted, is doomed to failure 
(1).However, there are elements of methodology which are 
ahistorical and applicable to all epochs and from a Marxist 
perspective the. key to understanding the nature of the 
social system and its mode of production is the socially 
produced surplus (2). This is based upon the notion that 
purposive human activity, particularly when carried out in 
co-operation with others, acts upon nature and can produce 
more than is necessary to simply reproduce human life (3). 
Marx identifies as a consequence, a division within labour 
time between necessary labour (necessary labour time), i.e. 
that labour socially necessary to reproduce the direct 
producer, and surplus labour (surplus labour time), i.e.
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labour over and .above necessary labour, when the direct 
producer produces not for himself but for another or others 
(4). This idea of a socially produced surplus, based upon 
surplus labour time, is therefore, according to Marx, a 
non-historical category (5).
"Capital has not invented surplus labour. Wherever a part 
of society possesses the monopoly of the means of 
production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the 
working time necessary for his own maintenance an extra 
working time in order to produce the means of subsistence 
for the owners of the means of production...." (6).
The basic antagonistic relationship therefore, in any 
hierarchically structured social system, is between the 
direct producers of the surplus and the controllers of the 
surplus once extracted. This relationship is fundamental to 
all hitherto known class societies. However, the actual 
form of surplus extraction will differ between different 
historical modes of production.
"The essential difference between the various economic 
forms of society, between for instance, a society based 
upon slave labour, and one based upon wage labour, lies 
only in the mode in which this surplus labour is in each 
case extracted from the actual producer, the labourer" (7).
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The nature of the extraction of the surplus will provide 
the general contours of the social system, its class 
structure.
"The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour 
is pumped out of direct producers, determines the 
relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out 
of production itself, and in turn, reacts upon it as a
determining element" (8).
For example, in societies based upon slavery the extraction 
of the surplus is direct and unfetishised, because the 
direct producers are the property of the class of owners 
and function simply as an instrument of production (9). The 
surplus is extracted in a relationship ultimately based 
upon force and the class structure can be identified around 
this process, slave and non-slave. As Marx points out, it 
appears as if the whole of the slave's labour is unpaid 
work for the master and the onus is on the master to
provide for the slave's reproduction (10). The relationship 
is one of complete dependency. In the end any slave failing 
to fulfil his or her economic function can simply be
disposed of and replaced, as well as being subject to
barbarous conditions whilst working (11).
Under feudalism the nature of the surplus extraction 
process changes but is still direct and non-fetishised
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(12). As Marx suggests under feudalism,
"... we find everyone dependent, serfs and lords, vassals 
and suzerains, laymen and clergy. Personal dependence 
characterises the social relations of production. . .1 (13) .
Here the surplus is extracted via the medium of compulsory 
labour where the dependent labourer can clearly identify
the surplus labour time and can be certain of its
magnitude, i.e. that time expended working for the owner of 
land (whether Lord or clergy), and necessary labour time, 
i.e. that spent reproducing his own existence. There has 
developed a degree of independence within the surplus 
extraction process, which may even allow the labourer to 
generate a surplus of his own but which is ultimately 
dependent upon his relationship with his master (14). T h i s  
does differentiate the serf from the slave, but ultimately 
however, both slave and serf labour can be viewed as "an 
inorganic condition of production" (15) and subject to the 
ultimate sanction of force to maintain their position in 
the surplus extraction process. It is only with the onset 
of the capitalist mode of production that these
relationships are fundamentally changed.
Under the capitalist mode of production the question of the 
surplus is more veiled than under previous modes of
production. Capitalism relies not upon relationships of 
dependency but on particular forms of non-dependency, or
PAGE 14
freedoms.
"....the economic structure of capitalist society has grown 
out of the economic structure of feudal society. The 
dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the 
former...."(16).
Free labourers, as Marx points out, are free in a double 
sense (17) - They are no longer part of the means of 
production (as slaves and serfs were) but equally they do 
not own their own means of production. Their freedom from 
the fetters of feudalism also frees them from, "all the 
guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal 
arrangements" (18). Consequently, capitalism ends 
dependency, custom and external extra-economic force as 
arbiters in the surplus exraction process, but it does not 
end that process itself, simply transforms it, "replacing 
feudal exploitation with capitalist exploitation" (19).
The free labourer, who is no- longer an element of 
production in himself, is equally unable to make his labour 
concrete either in use-values to guarantee his own 
existence or in commodities to sell. As a consequence to 
maintain his daily existence he is forced, (not by custom 
or direct force but by economic necessity), to sell the 
one commodity which he possesses, his capacity to work or 
labour power. This is sold to the owners of the means of 
production, for a specified period of time in a freely
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contracted exchange (20).
"The historical conditions of its (capital's) existence are 
by no means given with the mere circulation of money and 
commodities. It can spring to life only when the owner of 
the means of production and subsistence meets in the market 
with the free labourer selling his labour power" (21).
Labour power however, is a peculiar commodity. It has an 
exchange value, determined by the socially necessary 
labour-time needed for its production and reproduction but 
its use-value to the capitalist is its capacity to produce 
a surplus.
"...the value of labour power and the value that labour 
power creates in the labour process, are two entirely 
different magnitudes; and this difference of the two values 
was what the capitalist had in view, when he was purchasing 
the labour power" (22).
In other words, the capitalist mode of production provides 
an economic motivation to both worker and capitalist. For 
one, necessity born out of freedom provides the impetus for 
alienated labour. For the other the desire to accumulate 
surplus value and capital is equally a necessity because 
failure to do so threatens the individual capitalist's 
existence as an independent unit of capital (23). The 
capitalist labour process is not simply a process through
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which man acts upon nature to produce use-values but it is 
a process of surplus extraction. Within the freely 
contracted wage relationship between worker and capitalist, 
(which ironically is an absolute necessity for both 
parties), an unpaid surplus is extracted. The major 
difference between this and the previous forms of the 
surplus extraction process is that what was once open and 
obvious is now veiled in the apparent exchange of 
equivalents. As Rubin points out,
"the theory of fetishism is, per se, the basis of Marx's 
entire economic system and in particular his theory of 
value" (24).
What is being suggested therefore, is that the mode of 
surplus extraction conditions the class structure of any 
social system but at one and the same time those class 
relations affect the nature and magnitude of the surplus. 
They are both, determined and determining and interpenetrate 
one another. This is just as much the case for feudal or 
slave based societies as it is for capitalism. This forms 
the specific political economy of any mode of production 
and can be elaborated on a number of levels.
Firstly, analysis at the level of the most basic economic 
relationship, within the labour process itself, identifying 
the manner in which the surplus is extracted from the 
direct producers and the strategies adopted by the
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controllers of the means of production. Under capitalism 
this would consist of analysis of the individual capitalist 
firm (25). What needs to be explained is why, when the ,
productive capacities of capitalism■/have been so massively 
advanced by capitalism's necessary conquest of science and
technology (26), the potential for production far
outstrips actual production (27).
Firstly, this is because production is social but the
surplus is appropriated individually by the owners of the 
means of production, and conflict is generated. This 
conflict manifests itself both in a reduction of actual 
production (28) and a lack of interest on behalf of the
work force in enhancing production capacities on the basis 
of their own initiative (29) . Secondly, this necessitates 
the employment of a whole section of the employable 
population in activities of supervision and control, which 
whilst they are functional to the class of owners are not 
directly socially productive (30). The purchase of labour 
power after all, only gives the purchaser the possibility 
of extracting a surplus. Once purchased for the specific 
period of time that potentiality has to be turned into a 
reality. As Braverman suggests,
"Under the special and new relations of capitalism, which 
presuppose a free labour contract, they (capitalists) had 
to extract from their employees that daily conduct which 
would best serve their interests, to impose their will upon
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workers whilst operating a labour process on a voluntary 
contractual basis" (31).
Consequently, "the capitalist strives through management to 
control" (32). This necessitates the employment of foremen, 
overseers and layers of management responsible for control 
functions whose job it is to see that an actual surplus is 
produced within the labour process. Furthermore, the volume 
of the surplus will be affected by the ability of the 
direct producers to resist these attempts at contol and to 
assert their own forms of negative control on the labour 
process (33). This activity is the rational response of the 
labourer seeking either to minimise his participation in 
a necessary but alien system of surplus extraction or 
simply trying to make tolerable the conditions under which 
this surplus is extracted (34). The forms this negative 
control may take can be individualised or collective, 
conscious and co-ordinated or unconscious and spontaneous, 
the end result is the same a reduction in the surplus 
extracted by the capitalist (35). In other,words the class 
structure of capitalism generates conflict that conditions 
the surplus extracted at the level of the individual firm 
and provides the objective basis of class struggle. This 
means the day-to-day struggle around production and not 
just • its periodic manifestation in strikes, occupations, 
sit-ins, etc.(36).
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From the point of view of the individual capitalist this 
necessitates a series of strategies which seek to limit the 
degree of negative control exerted by the working class. It 
seems futile to argue that any one strategy is the 
embodiment of capitalist rationality as different 
strategies will predominate at different moments in time 
and different strategies can co-exist both within different 
sectors of the economy and even within the same firm (37). 
It is more likely that the individual capitalist will adopt 
the appropriate strategy in differing circumstances, 
depending upon a series of features; the type of production 
(batch or continuous flow), the level of technology, the 
level of worker organisation and the sophistication of 
worker responses, the degree of necessary autonomous 
initiative, the market conditions that the individual firm 
faces. All these features will interact to produce the 
specific strategy. Presumably a firm operating in a market 
characterised by restricted competition, in a period of 
full employment, will be able to adopt different strategies 
to a firm in a strongly competitive market, in a period 
when there exists a significant reserve army of labour. 
This has to be qualified as it cannot be assumed that the 
choice of strategy is always correct nor does it assume 
that the range of choices is limitless. The reason for this 
latter point is that the struggle over the generation and 
control over, the surplus manifests itself not only at the 
level of the individual capitalist's relationship with his 
own workforce, (i.e. around the labour process) but also at
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the level of the class relationship between the capitalist 
class and the working class and within different fractions 
of the capitalist class itself. This critically revolves 
around the question of competition, labour productivity and 
the internal discipline of the capitalist mode of 
production (38). It is to be argued that the form these 
elements take under capitalism in comparison to their form 
in the USSR, is the key to understanding the specific 
socio-economic nature of the latter.
In a capitalist economy changes in the productiveness of 
social labour play an important role in the generation of 
the surplus. Obviously increases in the amount of time 
spent at work or increases in the employed workforce will 
facilitate an increase in the absolutelevel of the surplus 
(39). The physical volume of goods produced will increase 
but with a concomitant increase in expenditures of human 
labour time. However, increases in social labour 
productivity will lead to an increase in the relative 
surplus generated (40)V That is the given amount of labour 
time expended now produces either a larger volume ’of 
products or more complex, higher quality products. The end 
result is that the necessary labour time decreases and the 
surplus labour time increases, in the production of any 
specific product and consequently the volume of surplus 
value also increases. For the individual capitalist, 
increases in the productiveness of the labour power he 
purchases, strengthens his position relative to his
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competitors. As the value of a commodity produced, under 
capitalist conditions, tends towards the average socially 
necessary labour time needed for its production, the 
capitalist experiences a temporary competitive advantage 
which, all other things remaining equal, results in 
increased profits. These profits may enable the individual 
capitalist to further revolutionise the productive process, 
hence gaining further competitive advantage as the more 
efficient producer expands at the expense of the less 
efficient competitor or may allow for the takeover of the 
latter by the former. From the point of view of the 
individual capitalist therefore, there are real advantages 
in attempting to raise labour productivity even if the 
short term gains are eroded as competitors equal or surpass 
their example (41).
However, the pressure to increase productivity is not 
something.the individual capitalist firm can choose to 
ignore because for capitalist firms as a whole this process 
acts as an external compulsion upon all to keep up with the 
most advanced and seek to surpass them. The reason for .this 
is that labour expended over and above the average socially 
necessary in the production of any commodity is lost and 
creates no value (42). Consequently, the capitalist failing 
to revolutionise his productive process will be at a 
competitive disadvantage. For the individual capitalist his 
very existence as a capitalist may well be jeopardised if 
he fails to continually revolutionise production and
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continually raise the productivity of labour.
From the point of view of control over the surplus and over 
the labour process itself, the development of labour 
productivity has a number of ramifications. Firstly, it 
leads to a cheapening of labour power, in value terms, 
since the socially determined
necessities can now be produced with a smaller input of 
labour time and consequently at a lower value. As the value 
of labour power is determined by the average socially 
necessary labour time for its reproduction this implies an 
increase in the surplus available for the capitalist. 
Secondly, the continual necessity to increase labour 
productivity leads to an ever widening use of technology 
and science to improve constant capital and leads to the 
expulsion of labour from the labour process (43). The 
creation of a reserve army of labour further depresses the 
value of labour power, as it acts to reduce the resistance 
of labour individually and weakens the organised response 
of labour thus improving the profitability of both the 
individual capitalist and the capitalist class (44). 
Thirdly, the implementation of new technologies changes 
both the nature of labour itself and its organisation. For 
Braverman, this implied the deskilling and degradation of 
work under capitalism and the gradual erosion of control 
exercised by the skilled working class (45). For his 
numerous critics Braverman's notion is overly romantic but 
all nevertheless, recognise the changing nature of the
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capitalist labour process under the influence of 
technological change has implications for the question of 
control (46).
As Marx points out, this process is racked by its own 
internal contradictions which stem from the antagonistic 
relationships at its core and which precipitate wasteful 
expenditures, idle resources, unemployment and periodic 
crises. Nevertheless, capitalism's ability to increase the 
productiveness of labour and to accelerate its 
socialisation is seen as its great progressive function 
providing the motive force for the system's development and 
eventually creating the basis for its overthrow (47).
What is being suggested is that under the capitalist mode 
of production, increases in labour productivity yield 
benefits that accrue to the individual capitalist firm and 
also to the class as a whole, hence both have an interest 
in raising labour productivity. For the working class the 
situation is more complex. As a class they can have no 
interest or incentive to improve labour productivity if it 
results in the cheapening of labour power and a rise in 
unemployment. However, in so far as the working class can 
be segmented and groups and individuals within the class 
differentiated, monetary inducements can lessen the 
resistance to such schemes (48). The reason for this is 
that money, acting as the universal equivalent, will 
provide access to consumption goods and services and the
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consequent fragmentation of the working class will further 
weaken collective resistance and increase profitability 
(49). Ironically, the present phase of capitalist
development produces pressures that simultaneously 
homogenise the working class and fragment it (50).
For the classical writers in the Marxist tradition, the
contradictions inherent in the capitalist process of 
development, act as fetters upon the further
revolutionising of social productivity which is only
possible under socialism (51). A massive growth in labour 
productivity should be possible because advances no longer 
accrue to owners of capital, but to the direct producers 
removing the central contradiction. As Lenin argued,
"The communist organisation of social labour, the first 
step towards which is socialism, rests, and will do so more 
and more, as time goes on, on the free and conscious 
discipline of the working people who have thrown off the 
yoke both of the landowners and the capitalist" (52) .
The working class would now have a direct material stake in 
measures designed to improve productivity as these will 
potentially reduce the amount of labour time to be expended 
and not result in unemployment, -increased rates of 
exploitation and fragmentation of the working class but in
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increased leisure or increased material consumption or some 
combination of both. If this linkage is made and working 
class interests are directly stimulated then the vast 
, productive and creative potential of the direct producers 
can be released. Resistance to new technology would be 
irrational and disappear as the gains of science and new 
technology will be available to all and their development 
encouraged. For Lenin technological progress under 
socialism will,
"... make working conditions more hygenic, will free 
millions of workers from smoke, dust and dirt and 
accelerate the transformation of dirty repulsive workshops 
into bright laboratories worthy of human beings" (53).
Lenin was clear on the potential of this released force,
"Capitalism can be utterly vanquished by socialism creating 
a new much higher productivity of labour.....communism is 
the higher productivity of labour compared to that existing 
under capitalism .... of voluntary, class conscious and 
united workers employing advanced techniques" (54).
Once labour power is no longer sold as a commodity and the 
law of value no longer operates as the regulator of the 
socio-economic system, use values will be produced directly 
as the needs of the freely associated direct producers 
develop and not as profitability dictates. The replacement
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of the anarchy of capitalism will further destroy a whole 
host of socially useless functions and occupations thus 
further resources can be drawn into social production. 
Classical Marxist writers, saw the eventual outcome of this 
process, fueled by the ever increasing productivty of human 
labour, as material abundance where the division of labour 
could be overcome and class antagonisms eliminated (55).
The analysis provided in this section raises a series of 
questions with regard to the USSR. What form does the 
process of surplus extraction take? Who controls the 
socially generated surplus? What are the class relations 
that derive from this process? How do these relations 
condition the surplus and what form does it take? What 
dynamic or laws of motion govern the operation of the 
Soviet economy? How do units (enterprises) within the 
surplus extraction process interrelate? To what extent is 
the process different from that operating under capitalism? 
The second chapter takes up these questions.
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CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE USSR
In order to begin to answer the questions posed at the end 
of the last chapter it is necessary to consider the way in 
which Soviet political economists and their western 
counterparts, regard the question of work and class 
structure. This is not an exhaustive treatment of this 
topic but is intended to point out common limitations in 
their work before developing an alternative analysis of 
work and labour in the USSR linked to the present 
performance of the Soviet economy. In this way a more 
adequate political economy can be constructed which will 
provide the basis for explaining the motivation for the 
Shchekino experiment and the other experimental initiatives 
considered in Chapter 5.
SECTION 1: SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CLASS STRUCTURE.
The first general point to be made is that the analysis is 
couched in the terminology and categories of Marxist 
political economy. However, the same categories that can be 
used to such an effect in the analysis of capitalism, seem 
hollow in the hands of Soviet theoreticians. The reason for 
this is that the present ruling group have inherited 
Marxism as their ideological foundation and it cannot be 
simply cast aside. The legitimating link between past and
PAGE 32
present make it necessary to maintain the facade of Marxist 
categories even if the content is neutered (I).
The class analysis adopted is a formalistic interpretation 
of Marxism which identifies classes in terms of legal forms 
of ownership. The analysis is rooted in the traditional 
Stalinist view of political economy. For Stalin,
"the province of political economy is production, the 
economic relations of men. It includes: (a). the forms of 
ownership of the means of production; (b). the status of 
the various social groups in production and their 
interrelations that follow from these forms ....... (c).
the forms of distribution of products, which are determined 
by them" (2).
As Ticktin has pointed out, in another context, this is an 
inversion of the usual Marxist methodology which usually 
proceeds from the socio-economic to the political and legal 
forms and not the reverse (3) .
The working class and the peasantry are differentiated from 
one another as the two major classes, in respect to 
property relations. The working class are involved in 
production in the state sector, with state owned means of 
production whilst the peasantry operate within the 
collective farm sector, where the means of production are 
owned by the collective (4). The utter formalism of this
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distinction is well illustrated by Stalin himself, as he 
points out,
"the land, which has been turned over to the collective 
farms in perpetual tenure, is used by them virtually as 
their own property, in spite of the fact that they cannot 
sell, buy, lease or mortgage it" (5).
(He might also have added nor change its use).
These classes are overlaid by a stratum, the 
intelligentsia, who are not defined in terms of property 
but with respect to work function and education (6). Both 
the classes and the stratum are defined as 
'non-antagonistic' or 'friendly' (7). Or as Manevich
states,
"It is characteristic of socialist production relations 
that the contradictions they are subject to, (with respect 
to the social organisation of production as well) are 
non-antagonistic" (8).
In relationship to Marxist political economy this 
characterisation is absurd. Firstly, as indicated, no class 
can be defined in isolation from its antagonistic opposite 
pole. The whole basis of class analysis around the question 
of the surplus extraction process, necessitates such a 
definition, unless what is being described is a classless
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society then the concept of class disappears. Secondly, the 
adjective 'friendly' has no analytical content whatsoever, 
as the class relation, defined in a Marxist sense, is a 
relationship based upon contradiction which implies 
antagonism. This formulation is undoubtedly desirable on 
political and ideological grounds for the ruling group, 
(who interestingly disappear by coalescence in this
analysis). Stalin's vehement attack on central concepts of 
Marxist political economy, confirms this desire to maintain 
the form of Marxist analysis whilst removing the content.
".... we must also discard certain other concepts taken 
from Marx's capital ..... I am referring to such concepts, 
among others, as 'necessary' and 'surplus' labour,
'necessary' and 'surplus' product and 'necessary' and 
'surplus' time" (9).
Therefore, by starting from a legalistic definition of 
class and by declaring them 'non-antagonistic', Stalin and 
later writers in this tradition are able to conclude that 
all Soviet labour is 'necessary labour' (10). The point of 
departure for Marx, the process of surplus extraction,
disappears in Stalin's analysis and in the analysis of
contemporary Soviet writers. However, if these formulations 
are inadequate to explain the political economy of the USSR 
they are of equally little use with regard to the practical 
problems facing the present ruling group, particularly in 
relation to the management of the Soviet economy in a time
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of crisis. It was recognised by the ruling group that 
sociological research could play a part in identifying, 
understanding and eventually managing complex social 
processes, much like the role it plays in the west (11). 
This in turn led to an easing' of official proscriptions on 
sociological work and fueled an internal debate, within 
Soviet academic circles, concerning the question of class 
structure (12).
The consequence has been that over the last decade or so, 
traditional attitudes to class structure have been 
questioned and amended in concrete sociological studies 
(13). The revision however, has not been in the direction 
suggested by Marxist political economy but has involved the 
superimposition of a predominantly functionalist 
methodology over the traditional formulation and the two 
co-exist. The revised approach is based upon the 
intra-class occupational structure. For example, Shkaratan 
utilises an eightfold division into occupational groupings 
from 'management' to 'unskilled worker' in his work (14). 
This type of framework is then used to correlate questions 
like labour turnover, migration patterns and labour 
discipline and participation, to stuctural features like 
place in the hierarchy of skills, training level, education 
etc. The end result seeks policy responses to management 
questions (15). The practical need for such work in an 
increasingly complex and technologically based society 
forced the political and ideological compromise embodied
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within this analysis but this also has been further 
justified.
This type of analysis, it is claimed, is in full accord 
with the present stage of Soviet development (16) . 
Socialist society, in the period when it is constructing 
the material preconditions for 'full communism', cannot 
overcome a necessary 'social division of labour'. This is 
seen as a function of both technology, and the present stage 
of development.
"Thus though there are no antagonistic classes under 
socialism, socio-economic distinctions and non-antagonistic 
contradictions between different kinds of labour 
nevertheless continue" (17).
The remaining inequalities are seen as necessary, as 
distribution is based upon the quality and quantity of work 
performed.
"The economic law of distribution according to the amount 
and quality of work performed determines the entire system 
of wages and salaries" (18).
Work itself, is described as being "no longer an onerous 
duty" but "a right and an objective necessity", whilst 
labour is no longer a commodity but is "hired along planned
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lines" (19). It is worth pointing out that work is not a 
duty under capitalism but an objective necessity and that 
the final statement conceals as much as it reveals.
The end result of this analysis is that the Soviet economy 
is described as being consciously regulated and not 
subordinate to the law of value. It is suggested that the 
absence of private ownership of the means of production and 
their control by the state excludes the possibility of 
exploitation (20) . Kozlov also argues that exploitation has 
been abolished, as the state is the political expression of 
the working class. Consequently any socially produced 
surplus at the disposition of the state, is firstly, 
conciously pre-determined by the planning process, and 
secondly, at the disposal of the direct producers via their 
control of the state (21). The USSR is viewed as a society 
moving towards 'social homogenity' (22). As Table 1
illustrates, by defining the class structure in terms of 
only two classes the appearance, of homogenity can be 
created and once again the ruling group disappears by 
amalgamation. Part of this homogenisation process is the 
supposed destruction of the distinctions between mental and 
manual labour and the. overcoming of disparities between 
urban and rural life (23). Table 2 illustrates the shift in 
the USSR away from a predominantly rural to a predominantly 
urban population. However, it also shows that the 
proportion of the rural population is still large in 
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Tables 3 and 4 show the increasing educational level of 
both agricultural and manual workers but they are both 
still more likely to be less educated than their urban or 
mental worker counterparts. The low prestige afforded to 
manual work and the ever increasing pressure on working 
class children to obtain higher education so that they need 
not become workers themselves, testifies to the gulf 
between ideological claims and Soviet reality. Furthermore, 
the gap between urban and rural workers is still large, 
even though the average wage of collective farm workers has 
risen by 18.5% in the last 3 years it is still 22.5% less 
than the average wage of their urban counterpart as Table 5 
indicates. The disparity appears even larger when it is 
realised that industrial workers work an average of 231 
days a year but this rises to 257 days for collective farm 
workers; 264 days for collective farm machine operators and 
tractor drivers; and between 309 and 315 days for 
collective farm workers involved in animal husbandry (25). 
Therefore, the rural worker works longer hours for less. On 
top of this disadvantage, the allocation of consumer goods 
and social provision is worse in rural areas and this 
ensures that living and cultural standards in the rural 
areas are well below the urban centres.
In the process of constructing the homogenous Soviet 
society, the leading role of the party and working class is 
continually emphasised and the otherwise harmonious picture 
is only clouded by peripheral problems which, it is argued, 
will be overcome by better management of social processes 
(26).
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TABLE 3: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE EMPLOYED BY
SOCIAL GROUP. (No. with Hiqher 
Education per 1000).
and Secondary
1939 1959 1970 1979 1983 1984
WORKERS 87 401 590 760 813 825
EMPLOYEES 546 911 956 982 986 987
COLLECTIVE FARM 18 
WORKERS
226 393 593 677 6 95
Source: "Narodnoe Khozyaistvo 
and "Narodnoe khozyaistvo 1983
19 82", op.cit., p 
", op.cit., p.30.
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TABLE 4: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF WORKERS IN MENTAL
AND MANUAL WORK (No. with 
Education per 1000).
Higher and Secondary
1939 1959 1970 1979 1983 1984
MANUAL WORKERS 45 325 543 732 8 01 815
MENTAL WORKERS 515 896 953 981 98 5 986
Source: "Narodnoe khozyaistvo 1982", op.cit., p 
"Narodnoe khozyaistvo 1983", op.cit., p-.30
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TABLE 5: AVERAGE WAGES OF WORKERS, EMPLOYEES AND 
COLLECTIVE FARM WORKERS
1980 1981 1982 1983
Average Wage of
Workers and 168.9 172.5 177.5 182
Employees
Average Wage of
Collective 118.5 122.1 128.9 141
Farm Workers
Source: Vestnik Statistiki, 1984, No.11, p.37.
The existence of a whole range of labour problems, which 
will be considered in more detail in section six of this 
chapter, are explained as survivals from the previous 
capitalist mode of production (27).
Western sociologists appear to be just as confused as their 
Soviet counterparts when it comes to the question of class 
structure and work in the USSR. This confusion is evident 
throughout the work of David Lane (28). It is perhaps most 
explicitily expressed in his joint work with O'Dell, where 
they define the Soviet working class as,
"all manual and non-manual labour occupied in publicly 
owned institutions concerned with production, distribution 
and exchange" (29).
By pressing the formalism of Stalin's definition of classes 
to its logical conclusion they argue that non-manual 
workers do not constitute a seperate stratum but are 
integral to the working class because,
"in a Marxist sense their relationship to the means of 
production is the same as that of the manual workers: all 
are wage earners employed in state-owned enterprises" (30).
They do not however, define the class that stands .in- 
opposition to this working class. Furthermore, in applying 
this definition to the USSR it is impossible to leave
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anyone out of the working class. It would seem that Lane 
and O'Dell also reach this conclusion by their use of terms 
like "a politically unitary class society" we may conclude 
that they view the Soviet Union as a classless society. In 
the concluding chapter of their work this is confirmed when 
they refer to the economic class structure as being 
"unitary" (31). In fact what they do is simply reproduce 
the functionalism of their Soviet counterparts and state,
"It is certainly not the case that with the development of 
socialism the working class becomes a unitary and 
undifferentiated group. Social stratification arises from 
the social division of labour, which gives rise to an 
occupational structure. The division of work activity 
involves specialised and different social functions and 
qualitative differences between groups playing specified 
roles" (32).
By the end of this paragraph the concept of- class has 
disappeared. What is of importance is the occupational 
structure where 'groups' are differentiated by 'work 
activity'. The social division of labour they refer to is 
more correctly defined as a technical division of labour 
that stems from a particular stage of technological 
development. It is precisely the social division of labour 
that their analysis excludes by definition. For Lane and 
O'Dell, it is the level of technology and its rate of 
advance which influences and determines the occupational
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structure and they conclude,
"in our view the occupational structure has evolved in a 
way not unlike that of capitalist societies" (33).
In other words we have confirmation of the "logic of 
industrialism thesis" which is a form of technological 
determinism which suggests that convergence is taking 
place, between East and West./driven by the imperatives of a 
neutral technology. Lane and O'Dell then go on to conclude, 
like their Soviet counterparts, that problems like 
absenteeism (34) , drunkenness (35 ) , low productivity and 
poor quality production (36), or the high proportion of 
unmechanised manual work (37), are all either artefacts of 
the recent peasant past of large sections of the workforce 
or simply attributable to the Soviet Union's late start on 
the road to industrial maturity. The argument would be more 
convincing if it could be shown that more industrially 
mature societies did not suffer the self-same problems. It 
also raises the question of how long a peasant remains a 
peasant once removed from the countryside and employed in 
an industrial environment and living in an urban location. 
As the Soviet workforce becomes more of a hereditary class 
this peasant background becomes more tenuous and the 
reasons for the behaviour cited have to be located in the 
present work situation of the Soviet worker.
The general point to be made is that this type of analysis
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assumes away the central question. By assuming that the 
class structure is "non-antagonistic" or "unitary" and that 
exploitation has disappeared, then by definition so too has 
the surplus. The question of control over the surplus 
(either direct by the ruling group or negative by the 
workforce) is also rendered irrelevant. The abandonment of 
Marxist political economy reduces the analysis of class to 
little more than.a ritual in the Soviet case. For Lane and 
O'Dell it is a term that leads to confusion until it is 
substituted in their analysis by the functionalism of 
occupational structures.
I would further argue that western writers in the Marxist 
tradition have fared little better in this debate, with the 
analysis of class structure and the mode of production 
continually being hampered by the lack of empirical 
knowledge of the USSR, or the desire to force the reality 
of the USSR into a particular pre-conceived theoretical 
viewpoint (38). The problem is that some features of the 
contemporary USSR are superficially similar to either forms 
existing under capitalism or under previous modes of 
production. Therefore, by picking up on these similarities 
and working them up into an all embracing theoretical 
perspective, the specificity of the USSR is either lost or 
reinterpreted to fit the theory. I would argue that the 
central question of surplus extraction and control has not 
been the starting point for any of these perspectives and 
if it is mentioned at all it is deduced as a result of the'
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analysis rather than forming its starting point.
All these analyses are indicative of a broader problem. 
They all divorce the concept of class from the operation 
and performance of the economy as a whole and from 
relationships both within and between enterprises, that 
condition that operation and performance. For example, the 
Soviet sociologists cited, describe the society as socially 
harmonious, the theoretical political economy texts 
describe the development of the Soviet economy as planned 
and proportional, whilst they both ignore the empirical 
realities of the Soviet economy. For example Berri argues 
that,
"Planned management of the economy ensures its smooth, 
crisis free development at high stable growth rates, with 
full employment and increasingly efficient use of 
resources" (39).
Likewise Lane and O'Dell, who make much of describing the 
Soviet working class in relationship to production, only 
mention the performance of the economy on the last page of 
their work (40). Class is treated as a sociological 
category, the main aim of which is the unambiguous 
classification of individuals into an occupational 
hierarchy, rather than a category of political economy. As 
previously suggested, class structure both reflects and 
effects the surplus extraction process and does not
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necessarily lead to such unambiguous classification schema. 
Even under capitalism it may be the case, that some 
individuals do not appear to fit neatly into the class 
structure but this does not undermine the analysis and is 
irrelevant as a basis for rejecting Marxist political 
economy because it is not the intention of the theory to 
provide such a schema. Class analysis is not a labelling 
process but is an attempt to grasp the central dynamic of 
any socio-economic formation (41).
The degree of social harmony suggested by Soviet authors 
and their western acolytes, would tend to suggest that 
Soviet society should have little difficulty in motivating 
Soviet workers to produce more, more efficiently and with a 
higher regard for quality. If the Soviet Union is a 
'non-antagonistic' social formation it raises the question 
of why it is plagued by a series of labour problems, 
leading to declining labour productivity growth and an 
overall ‘slowdown in economic growth. It is only when these 
problems are placed in the context of the struggle around 
the generation and control over the surplus that they 
become explicable. The following section seeks to identify 
the antagonistic relationships that underlay the 
performance of the Soviet economy, both currently and in 
the mid-sixties, before relating this to the pressure for 
reform and the importance of the Shchekino experiment.
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2. THE PRINCIPAL SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN THE
USSR.
The basic argument to be developed is that the ruling group 
in the USSR attempts, however imperfectly, to extract and 
control the distribution of a reliable, usable and growing 
surplus from the direct producers. From the viewpoint of 
the ruling group this surplus is essential, not simply to 
maintain their own consumption privileges, but more 
importantly to legitimise their role and enable them to 
reproduce their socio-economic position. This has two 
related aspects.
Internally, a growing surplus is necessary to provide the 
ruling group with the ability to incorporate and control 
sections of the populace via gradations of consumption 
privileges, in the same way as the incorporation of the 
middle classes and the upper layers of the working class is 
achieved in the west, and thereby deal with rising 
domestic expectations and the consequent discontent,from 
whatever source (42). Their ability to do this is 
constrained, by amongst other things, the need to maintain
r-
artificially low prices for- agricultural products (43). 
This is the necessary price to be paid for dampening 
potential internal discontent and maintaining a minimal 
level of support. The examples of Poland in 1971, 1976, and 
more recently (44), the outbreaks of worker discontent in 
the USSR in the early sixties and more recently serves as
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a reminder of the potential costs (45) . Official concern 
over the availability and quality of consumer goods and 
agricultural products, over a number of years, reflects 
this desire (46). If.this could be achieved the incentive 
effects would strengthen the ruling group's control over 
the process of surplus extraction, guarantee their 
reproduction and coalescence as a ruling class but the 
pre-condition for this is a rising socially produced 
surplus.
Externally, it is necessary for the ruling group, to 
maintain a sphere of influence on the world stage. This is 
achieved in a number of ways. Firstly, directly through 
arms and military expenditure, which guarantees the 
integrity of Soviet borders in regions like China or 
provides a buffer zone like the Eastern bloc countries. 
Secondly, indirectly through economic aid and trade with 
socialist bloc countries, friendly states or potentially 
friendly states (47). The ultimate aim being, to maintain 
the USSR outside the capitalist world economic orbit. The 
argument is that the USSR is not driven externally as a 
result of its own internal economic laws of motion, as with 
the imperialistic dynamic that operates within capitalism. 
The USSR does not suffer from the overproduction of capital 
go'ods that need to find markets overseas but it is its 
economic backwardness that generates a need for a buffer 
zone between itself and capitalism. This is primarily a 
political and strategic question although it does have
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potential economic advantages from an increasing division 
of labour, leading to specialisation and integration within 
COMECON and scale economies (48 ) . The USSR cannot and could 
not compete wholly on the world market with the western 
capitalist countries due to the nature of Soviet products. 
For example, only a little over 4% of Soviet exports of 
machine tools go to developed capitalist countries, the 
main reason being poor quality and design (49). Hence 
contact with the west can only be carried out in a much 
mediated form. The ultimate aim is to maintain the USSR 
outside the capitalist orbit but again the pre-condition 
for this is a growing domestically produced surplus.
It should be pointed out that the surplus is not, as some 
writers maintain, simply the additional consumption 
privileges of the ruling group (50). It comprises the whole 
socially produced surplus product, over and above that 
necessary to reproduce the direct producers and control 
over the surplus implies control over decisions about 
present consumption, accumulation and distribution. As a 
consequence, it implies control over the future direction 
and proportions of the economy and the development of the 
labour process.
As a consequence the fundamental plane of antagonistic 
social relations lies between the direct producers and the 
economic administrators of the state, at both the central 
and local level and their management representatives within
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the enterprise. The role of management is particularly 
contradictory and will be elaborated upon further. However, 
it should also be remembered that the antagonisms generated 
around the surplus extraction process also affect that 
process itself. The direct producers are able to exert 
negative control over both the quality and quantity of the 
surplus extracted via their indirect control of the labour 
process. This interaction gives rise to the particular 
economic performance of the. system under examination. In 
order to explain this it is necessary to outline the nature 
of the surplus extraction process in the USSR and the 
economic results that its specific form produces.
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SECTION 3: THE NATURE OF WORK AND REWARDS IN THE USSR.
The starting point of this analysis is work and labour 
time, given that this is the precondition for the 
production of use-values necessary to satisfy human wants. 
The individual Soviet worker commits his labour-time to a 
pre-specified labour activity, at a particular enterprise 
or association, for a specified period of time by signing a 
labour contract (51). The worker is compelled by economic 
necessity to enter this relationship because he is 
effectively divorced from the means of production which are 
necessary to turn his labour into the use-values necessary 
for his existence, at a given social and technological 
level. The means of production stand outside the direct 
control, of the worker, much like the situation under 
capitalism described by Marx as a situation where, "dead 
labour dominates and pumps dry, living labour power". The 
access to use-values is conditioned by work, non-work is 
not an option (52). The worker has discretion over both the 
labour activity he undertakes and over the location where 
he works but this is constrained by three things.
Firstly, the labour activity is determined by previous 
education, training, skill level and experience coupled 
with the available work opportunities and the demands for 
the skills of the individual worker (53).
Secondly, the location, either geographically or between
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enterprises, is subject to control. For example, some 
cities have restricted access and the internal passport 
system can be used to control the workers freedom of 
movement. Movement between enterprises and branches,has and 
can be controlled.t For example, movement out of the 
military production sector can be difficult. The record of 
the worker's performance in his work book can also be used 
for control purposes.
Thirdly, the labour laws in operation at any. particular 
time will constrain freedom, along with the obvious 
constraint that the choice of external emigration is 
absent.
In a sense therefore, the Soviet worker is as free as his 
western counterpart and out of this freedom is born the 
economic necessity to expend labour time, in order to 
receive the means to attain the necessaries of life. 
However, this freedom needs to be qualified. Unlike his 
western counterpart, the Soviet worker is not only subject 
to the necessity to work but also has the right to work 
(54). This principle, enshrined in the Soviet constitution, 
is perhaps the major remaining gain from the October 
Revolution and creates a particular relationship of 
dependency, in that the individual enterprise cannot make 
superfluous workers redundant. If the enterprise wishes to 
remove workers it can only do so in carefully defined 
circumstances and it must find them a similar job, with 
similar conditions, content and rewards (55). This is not
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to suggest that all enterprises stick to the letter of the 
labour law (56). In specific circumstances individual 
workers can be forced to leave their work but even then the 
worker has recourse to the Trade Unions and the legal 
system for redress and reinstatement (57). The point is 
that even if individuals can be victimised by enterprise 
management, the workforce as a whole, or even sectors of 
it, either by trade grouping or region, are relatively 
secure and the Soviet worker is protected in a manner 
incompatible with and unseen under capitalism (58).
This relationship, between the worker and the ruling group, 
is both a product of, and a cause of, the ruling group's 
insecure position in Soviet society. As _ the ruling group 
rest upon state property and the historical legacy of 
Bolshevism they cannot break this linkage without cutting 
the legitimating links with the October Revolution. 
Furthermore, it would remove the apparent validity of the 
claim that the Socialist bloc's superiority over capitalism 
is shown in the maintenance of full employment whilst the 
capitalist world experiences ever-increasing unemployment 
(59). The power of this ideological dimension should not be 
overlooked. However, the fact that this relationship cannot 
be severed is a partial cause of the insecure grip the 
ruling group has over the socially produced surplus and 
consequently threatens their reproduction.
The consequence is that the dual freedom Marx referred to, 
with regard to the worker under capitalism, is
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inappropriate in the Soviet context. Workers under 
capitalism are insecure individually and as a class and 
this insecurity is an important element of control at the 
level of both the individual capitalist firm and at the 
level of the whole society. However, while the Soviet 
worker may be individually insecure, collectively he is 
secure and cannot be controlled in the same manner. This is 
the first element of the particular nature of the Soviet 
labour process, the second element refers to rewards.
In return for the labour time expended the worker, receives 
an individual return in the form of a money wage. This is 
predominantly determined administratively by the centre but 
can be manipulated at the level of the enterprise by the 
use of premiums, bonuses and piece-rates. For example, 
currently 80% is accounted for by basic wages and the
remaining 20% by bonuses but there are two problems. 
Firstly, there has been an overall tendency towards wage 
levelling and a reduction in the level of wage
differentials. In 1955 the relationship between the wages 
of ITR and workers was 1.68 but by 1977 it had fallen to 
1.21 (60). Secondly, as Ticktin has pointed out, the wage 
in the USSR may be paid in a money form but money in the 
USSR does not function as the universal equivalent hence 
the wage form is quite different from capitalism (61). 
Access to use-values is not determined on the basis of
money alone. Access depends upon position in the hierarchy,
access to privileged, closed supply channels, access to 
foreign currency, place of residence, influence and 'blat',
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chance or foreknowledge, corruption and the bartering of 
skills on the black market (62). For the ordinary worker
the holding of money’may well be a necessary condition to
gain access to use-values but it need not be a sufficient 
condition. Evidence for this is the all pervasive nature of 
the queue as an allocative mechanism and the continual rise 
in the personal savings index. Therefore, the money wage is 
not the same as that under capitalism as money does not
provide unambiguous access to use-values. Furthermore, the 
worker receives a return for his expended labour in the 
form of part of the social wage which it is estimated 
accounts for 23.4% of the family income of workers and
employees and 19.1% of collective farm workers income. In 
fact these payments are rising faster than individual
wages; in 1971-1981 average wages grew by 45% for workers
and employees and 72% for collective farm workers but per 
capita payments from the social wage rose 81% in the same
period (63). This may take a number of forms.
Firstly, it can be state determined, like health, 
education, transport or subsidised food (again actual 
access will be a function of elements like place of 
residence, place in the hierarchy etc.). Secondly, it can 
be determined by the enterprise, for example housing, 
cultural and sporting amenities, holiday facilities, access 
to sanatoria etc. Access to the first elements of the 
social wage are non-discriminatory, in as much as they are 
unaffected by the individual worker's work performance. The 
second category can be manipulated at the level of the
PAGE 57
enterprise and some correspondence between work performance 
and access can be administratively arranged. Soviet sources 
however, have expressed concern over the lack of 
correspondence between the social wage and work performed. 
Particularly as throughout the period 1976-1982 the per 
capita payments and benefits from public consumption funds 
have been growing faster than the growth in labour 
productivity (64).
There are a number of ramifications that follow from this 
analysis. Firstly, the particular nature of the wage form 
means that the relationship between work performed and 
use-values eventually received is tenuous as the wage is 
mediated by a variety of other elements. This has two 
complementary aspects. By reducing work effort to a minimum 
the worker's consumption of use-values will be hardly 
affected and in the opposite respect, by increasing effort, 
even if wages rise marginally, there is no necessary impact 
on the volume of use-values at the workers disposal. The 
implication to be drawn from this is that in the USSR wages 
can neither be used as an incentive nor as a disciplining 
mechanism, except in the most limited form. Therefore, the 
Soviet workforce is controlled by neither the stick of 
unemployment nor the carrot of increased wages. Labour 
power cannot be considered a commodity because for this to 
be the case labour would have to be free in the dual sense 
referred to earlier. Economic regulation in the USSR can be 
seen in
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terms of open state intervention because the social 
relations of production are necessarily transparent (65). 
The veil of commodity fetishism does not hide the political 
nature of economic decisions from the direct producers. 
This raises therefore, the question of economic regulation 
and the nature.of production itself.
During the labour time expended the worker, operating with 
the means of production located in the enterprise and in 
co-operation with others, produces an output. The 
technological level, volume, rate of renewal and rate of 
innovation of the means of production are determined by the 
centre. So too is the flow of necessary inputs to produce 
the specified output. The general direction of output and 
its composition are determined by the political decisions 
of the ruling group and are turned into plan instructions 
in the iterative planning process between the enterprise 
and the centre and here again the antagonistic nature of 
the social relations of production assert themselves.
The argument, associated with Ticktin (66) and Smith (67), 
is that effective planning is impossible in the USSR 
because socialist planning implies the conscious direction 
of the economy by the freely associated direct producers. 
In the absence of such participation, in conditions of 
scarcity and social antagonism the supposed planning 
degenerates into over-centralised bureaucratic
administration of. the economy.
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In the Soviet context the plan is only amenable to control 
by the worker in the most formal sense. Participation, even 
to the maximum extent in the party, trade unions, 
production conferences at enterprise level etc. gives the 
worker little direct control over the general direction of 
the economy, or over the assortment or quality of goods, or 
over the particular output of his enterprise. The 
hierarchical nature of the society and of economic control, 
coupled with the principle of one-man management 
effectively excludes direct participation (68) . On top of 
this the very methodology of planning, on the "ratchet 
principle" or "planning from the achieved level", means 
effective change is impossible and the plan appears to take 
on a life of its own, outside the influence of the worker, 
or even the manager (69).
The workforce is only able, in a negative and indirect 
sense to maintain a degree of control over its own labour 
process and thereby affect the volume and nature of the
surplus (70). As suggested in the first chapter, this type
of control^ is implicit in any hierarchically ordered 
society where the direct producers are divorced from the 
means of production. It is management's function to 
minimise this negative control and at an operational level
extract the surplus which, under capitalism takes a value
form. In the USSR this relationship is both qualitatively 
and quantitatively different.
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Under capitalism the role of rewards and discipline, via 
the media of money and unemployment respectively, 
reinforces management's task. However much the balance of 
class forces shift, ultimately these sanctions are at the 
disposal of management to discipline the workforce. The 
precise balance between reward and sanction will be 
determined by the broader features of the period. For 
example, with a significantly large reserve army of labour 
management's concerns in recession will be different from 
their position during periods of boom when near to full 
employment exists and labour shortages develop. Coupled 
with this a particular feature of capital's control has 
developed during the current recession. That is the ability 
to shift productive capacity between locations and thereby 
discipline the workforce with the threat of such action. In 
the USSR the disciplining role of unemployment is absent, 
the role of money is ambiguous and the physical removal of 
productive capacity has no similar function in the USSR.
The role of management in the USSR is more ambiguous and 
problematic than under capitalism. Under capitalism the 
performance of a manager or a management team relates 
directly to their economic results which are mediated 
through the impersonal market and their rewards, either 
salary or more nebulous elements like prestige, are a 
function of this performance. Managerial remuneration 
packages under capitalism are increasingly composed of 
salary plus bonuses etc., but more importantly, commonly 
include shares in the company by whom they are employed.
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Consequently, any objective grounds for presuming that a 
divorce of ownership from control will lead to different
patterns of behaviour is being eroded. There is a unity of
purpose between the eventual owners of the extracted
surplus and those whose function it is to supervise the 
process of surplus extraction. Many radical writers have 
pointed out anyway, that the concept of a divorce of
ownership from control need not lead to any fundamental 
change in the operation of capitalism because ultimately 
managerial performance is subject to market disciplines 
(71). Even a more orthodox writer like Marris has pointed 
out that the divorce between ownership and control need not 
lead to a divergence of objectives. He argues that owners 
and managers may well have a single unified aim of 
maximising the "balanced rate of growth", a concept not 
dissimilar to the Marxist notion of accumulation as the 
prime motivation of capital (72). Furthermore, the 
capitalist manager has, to varying degrees, some control 
over the eventual disposition of the extracted surplus, 
determining the proportions of dividend paid, retained 
profits etc. and can determine the direction and level of 
reinvestment in new capacity. This is a powerful motivating 
influence on the capitalist manager's behaviour because not 
only are current rewards dependent upon current performance 
but so too are security and rewards into the future. There 
is therefore, a correspondence between the interests of the 
owners of the surplus and the agents whose role it is to 
supervise the extraction of that surplus. Furthermore,
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there is an unambiguous, medium through which managerial 
performance can be assessed.
In the USSR managers are also judged by their performance 
and money rewards, prestige and advancement follow 
success. Money rewards may well be secondary, for the 
reasons already suggested above, in comparison to
advancement up the nomenklatura or movement to a more
prestigious enterprise or location where access’to consumer 
goods and cultural amenities may be easier or more certain. 
However, Soviet managers have little or no control over the 
surplus they are responsible for extracting and cannot
guarantee that their sucess will lead to an enhancement of
their enterprise's capacity, via reinvestment. Furthermore, 
the mechanism through which their performance is assessed, 
the plan, is amenable to manipulation by them. Therefore, 
plan fulfilment, does not necessarily reflect their ability 
to supervise the surplus extraction process, so much as it 
measures their ability in the bureaucratic process of plan 
compilation. -
The fundamental antagonism between the ruling group and the 
direct producers istherefore, supplemented by a further 
plane of antagonism between the economic administration at 
the centre, who control the disposition of the surplus once 
produced and the immediate controllers of the means of 
production whose task it is to put the plan into operation, 
enterprise management staff. The suggestion is that those 
who set the plan targets at the centre are continually
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thwarted by the self-interest of those whose task it is to 
supervise the process of production. The reason for this is 
that no Soviet plan, or indeed any plan, can be 
all-embracing and completely unambiguous and this leaves a 
degree of discretion to enterprise management who act in a 
manner most suitable to themselves ( 74) . This disrupts the 
internal logic of the plan and instead of being a set of 
unified directives for the enterprise it degenerates into 
an ever-changing series of disjointed and often mutually 
contradictory administrative measures as the centre 
attempts to keep up with the reality they are supposed to 
be directing. This is not to suggest that Soviet enterprise 
heads are deliberately corrupt or disruptive but is a 
recognition of a we11-documented element of Soviet 
industrial life (75). In fact some actions, even if they 
are illegal or semi-legal are essential for the functioning 
of the system.
The ambiguous position of management has an impact upon the 
negative control exercised by the workforce. Managerial 
rewards are in the last analysis determined by plan 
fulfilment and their aim is to fulfill or marginally 
overfulfill the plan. This leads the enterprise director to 
courses of action directly in conflict with the aims of the 
centre.
Firstly, within the planning process, it is rational for 
enterprise management to underestimate the productive 
capacity of their plant, in this way the targets received
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will be achievable within present plant capacity, even if 
the enterprise is faced by supply problems. This implies an 
underestimation of the potential surplus that could be 
extracted from the plant's workforce.
Secondly, directly related to the above, if the enterprise 
anticipates supply difficulties, then again it will be
rational to overestimate the material supplies necessary 
for production. This is particularly true of labour 
supplies when the USSR is faced by an apparent labour 
shortage. It is irrelevant for the individual manager that 
his action actually creates the difficulty he is trying to
avoid. If he did not act in this manner it could not be
guaranteed that other enterprises would follow his example. 
As Berliner pointed out in the late fifties, labour will be 
hoarded to meet unexpected contingencies (76). This 
situation has not changed and the continual changes in plan 
targets, changes in priorities, breakdowns due to poor
quality machine tools coupled with inadequate maintainance 
and repair, staff being withdrawn for agricultural work at 
harvest time, late supply of essential inputs all leads to 
arhythmic work patterns and confirms the rationality of 
labour hoarding for enterprise management seeking to 
fulfill plan targets (77). It is worth pointing out that 
this dynamic is the complete opposite of that which 
operates under capitalism where the key to managerial 
success is the expulsion of living labour from the
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production process. The safety factor of hoarded labour 
leads to overmanning and underemployment which further 
reinforces the security of the workforce and further 
reduces any correspondence between work and rewards. What 
effectively exists is a situation where enterprise 
management recognise that they require at least the 
acquiescence of the workforce in order to be able to 
fulfill the plan. Hence a trade-off exists through which 
the enterprise management quantify potential workforce 
resistance and underestimate capacity as a consequence, 
leading to a much lower intensity of labour than exists in 
the west. This in turn recreates the problem that the 
enterprise management is seeking to avoid.
It could be argued that the features of the labour process 
in the USSR, so far identified, are only different by 
degree to the capitalist labour process. However, whilst 
negative control exerted by workers exists under capitalism 
it is nevertheless inimicable to that mode of production. 
At an abstract level it would be eradicated by the 
operation of the law of value. This can be explained by a 
simple example. Consider a firm operating within a 
competitive market (78), at a similar scale and 
technological level to its competitors but where its 
workforce have been able to secure a degree of negative 
control. This may operate upon line speeds or manning 
levels or any other aspect of the labour process. The firm 
would find that the labour time necessary to produce the 
particular commodity would exceed the average socially
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necessary labour time. This labour expended would not be 
reflected in the value of the commodity and the firm would 
find surplus labour-time, surplus value and profit all 
reduced. This decline of profitability, with respect to its 
more managerially aggressive competitors, would eventually 
lead to the firm being driven from the market, either by 
failure or take-over. The centralisation and concentration 
of capital that occurs as a consequence would mean that the 
control enjoyed by the workforce would be lost. This occurs 
either because the former.employees will jointhe ranks of 
the reserve army of the unemployed, with the negative 
effects that follow from that or will be forced to work in 
the more aggressive environment without the negative 
control they once enjoyed.
The suggestion is that the operation of the law of value 
under the capitalist mode of production will undermine the 
objective basis of negative control and the form of control 
will tend towards the most efficient. This is not to deny 
that in reality this process may well be mediated by, for 
example the operation of the social-democratic state, which 
may well deflect the operation of the law of value under 
certain circumstances for some period of time (79). Nor 
does it imply a unilinear movement towards the most 
efficient forms of control. The reality will be determined 
by the relationship between the antagonistic classes both 
globally and locally but the inherent tendency will be as 
described above.
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In the USSR however, the forms of negative control are 
continually being reproduced and there is no inherent 
tendency for their elimination. They need not impair the 
enterprise's performance, if plan targets are deliberately 
manipulated to accommodate this behaviour, nor hinder the 
success and advancement of management, if this is dependent 
upon plan fulfilment, nor the workers access to use-values, 
if this is only tenuously linked to the amount and quality 
of his work. Inefficient enterprises may well be criticised 
in the USSR but they are not closed down, their means of 
production removed and their labour dispersed to more 
efficient enterprises.
The outcome of production in the USSR, is intended to 
comprise solely of use-values. However, as a result of the 
antagonistic relations of production the result is an 
output comprised of two elements. Firstly, a usable 
portion that has a use-value for the society as a whole 
either as an intermediate or finished product for 
consumption or investment purposes. Secondly, an unusable - 
portion that is waste and has no use-value (80). The 
determination of use-value and waste has both an objective 
and subjective element. Objectively, an electronic switch 
that does not work is waste but equally a pair of shoes 
that no one wants because they are of poor quality design, 
even though they could objectively function as shoes, are 
just as much waste as the .switch. In the process of 
producing both waste and use-values society utilises both 
living labour and labour embodied in the means of
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production. The end result is the same, some part of the 
socially expended labour time has resulted in no ultimate 
use-value for the society even though the labour embodied 
in it has been recompensed as if it were socially 
necessary. This therefore, limits the surplus available to 
the ruling group, extending apparently necessary labour 
time and reducing the surplus labour time of the workforce 
as a whole. This is not to suggest that only production 
under Soviet conditions is wasteful. Clearly under 
capitalism the antagonistic production relations lead to 
waste of a variety of forms. Again the discipline of the 
law of value will restrict the waste produced, from the 
point of view of the capitalist, and set into motion forces 
that will tend to eliminate wasteful production techniques 
and commodities. This is essentially the same point as that 
concerning negative control outlined above.
In the USSR this tendency does not exist in the realm of 
economic regulation as the automatic result of apparently 
impersonal forces. Wasteful production may reproduce 
itself, and administrative initiatives against it may 
succeed in specific instances but only temporarily 
displacing the problem elsewhere and such initiatives are 
continually necessary. The fundamental problem for the 
ruling group is that in the absence of the law of value, no 
unambiguous economic regulator exists that will 
simultaneously discipline the workforce and the enterprise 
management and provide the necessary correspondence and 
commensurability between labour time,
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use-values produced and rewards. The consequence is that 
individual enterprises effectively appear as autonomous 
elements in the surplus extraction process, representing 
localised trade-offs between enterprise management and 
workforce, yet continuously subject to necessary 
administrative interference from the centre. The results of 
these antagonistic social relations of production in the 
USSR are considered in the next section.
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SECTION 4: THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
So far the antagonistic nature of the social relations of 
production in the USSR have been presented and developed in 
a theoretical sense only. The concrete expression of these 
relationships produces a series of interconnected problems. 
Figure 1 attempts to describe these interrelationships and 
present them in a circular flow diagram. The unbroken lines 
in the figure represent the direct links between particular 
problems., whilst the broken lines are an attempt to 
identify the way in which problems feedback into other 
areas. This form of presentation, even though it
understates the complexity of the linkages involved, is 
necessary for purposes of exposition and provides a 
framework for analysing these questions.
The central element in this analysis is the failure of the 
ruling group to achieve planned levels of economic growth, 
through the extraction of the socially produced surplus. 
This can be viewed as both the culmination of the process
and its starting point from one time period to the next.
This section will present a summary of the empirical
evidence regarding these problems and will begin to trace 
out some of the linkages involved in Figure 1. Later 
sections will complete this analysis and show that the 
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The recent experience of the Soviet economy has been 
characterised by a slow-down in overall rates of economic 
growth. The rapid growth rates of the 1930 's and the 
post-war years of reconstruction, have given way to much 
more modest and decelerating rates of growth in the present 
period. This of course, ignores the question of the nature 
of growth itself. As Rakovsky pointed out in the early 
1930's, quantitative growth may well be achieved at the 
cost of negative qualitative changes in production which 
may well cast doubt on the precise nature of the growth 
attained (81).
Table 6 indicates the general pattern of Soviet economic 
performance over the period since the second world war. It 
should be noted that from this perspective Soviet growth 
appears impressive. The general indicators do however, show 
a number of the distinctive features of Soviet development. 
Firstly, even though the gross social product and national 
income are still growing this is appreciably slower than 
previous periods. Secondly, there has been proportionally 
much higher growth in Department 1 than in Department 2, 
even though the ruling group has attempted to change this 
balance. Thirdly, growth in agricultural output is much 
more modest than growth in industrial output over this 
period. .Fourthly, the stagnation in industrial output in 
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This generalised slow-down in growth can be confirmed from 
Table 7, where the annual average rates of growth of 
National Income and Gross Industrial Output are shown to 
have steadily deteriorated since the 8th Five Year Plan. 
Furthermore, the failure to meet plan targets in the 
current period is clearly indicated (82).
TABLE 7: Average Annual Rates of Growth (%)
PLAN PERIOD NATIONAL INCOME INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
1961-65 7th 5.6 6.5
1966-70 8th 7.1 7.4
1971-75 9th 5.1 6.4
1976-80 10th 3.9 4.4
1981-1985 Plan 3.4 TO 3.7
1981 (Actual) 3.2 3.8
1982 (Actual) 2 2.8
1983 (Actual) 3.1
Sources: P.Khromov, Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1981, No.10,
pp.17-18; Pravda, 24/1/82; 20/11/81; Vestnik Statistiki,
1984, No.3, p.73; V.Fil'ev, op.cit., p.13.
Failure to achieve planned levels of economic growth, 
either in the sense of failure to fulfill the overall plan 
or by failure to achieve individual sectoral targets, leads 
to three problems. The flow of inputs into agriculture will 
fail to reach planned levels, the output of Department 1, 
investment goods and Department 2, consumer goods will also 
fail to reach planned levels. The actual proportions will 
be dependent upon the sectoral distribution of the failure 
and the priority accorded to the various sectors by the 
ruling group, during the production period.
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The restricted flow of inputs into the agricultural sector, 
already plagued by natural and climatic limitations (83) 
and experiencing a situation where greater amounts of 
investment yield smaller increments in output (84), will 
mean either that the supply of agricultural products will 
be reduced or made even more uncertain (85). This has a 
number of ramifications.
Firstly, the ruling group will be forced to import 
agricultural products from the west in order to maintain 
the necessary supply of foodstuffs to the workforce, hoping 
thereby, to reduce potential discontent and to maintain 
domestic stability. This will depend upon external sales of 
either primary products or scarce consumer goods to earn 
the necessary hard currency to purchase the imports. As a 
consequence it appears internally that the ruling group 
cannot resolve the agricultural supply question without 
western imports and externally it provides support to the 
argument that socialism has failed because the USSR cannot 
feed itself and has to rely on the west.
Secondly, the uncertain supply of agricultural products 
stimulates private sector agricultural efforts (86).This 
may operate directly to the detriment of the socialised 
sector as collective farm workers spend increasing time on 
their private plot. It may also reduce the flow of labour 
to the socialised sector in general, as older people and 
women will' tend to the private plot rather than attempt to 
get part-time work. The failure of socialised agriculture
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will bolster the private sector and legal and semi-legal 
markets and from the ruling group's viewpoint this will 
have a negative ideological effect. The practical impact is 
to add to the labour supply problems in the collective farm 
sector, as a result of this misdirection of effort. This is 
itself resolved in a particularly wasteful manner by 
drafting in industrial workers and students to assist in 
the agricultural sector particularly at harvest time. As 
Manevich, has pointed out, in 1970 collective farms called 
upon other branches of the economy to supply 1.4 times more 
workers for harvest work than in 1960 and by 1978, 2.4 
times more workers than in 1970 (87). Each worker stays on 
the collective farm for approximately one month and of the 
15.6 million people involved, 7.8 million are drawn from 
branches of material production (88). This has a 
deletorious effect upon agricultural production, as the 
incoming labour is unfamiliar with the work and poorly 
motivated and performs with half of the productivity of 
permanent agricultural workers. Furthermore, as a basic 
worker is four times more effective at his own work than at 
agricultural work the loss to the economy is magnified 
(89). Also if 15.6 million people lose two days travelling 
to and from the collective farm then that is equivalent to 
a years work for 110,000 people (90). It also has a 
negative effect upon industrial production and encourages 
enterprise directors, as previously noted, to overestimate 
their demand for labour to cover this eventuality (91).
Failure to achieve planned growth in Department 2 output
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leads directly to fewer consumer goods. This of course 
avoids the question about the desirability and quality of 
the output actually produced (92). Furthermore, if hard 
currency has to be obtained to purchase agricultural 
products, this places further constraints on domestic 
consumption. This is exacerbated by the fact that Soviet 
consumer goods destined for western markets have to be of 
higher quality and dependability than normal, if they are 
to be competitive and this further reduces the flow of 
consumer goods internally as a disproportionate amount of 
labour time will be expended upon them (93). As consumer 
goods include processed agricultural products, agricultural 
supply difficulties will further reduce the availability of 
consumer goods in general.
Taken together the failure to guarantee the supply of 
foodstuffs and consumer goods implies a shortage of the 
necessary use-values to motivate the Soviet workforce and
consequently diminishes the incentive effects of any
attempted reforms. In the period 1976-1980 wage funds and
collective public consumption funds rose by 28% and 
collective farm wages rose by about 30% but consumer goods 
production only rose by 21% and retail trade turnover only 
rose 22% (94). This coupled with the problems of poor 
quality and unwanted goods give rise to the all-pervasive 
nature of the queue and the continuing difficul-ties in 
obtaining consumer goods.
Furthermore, the personal savings index now stands at its
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hi ghest level ever. For example, in 1980 the level of 
savings equalled R156- billion, 2/3 of which was demand 
deposits (earning 2% interest) and 1/3 was time deposits 
(earning 3% interest). Interest payments alone in 1980 
totalled R 3 .5 billion (95). This level of savings would be 
sufficient to allow all those employed in the national 
economy to' take 209 days of unpaid leave. By comparison in 
1960 the level of savings would only have allowed 50 days 
of unpaid leave (96) . To highlight the problems in consumer 
goods production it should be noted that the savings level 
in 1980 was equivalent to 7 months turnover in the retail 
trade sector (97). The problems of consumer goods
production and the consequent increase in personal savings 
have a series of deletorious effects.
Firstly, the trading network, faced by continual shortages, 
will tend to lower its standards for quality and accept 
anything the producers will supply and then will be left 
with unsold goods (98). Therefore, the distribution network 
will not act to discipline the producers of shoddy goods. 
Secondly, the existence of considerable personal savings 
may explain the increase in the amount of time spent
between jobs and the slowness with which youths are drawn 
into productive work. The argument here is that people
moving between jobs can afford to wait before returning to 
work and live off past savings and youths can live at their 
parent's expense. Consequently, the failure in consumer 
goods production adds to labour productivity, labour 
discipline, and labour turnover problems as well as not
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providing adequate incentives for those in work.
Failure to achieve planned growth in Department 1, 
investment goods, as already suggested will constrain the 
future production of both agricultural and consumer goods
(99). It may also restrict present consumption if resources 
are diverted to prioritised sectors. However, there is a 
further impact because if the flow of investment goods is 
inadequate this will lead to three potential problems
(100). Firstly, there will be problems in expanding fixed 
productive capacity at the existing technological level and 
providing the correct mix of equipment, plant, instruments 
and tools. The lack of basic implements-in some sectors is 
the result of priorities being placed elsewhere. For 
example, in construction 30-35% of workers don't get the 
tools they require because they are not manufactured but 
have to be made by the workers themselves and this is
extremely wasteful (101). In the trade sector for example, 
only about 60% of the demand for equipment is satisfied and 
much of this is obsolete and only 40% of the required
spares are produced (102).
Secondly, the maintenance, replacement and- re-tooling of 
present capacity will be jeopardised. Even though the USSR 
has the largest inventory of metal working equipment in the 
world its' annual rate of rennovation is only 2% to 2.7% 
and even if this is upgraded, as planned to 4%, it will
take into the next century to rennovate this critical
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sector (103). As Kostin has pointed out, only approximately 
30% of Soviet capital investment is channelled into
reconstruction whilst the comparable figure for the GDR is 
60% (104). Furthermore, in the USSR 50% of the machine tool 
inventory is located in repair shops which illustrates the 
problems of inadequate production techniques and poor
quality inputs leading to a growing repair sector (105). 
The rate of retirement of fixed equipment throughout the 
economy is a measure of the dynamism of the capital 
formation process and in the USSR this rate has been 
declining,- from 1.8% in 1970 to 1.3% in 1981 (106 ). This 
further reinforces the need for expenditure on repair, as 
approximately 30-40% of equipment has been in use for 15-20 
years (107). As Abalkin suggests, functional but obsolete 
equipment represents wasteful production practices and it 
is no good to simply develop equipment extensively but it 
is essential to raise the technological level (108).
Thirdly, the failures also discourage innovation and
process development. In 1981 even though 205,000 machine 
tools were produced only 10,000 of these were numerically 
controlled and . only 830 sets of automatic and
semi-automatic transfer lines were produced (109). The 
production of new robotic forms of equipment are also 
proceeding more slowly than desired (110). These 
difficulties are reinforced by a planning mechanism that 
often appears to penalise rather than reward innovation and 
management will opt for proven techniques rather than adopt 
riskier newer methods, supplies for which may be dubious
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anyway. Planning from the achieved level reinforces these 
risk avoiding strategies on the part of plant management 
who have no direct personal interest other than’plan 
fulfilment, achieved as easily as possible. This leads to 
further problems.
Firstly, low rates of innovation and process development 
have led the ruling group to turn to the west and import 
technology but this involves similar problems to those 
associated with agricultural imports, the need to earn hard 
currency etc. But the problems are magnified with regard to 
technology imports. Agricultural imports are invariably 
utilised but the technology imports are often inadequately 
utilised or even left idle. In 1973 there was 1.5 billion
roubles of uninstalled foreign plant in the USSR and this
rose by 500% in the period 1974-1979. In 1983 in the
petro-chemical industry alone there was 845 million roubles 
of imported equipment lying unutilised (111) . The long and 
troublesome history of technology imports can be explained, 
in the most general terms, as a result of western 
production processes being designed with western technology 
and inputs in mind (112). Consequently, the transplantation 
of processes into an alien environment will only be 
successful if the quality and flow of inputs is guaranteed. 
Interestingly the importation of western technology 
demonstrates the point made earlier regarding comparable 
manning levels. Manevich has pointed out that in the
chemical industry, plant purchased from the west has led to 
the following manning levels; 1.5 times as many basic
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production workers; 3.5 times as many engineering, 
technical and administrative staff; 8 times as many 
auxiliary workers (113). Recent Soviet criticisms of 
technology imports suggest that domestic innovation may 
well be more effective in the longer term. There is also a 
further dimension, in that the USSR technologically 
inferior, or worse dependent upon the west, is undesirable 
for the ruling group on both strategic and propagandistic 
grounds.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, failure to innovate 
exacerbates the impact of Department 2 failures on the rate 
of mechanisation and automation within the Soviet economy 
(114).This problem has a number of dimensions.
TABLE 8: Percentage of Industrial Labour Force Employed in 
Manual Work.
1965 1972 ,1975 1979 1982
40.4 35.4 34.6 32.8 30.2 .
Sources: L.A.Kostin, "Trudovye resursy v odinnadtsatoi
pyatletke", Moscow, 1981, p.32; M.Ya.Sonin, EKO, 1977, 
No.4, p.5; L.A.Kostin, EKO, 1984, No.1, p.25.
Firstly, even though the number of mechanised shops, 
workplaces and enterprises is growing (115) and the 
proportion of manual workers has been consistently reduced 
as shown on Table 8, falling by more than 5% in the decade 
1972-82, the absolute number of manual workers at the
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beginning of the 11th Five Year Plan was still 40 million 
(116).
This problem is distributed unevenly throughout the 
economy. Danilov explains that the Central Statistical 
Agency classifies manual work in three forms;
1. manual labour where machines are utilised, for example 
loaders on conveyor belts.
2. manual labour without machinery, for example assemblers, 
auxiliary workers, loaders and unloaders.
3. manual adjustment and repair of machinery, for example, 
machine tool and equipment setters, repair mechanics (117).
The bulk of manual work is of the second category and is 
concentrated in particular industries like machine 
building, food and light industry and mining (118). Whilst 
70% of basic production is mechanised this falls to 50% in 
construction work (119); 29% for auxiliary production and 
22% for loading and unloading work (120). Only 20% of the 
work in the retail trade sector is mechanised and in 1983, 
in the RSFSR this sector only received 700 out of the 
required 3500, electrical loading devices (121). There are 
over 5 million people employed in heavy manual work 
connected with loading and unloading work alone (122). As 
Aitov pointed out, in the late 1970 's, 50% more people were 
employed in loading and unloading work in trade 
organisations than there were employed in foundry and 
metallurgy work (123). In agriculture the proportion of
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manual work is highest of all.
This poses two pressing problems. Firstly, unnecessarily 
large numbers of people are employed in relatively 
unproductive, unskilled manual labour with a consequent 
effect on overall rates of labour productivity. (This is 
made worse by the low level of technically substantiated 
norms in the sectors where manual labour is predominant, 
see section 6 below). Furthermore, while 6-10% of the basic 
workforce is unskilled this rises to 60% in the 
non-productive sector (124). It should be noted that 
employment in the non-productive sector has grown from
11.7% of the workforce in 1940 to 25.1% in the late 1970 's 
(125 ). This trend has continued and in 'the period 1979-1984 
employment in the non-productive sector (auxiliary, service 
and repair work) has grown by 33.8%, whilst employment in 
basic production has grown by only 12.7% (126). As already 
noted, the repair sector is a particular problem and at the 
beginning of the 11th Plan 3.9 million people were 
employed in repair work but only 400,000 of them were 
organised in specialist repair enterprises, therefore 
leading to considerable duplication, inefficiency and idle 
time (12-7). There is also a cost in terms of lost 
production as the following example suggests. In the late 
1970 's there were three times as many people and four times 
as much capacity engaged in making spares and repairing 
tractors as there were in basic production of new tractors 
(128). Furthermore, approximately 60% of construction 
workers are engaged solely in repair work (129).
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Secondly, as the majority of these workers are drawn from 
the older age groups as they retire they will have to be 
replaced. Younger people are unlikely to want this type of 
work as their expectations have been raised by education. 
For example, 90% of the migrants from the countryside now 
have secondary education and want more than unskilled 
loading work, hence there are problems of potential 
discontent (130). This will lead to the misplacement of
trained cadres and the combination of their frustrated 
expectations and heavy manual work will exacerbate labour 
turnover problems. The only real possibility is to 
mechanise these tasks but this process is itself
contradictory.
Even though Soviet commentators call for increased 
production of robotic equipment it is highly uncertain that 
this would lead to any vast improvement in Soviet 
industrial performance. Firstly, even though the stock of 
robotic equipment is increasing much of it is left 
unutilised for long periods of time (131) and approximately 
50% is left completely uninstalled (132). Secondly, 
successful utilisation of robotic equipment demands a
higher degree of production discipline than currently 
exists in the USSR (133). Thirdly, robotic equipment 
requires reliable, standardised high quality inputs if it 
is to function efficiently (134). Constant breakdowns and 
inadequate spare parts simply add to costs and
wastefulness. Furthermore, there is also evidence of worker 
hostility towards the introduction of robotic equipment and
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sabotage attempts against the devices have led, in some 
plants, to them being cordoned off from the workforce 
(135). It is likely that present Soviet robotic equipment 
is comparable to first generation simple manipulators which 
are technologically inferior to the third generation 
equipment now in increasing use in Western Europe, the USA 
and Japan.
A common complaint is that the design of Soviet robotics is 
not closely co-ordinated with industrial heeds and that 
single isolated units are wasteful and irrational (136). 
Parasyuk, points out that the allocation of new technology 
is often undertaken in a formalistic sense, simply to 
fulfil the plan for new technology, without thinking out 
the implications for the whole work environment (137).
Furthermore, as Aganbegyan suggests, machine building in 
general is declining in absolute physical unit terms and he 
identifies the cause of this problem as difficulties in the 
metallurgical industry (138). He points out that in a five 
year period between RIO and R12 billion were spent on 
repairs whilst only 5% of this amount was spent on 
developing this industry (139).
The disproportional mechanisation of basic production and 
auxiliary tasks is maintained because 80% of funds 
available to enterprises for mechanisation go on basic 
production and only 20% on
PAGE 87
auxiliary production and designers spend more time 
considering the mechanisation of basic production (140). 
However, measures to mechanise auxiliary production are 2.8 
to 3.5 times more effective than similar measures effecting 
direct production. For example, it has been estimated that 
R1 million spent on new technology will have the potential 
to release 137 people if spent on mechanising processing 
work; 170 people if spent on mechanisng foundry work; but 
476 people will be released if it is spent on transport, 
loading and unloading operations (141). In machine building 
itself it takes RIO,000 to free one manual worker from 
basic production but only R3,000 to free one auxiliary, 
worker (142). Enterprises tend to give a low priority to 
freeing auxiliary workers for two reasons. Firstly, freeing 
auxiliary workers will not necessarily make plan fulfilment 
any easier and may even impinge on it if it reduces the 
pool of labour available for tasks like harvesting work or 
construction assignments for the local Soviet. Furthermore, 
there is no guarantee if one enterprise acts in a* 
responsible way that others will follow its example. 
Secondly, the labour released is liable to be unskilled or 
relatively low skilled therefore, the advantage is' again 
minimised from the enterprise point of view. Unless the 
plan specifically penalises the enterprise there is no 
incentive to release auxiliary workers.
The low priority accorded to this problem at enterprise 
level is reproduced at the aggregate level. 
Organisationally, the machinery for auxiliary work is
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produced at 400 different enterprises which are the 
responsibility of 40 different ministries and only 15% of 
the output is centrally planned. Consequently, enterprises 
are forced to produce much of their own; requirements of 
auxiliary equipment and tools and estimates have suggested 
that approximately 75% of requirements are produced in this 
manner (143). This again is wasteful of capacity and 
reduces labour productivity. Manevich makes a similar point 
with regard to the production of specialised industrial 
instruments. In the machine building industry they are 
produced in 420 different plants, employing 460,000 
workers. However, if the work was rationalised and 
specialised the same volume of output could be produced by 
175,000 workers (144).
The desired impact of increasing mechanisation plus the 
introduction of industrial robots etc., is to increase 
labour productivity, labour discipline and release manual 
workers but this is problematic. Mechanisation in itself 
does not necessarily automatically bring these advantages. 
The mechanisation of production takes place within the 
context of a particular social system and it is this which 
determines the eventual- outcome of the process. For 
example, as already noted, the importation of western 
technology does not necessarily raise labour productivity 
nor produce comparable manning levels. Likewise as Dzokaeva 
points out the introduction of computers into accountancy 
sections does not necessarily lead to lower staff levels, 
less paperwork nor more efficiency (145). An example cited
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by Khromov, illustrates the point, that the re-tooling and 
re-equipping of Soviet enterprises need not diminish the 
workforce (146). In 17 refurbished Moscow enterprises 10 
envisaged an increase in the workforce of,on average,16%; 3 
had no plans for change; only 4 indicated a reduction in 
the workforce. Furthermore, once mechanised equipment is 
available it too needs to be utilised efficiently. Balashov 
points out, that in the USSR machinery is often used 
unnecessarily for jobs that could be accomplished better 
manually and the net result is more waste (147).
Mechanisation will only lead to a tightening of labour 
utilisation, increasingly intensive exploitation and a 
growing extracted surplus if the socio-economic mechanism 
forces that conclusion. If it does not then mechanisation 
may well lead to the more wasteful utilisation of capacity. 
Modern automated equipment needs to be utilised on a 3 
shift basis if it is to justify its costs of production 
however, shift coefficients in many sectors of the Soviet 
economy are low and declining (See Appendix A). This 
question will be returned to after a consideration of the 
complementary problems of declining labour productivity and 
labour discipline.
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SECTION 5: LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND THE SURPLUS
It was argued in Chapter 1 that the socially produced 
surplus can be expanded in one of two ways. Firstly, it can 
be expanded in the absolute sense by increasing the volume 
of labour inputs either by employing more people in the 
socialised sector of the economy or by increasing the 
length of the working day or the working week. Secondly, it 
can be expanded relatively by increasing the productivity 
of already employed labour, reducing necessary labour-time 
and extending surplus labour-time. During the course of 
economic development in the USSR these processes have 
operated simultaneously and growth in output is a result of 
both an increasing absolute and relative surplus (148). 
This is illustrated in Table 9.
TABLE 9: Growth in Industrial Production Accounted for by 
Productivity increases.
1st Five Year Plan • 51% 9th :Five Year Plan 84%
2nd Five Year Plan 79% 10th Five Year Plan 75%
War Years and 4th 69% 11th Plan (Planned) 90%
5 th Five Year Plan 68% 1981 (Actual) 62 %
6th Five Year Plan 72% 1982 (Actual) 61 Q.'Q
7 th Five Year Plan 62% 1983 (Actual) 80 Q.*o
8th Five Year Plan 73%
Sources: "Narodnoe Khozyaistvo", op.cit., p.36; V.Fil'ev,
op.cit., p.13; Vestnik Statistiki, 1984, No.4, p.69.
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However, the possibilities of increasing the absolute 
surplus have been much restricted since the mid-sixties. 
This is a result of a series of factors. Firstly, there has 
been a reduction in the natural growth rate of the 
population, even though the birth rate has risen recently, 
as indicated in Table 10.
TABLE 10: Birthrate, Deathrate and Natural Rate of
Population Growth (per 1000 population).
Birth Rate Death Rate Nat Growth
1940 31.2 18 13.2
1960 24.9 7.1 17.8
1965 ■ 18.4 7.3 11.1
1970 17.4 8.2 ' 9 . 2
1975 18.1 9.3 8.8
1980 18.3 10.3 8
1981 18.5 10.2 8.3
1982 18.9 10.1 8.8
1983 20.1 10.3 9.8
Sources: "Narodnoe Khozyaistvo", op.cit., p.30; Vestnik 
Statistiki, 1984,•No.4, p .67.
Furthermore, the average annual rate of growth of the 
number of workers in the economy as a whole, has continued 
to decline, as shown in Table 11.
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TABLE 11: Average Annual Growth Rate of Workers and
Employees Employed in the Economy (%).
1929 to 1932 20.6 1956 to 1960 4.4
1933 to 1937 13.4 1961 to 1965 4.4
1938 to 1940 5.9 1966 to 1970 3.2
1946 to 1950 7.2 1971 to 1975 2.5
1951 to 1955 4.4 1976 to 1980 2
Source: "Obshchestvennaya forma truda pri sotsializme", 
A.D.Smirnova and K.Sabo (Eds), Moscow, 1984, p.246.
When the industrial workforce alone is considered the 
decline in growth is even more stark, as Table 12 
indicates.
TABLE 12: Average Annual Rate of Growth of Industrial
Workforce.
1951 to 1955 
1956 to 1960 
1961 to 1965 
1966 to 1970
4.2 1971 to 1975 1.1
2.9 1976 to 1980 1.1
2.5 M19 8 2" 1.3
2 "1982" 1.1
Source: V.Fil'ev, op.cit., p.15.
The growth • in the population of working age was 
approximately 18% for the decade 1971-1980 but it is 
unlikely to exceed 4% in the decade 1981-1990 (149). This
has been accompanied by an increase in average life 
expectancy that has led to a change in the age structure of
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the population and consequently led to a larger proportion 
of the population reaching a pensionable age (150). 
Pensioners now number 50 million in comparison with 4 
million in 1941, 19 million in 1968 and 31 million in 1978 
and now account for almost 20% of the population (151).
Secondly, the flow of the surplus population from the rural 
areas to the towns has slowed appreciably. In the period 
1961-1970 the agricultural labour force was reduced by a 
yearly average of 240,000 workers but by the period 
1971-1977 this had fallen to 143,000 (152). The only
surplus rural population now identified by Soviet 
demographers is in the Central Asian regions (153). The 
question of surplus population is more complex and will be 
returned to in section 7 below.
Thirdly, the participation of women in the economy is high, 
see Table 13, and little further increase to the workforce 
can be expected from this source without for example, even 
larger social expenditures on nursery provision (154).
TABLE 13: Average Number of Women Workers and Employees in
the Economy.
Numbers in thousands As (%)
1940 13,190 39
1950 19,180 47





Distributed in particular sectors: Trade and Collective
Food provision 83%; Education 75%; Culture 74%; Public 
Health, Sport and Social Services 82%.
Source: Vestnik Statistiki, 1984, No.l, p.65.
A further possibility which has been discussed is an 
extension of out-work but the opportunities for this are 
limited to the production of simple goods and this cannot 
provide a long term solution (155). Attempts have also been 
made to draw pensioners back into production and pressure 
has been exerted on enterprises to encourage them to 
provide more opportunities for part-time work, whilst 
allowing the retert ion of pension rights, particularly for 
specialists (156). Even though the pensions of workers and 
employees have more than doubled in the period 1965-1980 
and risen by more than 230% for collective farm workers, 
surveys suggest that over 50% of pensioners would like to 
remain in social production and the vast majority suggest 
that this is for economic reasons (157). Of those who want 
to work 43% want part-time work while 7% would like to work 
at home but only 7 million pensioners are actually employed 
(158). The major difficulty is organisational and at the 
enterprise level it is proving difficult to provide the 
flexibility to arrange part-time work.
Increasingly, increments to the workforce depend upon young
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people being drawn into production, to some extent before 
they have finished their formal schooling (159). In 
1961-1965 they accounted for only 30% of new workers; by 
1966-1970 the proportion had risen to 57%; by 1971-1975 it 
had risen further to 92% and- the proportion is rising
(160). This has to be viewed against a background of
increasing reluctance, on the part of young people, to 
enter the world of work, with higher education being the 
preferred post-school route (161).
Attempts have also been made to increase the labour time 
expended in an absolute sense by the use of voluntary 
labour days, the results of which are ear-marked to improve 
social provision like health and educational facilities 
(162). However, this cannot be a lasting solution and is 
more symbolic than realistic. The real problem is not 
extensions of the absolute size of the workforce,
extensions of the working day or year, nor is the problem
demographic. The real problem is the ruling group's 
inability to increase the' relative surplus extracted from 
the already employed direct producers.
Labour productivity growth is the major method for 
attaining economic growth and from a Marxist perspective 
the ability of a social system to enhance the productivity 
of human labour is some measure of its progressive nature. 
Once again from a long term perspective Soviet achievements 
appear impressive and labour productivity has risen by a
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factor of fifty since the October Revolution (163). Since 
1940, the level of labour productivity overall, has risen 
more than eleven times, as illustrated in Table 6. It 
should be noted that overall levels of productivity have 
risen faster than the component parts due to the structural 
change in employment that occured in this period which is 
demonstrated in Table 14.
TABLE 14: The Relationship Between Employment in Industry, 
Agriculture and Construction (%)♦
1940 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1981
Total
Employment 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Industry and
Costruction 35 40 52.5 63 65.5 69 68
Agriculture 65 60 47.5 37 34.5 31 32
For every 100 
in Industry
Number in 186 150 90 58 53 43 42
Agriculture
Source: A.D.Smirnova and K.Sabo (Eds), op.cit., p.247.
A shift away from agriculture towards industry where 
productivity was higher, 'accounts for this feature (164). 
Again a number of elements are worthy of comment. Labour 
productivity has advanced more rapidly in industry than in 
agriculture and production of national income per worker is 
twice as high in industry as it is in agriculture (165). 
All the indices show a tendency towards stagnation. This 
needs to placed in some comparative perspective. Soviet 
statisticians have calculated that Soviet labour
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productivity is approximately 40% of the US level overall 
and this rises to 55-57% if industry is considered alone 
(166). Soviet labour productivity grew by a yearly average 
of 4.2% in the period 1971-1982, while in the UK the figure 
was 3.6% (167). The problem is that now growth via raising 
labour productivity is of prime importance, the rate of 
growth is slowing down. The pattern of declining annual 
labour productivity growth in industry is shown in Table 
15. The same pattern emerges when labour productivity 
growth is considered alongside industrial production and 
workforce growth over the last five Plan periods as in 
Table 16. As already pointed out, in Table 9, 'the planned 
increments to production to be achieved by productivity 
growth are not being met in the 11th Five Year Plan period. 
Furthermore, the decline can also "be demonstrated in 
relationship to the link between labour productivity and 
growth in the capital stock, as shown in Table 17. In 
comparison with other Comecon countries the USSR has both a 
lower labour productivity growth for a 1% growth in the 
capital stock and it has been declining consistently since 
the 8th Five Year Plan.
When industry is considered alone the average annual rate 
of growth of labour productivity was 6% in the 9th Five 
Year Plan (1971-75) but fell to 3.2% during the 10th Five 
Year Plan (1976-80) (168). During the first two years of
the 11th Plan (1981-85) labour productivity growth in 
industry was scheduled to rise by 6.3% but only actually 
grew by 2.7% in 1981 and 2.1% in 1982 (169) and by 1983,
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TABLE 15.
RATE OF GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY.
1 96 7 6 .7 1 973 6 .1 1 97 9 2 . 4
1 968 5 .2 197 4 6 .3 1 9 8 0 2 . 6
1 969 4 .8 1 97 5 5 .9 1981 2 . 7
1970 7 .0 1976 3 . 3 1 9 8 2 2 .1
1971 6 .3 197 7 4 . 0 198 3 3 . 5
1972 5 .2 197 8 3 . 6
S o u rc e : P .A . Khrom ov, o p . c i t . ,  p . 1 3 .  V .  F i l ' e v ,  
o p . c i t .  ,p . lS $ V e s tn ik  S t a t i s t i k i ,  1 9 8 4 ,
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although it had increased to 3.5% it was still well below 
planned levels (170). The significance placed upon labour 
productivity growth over the last ten years can be gauged 
from the following extracts from the Guidelines to the 10th 
and 11th Five Year Plans.
"To concentrate special attention on the accelerated growth 
of the productivity of labour, an especially important 
condition for the further development of production and an 
increase in the people's well-being. To guarantee through 
higher labour productivity 85-90% of the increment in 
industrial production, the entire increment in agricultural 
production and construction and at least 95% of the 
increment in the volume of rail cargoes" (171).
The 11th Plan reiterates these ambitious targets and aims,
"to raise the productivity of social labour by 17-20%, 
obtaining at least 85-90% of the increment in National 
Income in this way" (172) .
The 11th Plan calls for higher rates of productivity growth 
than those achieved in the 10th Plan but the results for 
the first two years show that, just as the 10th Plan failed 
to reach the planned increase, the 11th Plan appears to be 
heading the same way, see Table 9. The individual 
indicators, shown in Table 18, show the low rate of 
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plenary in November 1982, labour productivity was still not 
growing quickly enough (173). It should be remembered that 
a 1% increase in labour productivity in the agricultural 
sector yields a Rl milliard increase in output and a 1% 
increase in industrial labour productivity yields a R7 
milliard increase in National Income (174). By June 1983, 
Andropov was still arguing that,
"The key task in the economic sphere is an increase in 
labour productivity" (175).
There is however, a further dimension to this problem. The 
Plan Guidelines for 1981-85 stipulate that productivity 
growth in the economy must exceed wage'rises (176). In the 
10th Plan the relationship between wage rises and labour 
productivity growth did not maintain its planned 
proportions. As Karpukhin points out, the increase in 
average wages per 1% increase in productivity was 0.69%, 
rising to 0.84% when sums allocated to wage rises are 
included. In some sectors, coal mining for example, 
productivity fell but wages continued to rise and in a 
number of branches average wages rose faster than 
productivity growth (177). This situation has been 
replicated in the early years of the 11th Plan. In 1981 
labour productivity in industry grew by 2.7% and average 
wages rose by 2.3%, in 1982 labour productivity grew 2.1% 
and average wages rose by 3.5%. As Kostin has noted, the 
growth in the average wage has been 0.85% for each 1% 
increase in labour productivity in comparison with the
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planned growth of 0.63% (178). A later source, reproduced 
in Table 19, adjusts these figures for 1981-1982, but shows 
the clear tendency for labour productivity to decline and 
the increase in the average wage per 1% increase in labour 
productivity to rise.
As Andropov pointed out,
"wage increases that are not closely linked to increases in 
labour productivity will ...... ultimately have a negative
effect on all economic life" (179).
The negative effects refer to the further erosion of the 
incentive effects of money wages. If wages rise without 
comparable increases in production then they will not lead 
to access to use-values. Furthermore, this process will 
lead to a further erosion of the socially produced surplus 
if Soviet labour can continue to press average wages 
upwards and simultaneously retard productivity growth. 
Hence the pressure is on for increasing labour productivity 
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SECTION 6: THE CONTINUING PROBLEMS OF LABOUR DISCIPLINE
The antagonistic social relations of production, which form 
around the surplus extraction process in the USSR, express 
themselves most directly through a variety of labour 
discipline problems. These are central to the explanation 
of the slow down in economic growth provided in Figure 1 
and they need to be placed in context.
Firstly, they cannot be treated as a peripheral problem, as 
it was suggested earlier that they are by both Soviet 
political economists and their western acolytes. The 
Andropov discipline campaign, initiated only ten days after 
his election as General Secretary of the CPSU, indicated 
the centrality of these problems and their impact on 
economic performance. Andropov's analysis locates the 
source of the problems within the present .functioning of 
the socio-economic system.
"It is necessary to create the conditions, economic and 
organisational that will stimulate good quality productive 
labour, initiative and enterprise. Conversely poor work, 
idleness and irresponsibility must have an immediate and 
inescapable impact upon the remuneration, job status and
moral authority of personnel ....  We must wage a more
resolute struggle against all violations of state, party 
and labour discipline" (180).
The tenor of his comments indicates that those economic and
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organisational forms are absent and the correspondence 
between work and rewards is tenuous. Chernenko has in no 
way repudiated this analysis and when accepting his 
election as General Secretary stated,
"The question of organisation and order is a key 
fundamental question for us. Any disorderliness and
irresponsibility is costly to society ....  it is quite
natural that the measures the party has adopted with a view 
to improving labour, production, plan and state discipline 
.... have received truly nationwide approval" (181).
The present leadership recognises that declining 
productivity and the consequent poor economic performance, 
can only be reversed if workforce attitudes and practices 
are changed. This message is equally forcefully articulated 
in the speeches of Gorbachev since becoming General 
Secretary (182).
Secondly, these problems are not transitory. The theme of 
maintaining and improving labour discipline occurs 
continually in the writings and speeches of Chernenko and 
Andropov before him and reflects a modern tradition going 
back to the reforms of the mid-1960's (183). However, even 
though these problems have been identified they have proved 
resilient to both administrative efforts designed^ to combat 
them and attempts at moral exhortation and have been 
reproduced over time. The view that these problems would be 
alleviated as the economy and the workforce became more
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sophisticated seems unproven. In fact the impact and extent 
of the problems appears to be growing as a consequence of 
the increasingly sophisticated technology. For example, as 
Brezhnev pointed out, it is bad enough from a social point 
of view if a worker, provided with a shovel does not work 
consistently and well. The problem however, is magnified if 
the worker is operating sophisticated machinery (184). The 
social investment in the machinery, represents previously 
expended labour time which has been embodied in equipment, 
but which now fails to produce the expected increase in 
production. Therefore, the same infraction of labour
discipline now has a greater impact. As the previous
section indicated, it is precisely over recent plan periods 
that the decline in productivity growth has taken place.
Thirdly, these problems are not unique to the USSR but are 
replicated elsewhere in Eastern Europe (185), and in the 
capitalist west (186). It is therefore, feasible to argue 
that these problems are common to social systems based upon 
exploitative social relations of production and represent 
the common response of the direct producers. This is not to 
argue that the USSR (or the rest of Eastern Europe) is some 
variant of capitalism. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, 
exploitative relations of production occur in differing
modes of production and take particular forms. The question
is rather to understand the form the problems take, their 
impact upon the system, the methods by which the ruling 
group attempt to curb them and their degree of success in 
this endeavour. It is these relationships that determine
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the nature of the socio-economic system not the simple 
existence of labour problems. In a specific sense for this 
thesis, an understanding of these problems provides an 
explanation of the motives of the ruling group in 
initiating the Shchekino experiment, the form that it took, 
its later variants and the parallel experiments.
Labour problems in the USSR take a variety of forms all of 
which, regardless of cause or motivation, result in a 
reduction of the socially produced surplus. According to a 
survey of enterprise directors, cited by Kolodizh, they see 
labour discipline problems as the major constraint on 
raising production (187). Firstly, there are a series of 
problems concerning the length of the working day, all of 
which reduce the volume of expended labour-time and hence 
reduce the volume of the absolute surplus.
"A major reserve for raising labour productivity is 
strengthening labour discipline, cutting losses in 
labour-time • due to shirking and absenteeism, tardiness and 
premature' departure from work and inadequate organisation 
leading to overly long meal breaks" (188).
The statistical data available, according to idle-time 
records, suggests that this amounts to 0.1% of the working 
day per worker or between 1 and 2 minutes per day (189). 
However, as Sonin points out, the true picture of intra 
shift idle-time is not fully recorded and the recording of 
work-time losses generally is inadequate (190). The real
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losses only emerge from survey work and Soviet authors 
suggest that it might in reality be as high as 15-20% of 
the working day (191). A further estimate suggests that for 
every 100 Soviet workers 30 are absent from their place of 
work for an average of 1.6 hours per day (192) and at any 
time 1 million workers are idle at work (193). Volgin, 
reporting surveys carried out at 245 Moscow enterprises, 
comments that some enterprises only have 10% of their staff 
at work for the last hour of the working day (194). 
Rusanov, points out that even if idle time only accounts 
for 2.5-3 days loss per worker, per year, in industry this 
would amount to a loss of 91.5 million days (195). The 
significance of time losses is substantial and according to 
Soviet estimates saving 1 minute of labour time adds 1 
million roubles to production or is equivalent to the loss 
of a days work by 200,000 workers (196).
It is inadequate to ascribe these losses to human nature. 
The reasons have to be located within the work situation of 
the Soviet worker and the operation of . the economic 
mechanism. As has already been suggested labour discipline 
infractions need not necessarily affect the individual's 
access to use-values. Nor do they necessarily attract 
disciplinary sanctions from management, who can justifiably 
argue that it is better to have a worker who turns up late 
and leaves early than no worker at all (197).
One explanation that has been offered for these problems of 
attendance and time-keeping is the chaotic nature of the
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service sector. The necessity to queue and wait for repair 
services could provide an explanation for the time spent 
away from production and according to the survey cited by 
Volgin, .70% of workers taking time off claimed it was 
because services were unavailable when needed (198). 
However, this avoids the question of why the service sector 
is chaotic. As the respondents to the EKO's questionnaire 
on labour discipline pointed out, the root of the problem 
is poor organisation and labour discipline in this sector 
as well (199 ) .
It is not only part day losses that are important but also 
whole day absenteeism which again reduces the volume of 
expended labour time and the absolute surplus. This has 
been a long term problem in the USSR. For example Sosin 
estimated that in 1973 52 million man days were lost due to 
absenteeism (200) and Manevich cites a figure of 59 million 
for the previous year (201). Contemporary sources suggest 
that presently absenteeism accounts for about 20 days per 
worker per year (202), three quarters of which is due to 
sickness and one quarter simply due to non-appearance
(203). Sonin again complains that absenteeism is 
underreported and complains that time is often wasted on 
Party, Trade Union, Komsomol or local Soviet functions
(204). Varavka suggests that there are few checks on 
workers leaving the enterprise for fire brigade or militia 
duties and this form of absence is often spurious (205). 
Furthermore, management may well give approval for 
absenteeism on spurious grounds to either maintain their
PAGE 112
workforce or to compensate workers for overtime necessary 
because of storming and poor work organisation. (206). The 
combined result of absenteeism, idle-time within shifts and 
administratively authorised absence means that industry 
loses on average the labour of 170,000 workers per day 
(207).
Again the effects of the problems of absenteeism have to be 
viewed in the context of the economic mechanism. One of the 
results of idle time and absenteeism is that arhythmic work 
patterns are established which necessitate storming and 
overtime at the end of the month. The result of this, as 
one survey showed, is that conscientious workers ended the 
year with an average wage of 230 roubles per month whilst 
discipline violators, because of overtime working, were 
able to supplement their wage and had an average wage of 
226 roubles (208).
The example of the construction industry illustrates 
another aspect of this problem. Between 10-30% of the 
losses in work-time are due to discipline infractions and 
according to surveys one third of these problems are 
related to alcohol abuse (209).
Alcohol related problems affect both the absolute surplus 
and the relative surplus because -they are a major 
influence upon both absenteeism and productivity. Sonin, 
citing a suvey in Magnitogorsk points out that absenteeism 
is 3 to 3.5 times greater after holidays and pay days and
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is ususally drink related (210 ) . A review of the problem in 
Molodoi Kommunist points out that in 1925 11% of workers 
were chronic alcoholics but suggests that currently 3 7% of 
workers regularly drink to excess and this has contributed 
to the increase in death rates and the high level of 
industrial accidents (211). In the RSFSR a half of all 
fatal accidents and one quarter of all industrial accidents 
are drink related (212). Sosin, citing a survey in 
Krasnoyarsk, suggests that labour productivity in industry 
is 20-30% reduced on Mondays and days following holidays 
and pay days due to the effects of drink (213). Alcoholism 
is strongly related to absenteeism problems and it has been 
estimated that 1% of all industrial and construction 
workers are absent per day because of drink problems (214). 
A further study has suggested that 9 out of 10 cases of 
absenteeism are drink related and that a 10% increase in 
productivity would be achieved if on-the-job drunkenness 
could be eliminated (215). Furthermore, 46 out of every 100 
alcoholics begin their history of drink problems at work 
(216) .
In the conditions of an apparent labour shortage the 
unsolved problems of alcoholism result in problem workers 
simply moving from one plant to another. Again enterprise 
management may adopt the view that workers with drink 
problems are better than no workers at all (217). Zaigreyev 
even goes so far as to suggest that alcoholism is the 
source of the labour shortage problem (218). This is a 
simplification of a more complex problem that cannot be
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reduced to a single cause but alcohol related problems are 
a significant contributory factor.
Labour turnover presents the ruling group with a 
considerable problem that has long been recognised by the 
Soviet leadership (219). This problem affects both the 
absolute surplus and the relative surplus as it reduces 
both the absolute number of days worked but also reduces 
the intensity of that work for some period of time. The 
increasingly technological nature of the production process 
and the fragmentation of labour tasks which arises as a 
consequence, necessitates constant co-operation between 
individuals in production. A stable workforce, as well as 
providing continuity in production, will enable an 
accumulation of technical and production skills on a 
collective basis (220). Furthermore, this will provide, 
according to Soviet writers, the correct psychological 
environment within the enterprise, generating a collective 
ethos of self-discipline and achievement which will* be 
receptive to schemes aimed at increasing labour 
productivity, the quality of production or enhancing 
socialist competition (221) .
However, it has been estimated that currently labour 
turnover is in excess of 20 million persons per annum and 
this accounts for approximately 1/5 of the employed 
workforce, excluding collective farm workers (222). In some 
enterprises labour turnover is as high as 25-30% of the 
workforce per annum in comparison with the estimated
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desirable level of necessary turnover, defined by Soviet 
writers to be between 5% and 8% (223). The average time 
between jobs ranges from 30-31 days for industrial workers 
to 28 days for construction workers with consequent losses 
in production (224). It has been estimated that this rises 
to 2 months when migration between cities is involved 
(225). This is exacerbated by the decline in productivity 
that occurs prior to moving between jobs which it has been 
estimated at 15-25% for piece-rate workers and 50% for 
time-rate workers (226). Also there are losses in 
productivity during the settling in period in the new job 
which it has been calculated can take up to 3 months on 
average and results in a 10-20% reduction in productivity 
(227). To these losses have to be added the costs of 
retraining as over two fifths of those who change jobs also 
change occupation (228) . As Kostin notes, workers often do 
not master the skills of one job before moving on to 
another (229).
There are however, further problems as high levels of 
turnover undermine labour discipline in the enterprise. A 
shifting workforce will be more difficult to discipline and 
to motivate than a stable one and if spontaneous turnover 
is easy then disciplinary sanctions will be avoided by 
simply moving jobs. Furthermore, management, faced by 
apparent labour shortages will be less inclined to press 
disciplinary measures if workers simply leave and will 
understate personnel turnover when it occurs (230).There is 
also evidence that attempts at increasing the intensity of
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work by raising work norms leads to increased levels of 
turnover (231) .
Labour turnover also presents a significant regional 
problem and it has been estimated that labour turnover in 
Siberia and the Far Eastern regions is between 1.5 and 2 
times higher than in the European regions of the USSR 
(232). The problem is actually made worse by the fact that 
the USSR needs to encourage both inter-enterprise and 
inter-region flows of labour. The apparent labour shortages 
in both urban areas and Siberia, demand a degree of labour 
mobility but this needs to be planned and controlled if it 
is to be economically viable (233). The problem is that 
current labour turnover is largely unplanned and 
spontaneous. According to Maslova, the ratio of organised 
to individual forms of manpower redistribution is about 1:4 
and this rises to 1:9 in the case of regional 
redistribution (234). The problem is also acute in 
agriculture. Kostakov, provides an interesting example of 
the type of problem when he points out that in a decade 10 
million machine operators were trained but by the end of 
the decade the actual number employed had only risen by 1 
million (235) . (Given the disparities between urban and 
rural work, payments and living standards, outlined briefly 
in Chapter 1, this is not surprising).
From the point of view of the individual worker labour 
turnover may well be rational if he can materially improve 
his working conditions, living conditions or rewards.
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Kotlyar and Talalai suggest that between 30-50% of labour 
turnover, may well be rational from this perspective (236).
The labour problems identified so far, idle-time, 
absenteeism, alcoholism and spontaneous labour turnover, 
are the individualised response of Soviet workers to their 
position in the process of surplus extraction. They lack 
any meaningful direct control over production decisions,
they cannot organise independently in Trade Unions and 
cannot express discontent via a political process hence
their dissatisfaction in part, takes the form of 
spontaneous and individualised actions. The end result of 
this is that these responses amount to significant negative 
control over their own labour process as both the absolute 
level of labour time expended and its intensity is 
controlled by their actions. As Ticktin argues this degree 
of atomised control over the labour process is a direct 
corollary of the political atomisation necessary for the
maintenance of the Soviet ruling group and in a sense is
the price they pay for the form of political control they 
enjoy.
Survey work in the USSR confirms this perspective. For 
example, the reasons for labour turnover emerge clearly 
from the survey form issued by the State Statistical body 
in 1981 (237); dissatisfaction with occupation, poor work 
rbythm and organisation, heavy physical labour, monotonous 
work, poor work conditions, poor pay, poor or non-existent 
training, inadequate living, social and cultural conditions
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etc. These problems are confirmed by the localised survey 
work reported in the Soviet literature (238). Furthermore, 
the characteristics of these problems tend to vary in 
relation to the worker's age, marital status, sex, length 
of service etc., (239).
Compounding this, the lack of correspondence between work 
and eventual rewards reinforces this tendency for workers 
to vote with their feet or work as little as possible 
(240). The culmination of this activity is to contribute to 
the creation of an apparent labour shortage which further 
weakens management control and further exacerbates the 
vicious circle of problems. The irony of this is that the 
existence of an apparent labour -shortage encourages 
enterprises to compete for workers and poach from each 
other which further exacerbates the problems associated 
with spontaneous turnover (241). Before considering the 
question of labour shortages however, it is necessary to 
consider the central controlling mechanism in the surplus 
extraction process itself.
As pointed out in the opening chapter, all social systems 
based upon hierarchically ordered, exploitative relations 
of production are faced by the problem of ensuring that the 
direct producers actually produce an increasingly large 
relative surplus. In the USSR this antagonistic 
relationship between the ruling group and the direct 
producers emerges most clearly around the question of work 
norms. Work norms have a special significance as they are
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an attempt to control the pace and intensity of work and 
thus determine the volume of the surplus. Furthermore, they 
are the only method through which different types of 
labour, of differing complexity and in different branches 
of production, can be evaluated. This complex problem can 
best be explained via a comparison with capitalism.
Under the capitalist mode of production concrete labour, 
either unskilled, simple labour or skilled, complex labour, 
is reduced to abstract labour through the operation of the 
law of value. As already suggested, the existence of the 
market acts as the eventual arbiter of whether or not the 
expended labour time embodied in particular commodities is 
the average socially necessary for their production. This 
acts to regulate expenditures of concrete labour within 
capitalist firms. The efficient exploitation of human 
labour power will flourish whilst the inefficient will 
fail. Furthermore, it 'provides a means whereby different 
expenditures of concrete labour are reduced to their common 
essence and thereby made commensurable. The scope of this 
commensurability and the breadth of economic regulation is 
determined by the scope of the market and its freedom from 
external regulation, intervention and monopolisation. 
Abstracting from these layers of problems what has been 
identified is the underlying essential tendencies. 
Consequently, for the individual capitalist the regulation 
of labour time is not determined in an arbitrary manner but 
is consequent upon the externally generated compulsion to 
accumulate which operates through the law of value. A
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similar point was made earlier with regard to both negative 
control and wasteful production technique. This is not to 
argue that the capitalist labour process is free from its 
own contradictions and problems. Nor is it to suggest that 
the individual capitalist does not attempt to measure work 
or 'scientifically' control its pace. It is simply a 
recognition of the fact that his action corresponds to the
underlying logic of capitalism and his success or failure
will eventually be evaluated by the correspondence of his 
actions to this logic.
In the USSR however, the problem is qualitatively 
different. Given the social relations of production 
outlined in the early part of thia: chapter, the law of 
value does not and cannot operate internally and the state 
monopoly of foreign trade precludes its generalised 
penetration from the capitalist west. As a consequence
concrete labour, complex or simple, is not automatically 
reduced to abstract labour. Therefore, no spontaneous 
commensurability arises between different labour times, 
intensities or skill levels or indeed in terms of the
products produced, derived from the operation of purely 
economic forces. Labour is still the source of all value 
but the results of concrete labour are not expressed in a 
value form. This then raises two related questions: how is 
the commensurability necessary for economic calculation and 
control arrived at? Secondly, how is the pace and intensity 
of labour regulated in the absence of the operation of the 
law of value?
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The answer to both questions is via the medium of work 
norms which represent an attempt on the part of the ruling 
group to replace the spontaneous, unconscious regulation of 
the law of value with a different form of control. The 
intention is that the work norms should reflect the 
conscious regulation of the labour process and provide a 
basis for the payment of wages. As Kheifets, points out, 
the desired result of norming is to make wages and rewards 
correspond directly to the individual worker's expended 
labour and the end results of the collective's work (242). 
However, the setting of work norms is fraught with 
difficulties as they reflect the antagonistic nature of the 
social relations of production.
As Manevich suggests, there is a contradiction involved 
between the individual and social interests ( 243 ) . On one 
hand, as a member of a collective, the individual worker 
has an interest in improving output by working more 
intensively and conscientiously. Manevich's explanation of 
this would refer back to the assumption that the Soviet 
worker controls the productive process through his control 
of the state. As a consequence as the 'owner' of the means 
of production the worker would increase the intensity of 
his own labour. Of course, Manevich does not believe this 
and this can be seen from his explanation of the other pole 
of the contradiction.
On the other hand, for the individual this would lead to
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more work for the same rewards. Consequently, there is a 
tension between the ruling group's desire to extend and 
tighten the norming of labour and the direct producer's 
reluctance to accept this control. This problem is 
compounded by the composition of the norming committees 
(244). For the norms to be in any way realistic they need 
to be based upon the expertise and knowledge of the direct 
producers and therefore, over half of the members of the 
norming committee are workers. This leads to the 
possibility that workers will underestimate capacity if it 
is not in their interest to work harder. This contradiction 
is inescapable in the present context of the USSR.
Nevertheless, the necessity to increase the diffusion of 
work norms and extend the scientific organisation of labour 
(NOT) is agreed by all commentators but there are a number 
of elements to this question.
Firstly, it is not just a question of introducing norms but 
the nature of the norms themselves. There is a need to 
replace experimental-statistical (opytno-statisticheskie) 
norms by technically validated (tekhnicheskie obosnovanie) 
norms (245). As Manevich explains, the existence of the 
former accounts for the vast overfulfilment of plan targets 
by piece-rate workers, by as much as 200% in some 
instances, as the norms do not accurately reflect their 
productive capacities (246). Sonin suggests that the 
replacement of statistical-experimental norms for 
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lead to between a 3% and 5% increase in labour productivity 
overall (247). The diffusion of norms in general and 
technically validated norms in particular, throughout the 
1970's are shown in Tables 20,21 and 22. (The apparent 
progress these figures seem to suggest will be qualified 
below).
Secondly, there is the widely recognised need to extend 
norms throughout all branches of the economy and to all 
types of employee. The labour of piece-rate workers in 
basic production is, theoretically at least, easier to norm 
than those paid on time-rates. Yet it is this latter group 
who need to be controlled more closely as they have the 
wider degree of discretion. Furthermore, it is essential to 
extend norming into areas like auxiliary work, service and 
repair sectors where the nature of the work makes the 
calculation of norms both more difficult and more 
necessary. Parfenov points out that 3.5 million workers and 
2 million ITR have no norms whatsoever, particularly in the 
service sector and research (248) . As previously noted, the 
high manning levels in these sectors has been explained by 
the problems of norming this type of labour. The potential 
results of introducing norms into these branches was 
indicated by Baranenkova, who suggests that in the period 
1971-1975 the introduction of branch service norms into the 
auxiliary sector of the chemical industry resulted in
10,000 workers being released (249). There is also 
continuing pressure to norm the labour of ITR and employees 
whose work again can be difficult to quantify (250). There
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are however, further problems that the establishment of 
norms, even technically validated norms, do not resolve. As 
Kheifets argues, the quantity of norms may not be a 
reflection of their quality (251) . This has a number of 
elements.
Firstly, for work norms . to fulfil the ■function of 
rationally controlling expenditures of live labour and 
providing a basis for remuneration and economic calculation 
they need to be internally consistent and proportional. As 
Gavrilov suggests work norms must approach as closely as 
possible, the socially necessary expenditure of live labour 
(252). This however, presents a series of difficulties not 
least of which is the sheer complexity of the task. In 
Soviet industry there are 217 million individual work norms 
and in machine building alone there are 190 million that 
have to be administratively set (253). This poses an 
immense task of co-ordination to maintain proportionality 
and consistency.
For example, within a single enterprise all machinists 
operating the same equipment should have the same work 
norms and remuneration. So too should all other machinists 
in the same industry operating the same equipment. By 
extension all other machinists in other industries involved 
with similar work should have similar work norms and 
rewards. Then the consistency between labour expenditure 
and rewards would be maintained. This raises the problem of 
what is similar, and what criteria for evaluation should be
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adopted and how proportionality between more and less 
complex labour and its remuneration should be dealt with. 
In order to maintain consistency this suggests that it is 
necessary to have a centralised system of norm setting and 
this explains the pressure for norm setting from branch and 
inter-branch manuals coordinated from the centre (254). 
Kulagin points out that this is difficult as different 
enterprises have differing levels of technology, support 
services and organisation and therefore, he suggests that a 
decentralised system of norm setting should be adopted to 
reflect these difficulties (255). But if this is adopted 
the whole regulatory role of work norms becomes 
questionable. What you are left with is a series of 
localised work norms that reflect localised patterns of 
production and past work practices and investment 
decisions, this leads to different levels of rewards for 
the same objective expenditures of labour time. These 
disparities will lead to worker discontent if norms are 
perceived to be- unfair and, as has been suggested, to 
increasing labour turnover as workers move to enterprise 
where the same type of work yields the greater reward or 
the same reward at a lower intensity (256). It should 
however, be noted that inconsistent labour norms or some 
disproportionalities are better than no labour norms.
The second problem is that labour norms cannot be static, 
but must be continuously subject to scrutiny and upgrading. 
The reason for this is that the increasing dexterity and 
skill of the direct producers coupled with the the improved
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co-ordination and organisation of the workforce will 
increase the potentiality for. production. If work norms are 
to reflect the average socially necessary labour time they 
must change continually. As Kheifets suggests revision is 
often very slow or delayed completely (257). Manevich 
points out for example, that between 1969-1975 only 3.65% 
of output norms in the construction industry were revised 
or ruled to be obsolete ( 258) . As Pogosyan argues, the slow 
rate of norm revision, between 1-3% per annum, explains why 
plan overfulfillment of 150-200% can exist in some sectors 
particularly when it is linked to non-technically validated 
norms (259). However, the potential for increasing 
production and freeing workers is clearly demonstrated in a 
later article by Manevich, where he suggests that improved 
norming in the years of the 10th Plan released 1.7 million 
piece-rate workers (260). In the same period improvements 
in norms contributed between 0.6 to 0.8% to labour 
productivity growth and in some branches contributed as 
much as 2% to 2.5% (261).
The problem becomes even more acute when technological 
change is involved and the necessary revision of norms is 
not achieved fully or quickly enough (262). Bunich however, 
has pointed out that rapid revision of norms may well be 
irrational from the individual enterprise's point of view. 
If some branches or enterprises revise norms more rapidly 
than others they may well find they lose employees as a 
consequence (263). Low norms and higher pay for the same 
kinds of jobs makes hiring workers easier.
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The third problem is that even if technically validated 
norms are introduced they can be manipulated at the 
enterprise level by both managers and workers. Manevich has 
complained that managers operate a 'correction factor' 
which often nullifies the impact of the norms and it is 
rational for managers to manipulate norms in order to 
maintain their workforce at a suitable level. As Karpov 
pointed out, norms have more to do with the payment of 
wages than they have to do with the amount of work 
completed (264). Managers also manipulate norms in order to 
recompense workers for lay-offs which are management's 
fault, again in order to retain workers (265).
Furthermore, workers will work inside their real capacities 
even if the norms are set too low. Bunich complains that 
workers will try -not to surpass their targets by more than
5% as any greater overfulfilment will lead to uprating 
(266). The tenuous link between work and rewards encourages 
and makes this behaviour rational. It leads to an 
underestimation of enterprise capacity, no improvement in 
labour productivity and increased demands for labour.
What is being suggested is that work norms are essential 
because of the nature of the Soviet system but its
antagonistic nature contradicts and distorts their 
operation. No norm can ever be scientifically valid unless 
the direct producer controls all aspects of the labour 
process and production decisions. This would have to
include not just the pace and intensity of work but also
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fundamental decisions about what to produce, how to produce 
it and how to distribute the eventual use-values. Then the 
direct producer would have an unambiguous interest in 
directly validating ^every minute of his labour. Work norms 
would then be set by every producer/worker as a direct 
reflection of their self-interest. Norms set by any 
external body, (whether it is a multi-national corporation 
or the Central Norming Bureau of the USSR) can never be 
scientific if the worker has no direct control over them. 
The whole notion of scientific, in this context, is a 
mystification of the social relationship between the worker
and his work and the social group attempting to extract a
surplus.
The labour problems outlined in this section contribute to 
the decline in the rate of growth of labour productivity 
and the stagnation of economic growth experienced in the 
USSR. The problems reflect the antagonistic nature of the 
social relations of production and create the superficial 
appearance of an apparent labour shortage in the USSR. This
is considered in the next section.
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SECTION 7: THE SOVIET LABOUR SHORTAGE.
Soviet commentators and their western counterparts often 
refer to the Soviet labour shortage as a major contributory 
factor to the poor present performance of the economy and 
the slow down in economic growth (267). For Soviet writers, 
full employment is described as a basic law of the
socialist economy and is contrasted to the high and growing
rates of unemployment in the western capitalist economies 
as proof of the superiority of their 'socialist mode of 
production' (268) - The existence of significant labour 
shortages is usually overlooked in the theoretical material 
and is certainly not assigned a significant place in the 
political economy of the USSR. The extent and nature of the 
labour shortage can be gauged from Table 23. This indicates 
that in the years for which figures have been found, the 
number of workers and employees called for in enterprise 
plans, consistently exceeded the actual numbers of workers. 
In fact during the 9th Plan over 2 million workplaces were 
created that never reached their full complement of staff 
and in the 10th Plan the figure was 1 million (269).
The problem of labour shortages can of course be
exacerbated on a localised level by absurd planning
decisions with regard to the location of new enterprises. 
For example, Chernichenko cites the case of a new diesel 
manufacturing enterprise, which was built at a town with a 
total population approximately half of the enterprise's
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manpower needs (270). This created the need to transport 
workers in from the nearest larger town, (Yaroslav), which 
already had over 1000 vacancies, thus leading to 
unnecessary costs and further disproportions.
The apparent labour shortage also has a spatial element and 
is 60% greater in cities of over 1 million inhabitants, in 
comparison with cities of less than 1/2 million and this 
draws the population towards the larger cities (271). 
During the 9th and 10th Plans the growth rate of cities of 
over 1 million inhabitants was 2.5 times higher than the 
all-Union average. This obviously tends to place a larger 
burden on the social infrastructure of the cities, putting 
pressure on housing, health, education and transport 
facilities, as people migrate in the belief that‘ living 
standards will be better.
However, the labour shortage that develops either 
geographically or on the basis of poor planning decisions 
is not the prime problem. What is identified in Table 23, 
is a persistent systemic generation of labour shortage. 
Kostin suggests, that there are now more than 2 million 
vacant jobs in the USSR and between 0.75 . and 0.8 million 
new workers are required each year for new enterprises 
(272). In the crucial machine building sector for example,
200,00 0 machine tools stand idle because of manpower 
shortages and in agriculture approximately 50% of trucks 
are unmanned (273).
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Recently labour economists, writing from a more practical 
perspective, have begun to argue that the labour shortages 
are non-existent and that the problem is one of rational 
labour utilisation but nevertheless the notion of 
demographic problems underpinning economic problems still 
persists (274). The concepts of labour shortage and labour 
surplus have a dubious theoretical value unless carefully 
defined. They are not naturally occurring phenomena stemming 
from abstract, ahistorical laws of human reproduction. As 
Marx pointed out, during his comprehensive critique of 
Malthusian population theory,
"An abstract law of population exists for plants and 
animals only, and only in so far as man has not interfered 
with them" (2.75) .
Consequently, the idea of a surplus population, which 
Malthus explains as a consequence of humanity reproducing 
itself on the basis of a geometric series and the 
reproduction of the means of subsistence on the basis of an 
arithmetric series, is for Marx,
"a historically determined relation, in no way determined 
by abstract numbers or by the absolute limit of the 
productivity of the necessaries of life, but by limits 
posited rather by specific conditions of production" (276).
The total population is that developed upon a specific 
production basis and surplus population, changes in yarious
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historical conditions (277). The surplus population 
however,
"is purely relative: in no way related to the means of 
subsistence but rather to the mode of producing them" 
(278 ) .
Marx's argument is that within the process of surplus 
extraction, which is central to the laws of accumulation 
under capitalism, there is a mechanism operating that 
produces the appearance of a relative surplus population.
"Since the necessary development of the productive forces 
as posited by capital consists in increasing the relation 
of surplus labour to necessary labour, or in decreasing the 
portion of necessary labour required for a given amount of 
surplus labour, then, if a definite amount of labour 
capacity is given, the relation of necessary labour needed 
by capital must necessarily, continuously decline, i.e. part 
of these capacities must become superfluous, since a 
portion of them suffices <to perform the quantity of surplus 
labour for which the whole amount was previously required"
(279).
The consequence is that the same external mechanism that 
forces the capitalist to accumulate, simultaneously through 
its operation, creates a relative surplus population. 
However, the relative surplus population is not simply the 
result of the accumulation process but it is also a
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precondition for its functioning and a necessary condition 
for the existence of the capitalist mode of production
(280). The industrial reserve army, or relative surplus 
population, acts to discipline those in work and weaken 
their organisation but it is also necessary to allow the 
continual expansion of the mode of production. It provides 
literally a reserve from which the capitalist may draw 
hands as they are required,
"The course characteristic of modern industry ....... of
periods of average activity, production at high pressure, 
crisis and stagnation, depends upon the constant formation, 
the greater or lesser absorption and the reformation of the 
industrial reserve army or surplus population" (281) .
Therefore, what is being suggested is that the concept of
surplus labour is contingent upon the mode of production.
/ _
Under capitalism the’ relative surplus population is a
necessary condition for and natural result of the
accumulation process. It can neither be reformed nor wished
away. The logic of the process is such that at particular
points in time its size may fluctuate but the tendency for
its reappearance is ever present in the surplus extraction
process. Consequently, a historically determined link
exists between the production base, the technological
level, and the phase in the cycle of accumulation that
under capitalist social relations of production produces
the working population and its constituent working and
non-working parts. The actual relative surplus population
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at any time is a function of the interpenetration of these 
causes.
What are the implications of this analysis for the USSR? 
The first point to be made is that the appearance of labour 
shortages in the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, 
cannot be considered as natural phenomena but rather they 
are the result of the specific, historically determined 
social relations of production in those socio-economic 
systems. As has been continuously stressed throughout this 
chapter, the USSR is not subject to the same laws of motion 
as capitalism and consequently the accumulation process 
does not take the same form. The existence of a surplus 
extraction process, conditioned by external, unambiguous 
economic forces, acting upon formally free but 
contractually and economically tied individuals, is absent 
in the USSR. Consequently, the automatic pressures to 
economise necessary labour time and expand surplus labour 
time are absent. The contradictions inherent in capitalism 
that generates an industrial reserve army and creates, what 
Marx describes as, "the non-working worker", are absent in 
the USSR. However, a different set of contradictions exist 
and generate a tendency towards a relative labour shortage.
The central point is that the ruling group's inability to 
control the surplus extraction process leads to the 
conclusions outlined in Figure 1 above. Their inability to 
revolutionise the means and methods of production in the 
agricultural, industrial and service sectors of the economy
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leads to, by international comparison, high labour 
intensity, low and declining labour productivity, 
overmanning and apparent labour shortages. For example, in 
machine building it has been estimated that Soviet 
enterprises employ between 30 and 50% more staff than 
comparable capitalist firms (282). In engineering a 
comparison with comparable West. German plants shows that 
while 11%. of the West German workforce is occupied in 
repair and transport work this figure rises to 38% in the
L.
USSR (283). In chemical plants in the USSR 3 to 4 times as 
many design staff are employed in comparison with similar 
German and Japanese plants etc (284). The planning process 
and success indicators have simply reinforced the problem 
as enterprise management have - hoarded labour, 
underestimated plant capacity and inflated their demands 
for labour in order to be successful. Soviet estimates 
suggest that enterprise managers could free between 15% and 
30% of their staff with little or no effect upon the volume 
of production (285).
Furthermore, the wasteful nature of production reinforces 
these tendencies. If goods are produced that yield no 
use-value and if there is no mechanism to either halt this 
inefficient production nor reallocate the resources 
involved, then it will be necessary to hire more workers 
elsewhere to produce more, hopefully useful, goods. As the 
problem is reproduced the labour shortage deepens. 
Therefore, the economic mechanism overall exhibits a 
tendency to create conditions of labour hoarding, creating
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a relative shortage, rather than the tendency under 
capitalism to shed labour, causing a relative surplus.
Subjectively the ruling group has recognised the problem 
and intervened administratively to attempt to gain control 
over the process of surplus extraction but the 
intervention, for example through the uprating of plan 
targets, simply heightens the uncertainty felt by 
management and exacerbates the problems the intervention is 
attempting to resolve. For example, the chaotic state of 
the material supply system coupled with delays and changes 
in plan targets contributes to the arhythmic nature of 
production and this makes labour hoarding rational. The 
arhythmic nature of production also indicates the degree of 
overmanning. Khromov cites the example of a Moscow 
enterprise where in the first ten days 16.9% of the month's 
work is completed; in the second ten days 21.9% is 
completed; and in the last ten days 61.2% is completed
(286). This is not atypical and as he points out, only 
where there are significant manpower reserves can between 
2/3 and 3/4 of a month's work be completed in ten days
(287). Furthermore, the bureaucratic nature of planning 
itself gives rise to large administrative burdens, which 
are often irrational, and this leads to a growing need for 
administrative workers, further exacerbating the labour 
shortage (288).
The apparent labour shortage also acts upon labour 
discipline and turnover, as suggested above, and further
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weakens managerial control, reduces labour productivity and 
further negates the centre's intentions of increasing the 
surplus (289). The apparent labour shortage therefore, 
reproduces itself over time and is a feature of the
inherently wasteful and unplanned process of surplus
extraction. But it is more than this. It is both a result 
and the cause of the ruling group's lack of control over 
the process and is a testimony to the workforce's negative 
control.
This leads to a further question with regard to the nature 
of planning in the USSR. Soviet plans are intended to be 
rational, proportional and balanced. The plan for labour 
inputs is intended to reflect the size of the working
population, its age and sex structure, the dynamic nature 
of changing education and skill levels and the law of
growing labour productivity and it is intended to be in 
harmony with the plan for output (290). However, the 
appearance of labour shortages suggests that the plan is 
not harmoniously based upon the productive capacities of 
the economy but is in fact a set of externally determined 
targets. If the plan is a set of arbitrarily set targets 
then the notion of a labour shortage makes some sense but 
then the Soviet plan cannot be described in any meaningful 
sense as a plan. It is something reified and external to 
the direct producers and even to enterprise management. It 
is inadequate to suggest that the problem simply arises due 
to the complexity and size of the task as it is continually 
reproduced as part of the political economy of the system.
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The idea that the first 'planned' economy depends for its 
economic success or failure on the labour of old-age 
pensioners and the ability of Soviet women to produce more 
children shows the degree to which the concept of planning 
has to be stretched to accommodate the current Soviet 
economic mechanism. It would be more accurate to describe 
the economy as bureaucratically administered, by a ruling 
group whose economic instability allows a hitherto unheard 
of degree of negative control to the direct producers, 
which: in turn generates the apparent labour shortages.
It also calls into question the idea that the USSR 
represents a higher mode of production, in however a 
degenerated or distorted form. Marx :.after all identified 
capitalism's progressive function as its ability to 
revolutionise the material basis of production and 
consequently raise labour productivity. Therefore, a social 
system which is not capitalist but is technologically 
backward in comparison, that imports technology from 
capitalism and that is only able to raise labour 
productivity at a declining rate and is still seeking 
growth in the absolute surplus can hardly be described as a 
higher mode of production however sophisticated the 
caveats.
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SECTION 8: A BRIEF DIGRESSION ON THE.THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF
LABOUR SURPLUS AND SHORTAGE.
The question of labour shortages or surpluses can also be 
briefly considered on a more general and abstract level. If 
we consider an isolated individual in some habitable space 
(perhaps. the desert island so popular in classical 
political economy) we can abstract from the specificities 
of both capitalism and the USSR. The individual we will 
assume, is not a Robinson Crusoe figure who has come from 
an advanced mode of production to a more primitive world, 
'but an individual with no prior knowledge of economic or 
productive potentialities. For our isolated individual 
production occurs on the basis of his own expended labour 
time, acting upon the 'free gifts of nature' available to 
him. The individual will produce use-values to satisfy his 
own wants, which will be generated initially by 
physiological needs. His capacity to satisfy these needs 
will regulate his labour-time in correspondence with the 
level of technique and the available resources. In these 
circumstances both techniques and needs will be altered 
through experience. The individual's work activity will 
involve a learning process that will modify both needs and 
the means to satisfy them. However, in these circumstances 
there is no possibility of either a labour shortage or 
labour surplus developing because the expenditure of human 
labour time will be directly regulated by the individual's 
needs. Surplus labour is a concept with no relevance to
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this situation because if the potential labour time 
expended is greater than that necessary to satisfy his 
needs then it can simply be curtailed and turned into 
leisure time. The intensity of the individual's labour is 
therefore, determined by his needs which develop as his 
abilities to produce develop. Equally there can be no 
possibility of a labour shortage because the individual 
cannot conceptualise production on the basis of anything 
but his own capacities to labour. Certainly these will 
change through time but no conception of a labour shortage 
can develop.
It is in this respect that the isolated individual above 
differs from Robinson Crusoe. He was able to conceptualise 
production over and above his own labour capacities and he 
could envisage a form of labour organisation that could 
provide it. Therefore, objectively he did experience a 
labour shortage as his perception of his needs exceeded his 
ability to fulfil them. Those needs however, were 
generated in the context of a different social system and 
were never dependent upon his own expenditures of 
labour-time alone. They were based upon a mode of 
production that relied upon a form of labour organisation 
that was exploitative and produced a surplus for the class 
of. owners. The eventual resolution of this problem for 
Robinson Crusoe was the relationship with Friday as he 
extracted a surplus from Friday's labour. Interestingly, 
this relationship was initially based upon force but 
eventually became more subtle as Friday was incorporated,
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to some extent at least, into Crusoe's consumption 
patterns.
To generalise further, it is only when exploitative social 
relations of production exist that the possibility of 
labour shortages can begin to develop. Once the concept of 
utilising the surplus labour of the direct producers for 
the benefit of a class of surplus extractors develops then 
the need for an increasing pool of direct producers becomes 
apparent. This is true both in conditions of slavery and 
feudalism. However, implicit in these relationships is the 
possibility of generating a relative surplus population.
It is the divorce of production, based upon the needs of 
the direct producers, from individual control over 
labour-time that creates this possibility. Objectively each 
individual has the capacity to be both producer and 
consumer, adding to both the productive potential of the 
society and the claims made upon that production. 
Consequently, there cannot be a surplus population unless 
the social relations of production make the production of 
means of subsistence subordinate to some other law than 
necessity. This is indeed the case under the capitalist 
mode of production where profitable accumulation is that 
law, achieved through the surplus extraction process.
Equally, a labour shortage can only come into existence 
when the needs of the direct producers and their control 
over their own labour time is disrupted. In the USSR the
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exploitative relations are not subject to the law of value 
but equally are not regulated by need. Consequently, the 
indirect control of the direct producers manifests itself 
as apparent labour shortages. Only when harmony between 
needs and control over labour-time is achieved would it be 
possible to talk of full employment, individually regulated 
and controlled by the needs of the direct producer.
It has been argued therefore, that the political economy of 
the USSR is such that the ruling group has reached an 
impasse. To reproduce itself it requires a guaranteed and 
usable surplus yet the contradictory social relations of 
production upon which its position rests, produces 
circumstances that make this difficult to achieve.The 
indirect negative control exerted by the workforce 
undermines this aim.
Nothing has been said thus far, concerning 1 the occurrence 
of direct worker activity in the form of strikes, 
co-ordinated go-slows and demonstrations etc. The reason 
for this is that by its very nature, evidence of this type 
of activity is fragmentary and often disputed (291). More 
importantly however, the existence or non-existence of 
these types of activity is not crucial to the general 
thesis being presented. They represent powerful and 
concentrated evidence of the underlying antagonisms within
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the social system, (as they do under the capitalist mode of 
production) but they are not the only form of class 
struggle (this is also the case under capitalism). When 
strikes for example, do occur they are usually localised 
and harshly repressed (292). This in itself is a reflection 
of the nature of the system because in the absence of 
independent Trade Unions or political parties, worker's 
resistance will either be individualised or spontaneously 
explosive. It is a reflection of the antagonistic social 
relations of production in their specific Soviet form.
The preceding analysis therefore, suggests a central 
problem for the ruling group. In the absence of the law of 
value there exists no unambiguous regulator of economic 
activity that can simultaneously discipline both the 
workforce and enterprise management and at the same time 
maintain the ruling group's privileged positon. Regulation 
that does exist comes via a 'planning' process, that is 
inherently conditioned by. the self-interest of enterprise 
managment and the negative pressure of the workforce. This 
necessitates continual bureaucratic intervention from the 
centre, which in turn reinforces the problems that generate 
the need for intervention in the first place. What appeared 
necessary to the ruling group was a shift away from the 
extra-economic, political control that existed to economic 
forms of control that would neither destabilise its 
position by provoking popular discontent but which would 
simultaneously increase its control over a usable surplus
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and allow the incorporation of sections of the society and 
thus stabilise its political hegemony. The attempts by the 
ruling group to reform the economic system, from the 
mid-sixties onwards are part of this dynamic and represents 
their search for stability.
It is against this background that the experimental 
initiatives must be viewed. The Shchekino experiment was 
essentially an attempt to resolve the problems identified 
in this chapter, specifically labour shortages, declining 
productivity, labour indiscipline etc. The aim was to deal 
with these problems of labour organisation at the level of 
the enterprise and simultaneously incorporate sections of 
the workforce by the stimulation of worker's self-interest. 
It is to the experiment itself that the next chapter turns.
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CHAPTER 3: THE SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT.
The aim of this Chapter is to reassess the nature and 
operation of the experiment initiated at .the Shchekino 
chemical plant in Tula in 1967. The chapter will present an 
idealised model of the experiment's operation and will 
consider the experiment's results within this framework. 
The variants of the experiment that emerged in this early 
period will also be considered. This chapter deals with the 
early period of the experiment, from its inception in 1967 
until 1973. The reason for the delineation of this period 
is twofold. Firstly, it corresponds to the period 
considered by Soviet sources, to represent the successful 
years of the experiment, both at Shchekino itself and in 
terms of its extension to other enterprises (1). Secondly, 
these are the years considered by the major western text 
concerning the experiment and the intention is to provide a 
re-appraisal of the nature of the experiment and provide an 
alternative explanation of these early apparently 
successful years (2).
The following chapter will consider the period from 1973, 
through the legislative changes of 1977/1978/1979 up until 
the present. The second period is characterised at the 
outset, by diminishing interest in the experiment but 
increasing pressure for its generalisation. The period 
1977-1979 represents another watershed in the history of 
the experiment as considerable doubts arose about the 
performance of the Shchekino plant itself and the
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possibilities of fully generalising the experiment (3). 
This resulted in a series of attempts to introduce new 
conditions for the implementation of the experiment, in 
1977 (4) and 1978 (5) which finally culminated in the 
planning resolution of 1979 (6). The success of these
changes, in the post-1979 period will also be considered in 
the next chapter.
A review of the early period of the experiment can be 
justified on a number of grounds. Firstly, the detailed 
empirical work published on the Shchekino plant and the 
other enterprises that initiated the experiment in this 
early period, can be utilised to illustrate and verify the 
theoretical propositions advanced in the first section of 
this thesis. In this way the continuity of the problems, 
that it was argued underpin the political economy of the 
USSR, can be illustrated. Secondly, with the aid of 
hindsight the early period can be more clearly understood 
and the tendencies implicit in the early years of the 
experiment's operation can be more easily extracted. 
Thirdly, it is intended to evaluate the empirical evidence 
and present a counter argument to those which are commonly 
advanced, in both the Soviet and western academic 
literature, regarding the motivation for, and eventual 
impact of, the experiment. It is to be argued that the 
Shchekino experiment was the result of the particular 
contradictions within the Soviet labour process and that 
these contradictions determined and modified its operation 
and conditioned its eventual impact. Before considering the
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early years of the experiment a brief survey will be 
provided of non-Soviet views of the implementation of the 
experiment.
SECTION 1: WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF THE SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT.
Virtually all western commentators adopted a similar 
initial reaction to the experiment and welcomed its 
introduction, although often for quite different underlying 
reasons. Advocates of economic reform in the USSR saw the 
experiment as a desirable and logical supplement to the 
other reforms of the mid-sixties (7). Advocates of a market 
socialist model of economic regulation, for example Brus, 
viewed the labour allocation mechanism as particularly 
amenable to the introduction of market forms (8). The 
experiment could be viewed as a step in this direction that 
would not only stimulate individual productivity but would 
also potentially, increase labour mobility and lead to the 
creation of a more flexible labour market. The fate of the 
experiment therefore, should shed some light on the 
possibilities for market socialism as a viable form of 
economic regulation in the USSR. This question will be 
returned to in the final chapter of the thesis after the 
experience of the experiment has been outlined.
For those commentators who believe, along with Von Hayek 
and Von Mises (9), that it is only via market forms that 
rational resource allocation can be achieved, the 
experiment was also welcomed. Wiles for example, recognised
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the experiment's potential as a first stage towards the
reintroduction of unemployment and a degree of rationality 
into economic affairs, even if he was sceptical about the
extent and scope of the experiment (10).
For pro-Soviet, western commentators the experiment was not 
seen as a movement towards any form of market socialism. It 
was explained as an experiment that promoted the further 
technical refinement of the economic mechanism with little 
or no implication for the underlying political economy of 
the system (11).
The introduction of the experiment was criticised from some 
quarters and the most bitter condemnation came from Chinese 
sources, for whom the introduction of the experiment 
represented proof of the restoration of capitalism in the 
USSR (12). The (then! standard Chinese textbook of
political economy characterised the experiment as
"Taylorist", with a suitable quote from Lenin attacking the 
iniquities of the Taylorist logic, and described the 
experiment as suited to the "demands- of the Soviet, 
revisionist, bureaucratic, monopoly bourgeoisie" (13). For
writers in the state capitalist tradition the experiment 
can be similarly explained in terms of the logic of 
capitalism in its state capitalist form (14).
These two critical viewpoints are however, inadequate. 
Neither of them address the problem that if the USSR is 
some variant of capitalism or simply restored capitalism,
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why is it then necessary to implement this type of reform? 
Given that the specific nature of capitalism implies the 
existence of the law of value as the mechanism of control, 
why should an initiative of the Shchekino-type be 
necessary. To pose the question slightly differently, what 
sort of capitalism is it that has no labour market, where 
labour is not free in the dual sense described by Marx and 
where labour power is not a commodity? Secondly, they fail 
to examine the experience of the enterprises that undertook 
the experiment and fail to see that this does not support 
the notion of any form of capitalism existing in the USSR.
Delamotte, however, has presented the most comprehensive 
description of the early years of the experiment. His 
explanation of the motivation for the experiment is based 
upon a series of features of the Soviet economy and society 
at this period of time. The combination of potential labour 
shortages, due to demographic changes, already evident in 
the mid to late sixties, with overmanning and low labour 
productivity, by international comparison, are cited as the 
prime motives (15). What Delamotte does not do is show the 
interrelationship of these elements nor their derivation 
from the antagonistic contradictions of the socio-economic 
system and the necessity, from the point of view of the 
ruling group, to introduce Shchekino-like initiatives. He 
locates the experiment within a theoretical framework which 
is based upon a view of convergence between the Soviet and 
western industrialised economies. The logic of 
industrialisation, determined by common technology and
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particular techniques of production (particularly 
production line methods) is invoked to explain common 
problems that emerge with regard to worker satisfaction and 
its negative impact upon labour productivity, product 
quality, etc. The Shchekino experiment is viewed by 
Delamotte as part of the wave of job-enrichment schemes 
that emerged in the late sixties and early seventies in the 
west, and is the Soviet variant (16).
Superficially there are some similarities between the 
Shchekino experiment and the western examples cited by 
Delamotte. However, the problem with this analysis is that 
it fails to explain the motivation for these experiments 
within the specific political economies of the respective 
social systems. Shchekino, I would argue, was the result of 
very different pressures than for example, the scheme 
introduced at Volvo (17). Furthermore, the experience of 
the enterprises over time, both in the USSR and the west, 
was refracted through totally different social contexts and 
led to quite different results. The introduction and 
success of innovatory changes in the labour process in the 
west are determined by a series of forces, like the level 
of unionisation and collective response, the overall state 
of the world economy (boom or slump), the level of 
competition in the particular industry and the state of 
local labour markets. It will be shown that in the USSR a 
different series of criteria explain the introduction of 
experimentation in the first place and condition the 
eventual results.
PAGE 172
In order to comment upon these interpretations and the 
Soviet views of the experiment, it is necessary to review 
the form the experiment took in the early years and the 
initial results.
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SECTION 2: A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE NATURE OF THE SHCHEKINO
EXPERIMENT.
The introductory section of this thesis outlined a 
political economy of the USSR that was based upon, and 
sought to explain, the interrelationship between, a series 
of contemporary Soviet problems that have given rise to 
declining economic performance. The continuity of these 
problems over time can be demonstrated by considering the 
reasons suggested by Soviet sources, in the. late sixties, 
for the implementation of the Shchekino experiment.
Shilin for example, cites the following reasons; 
insufficient growth in labour productivity, low intensity 
of resource utilisation, particularly in the auxiliary and 
service sectors of Soviet industry (18); the imbalance as a 
consequence, between the numbers involved in basic 
production and in auxiliary and service sectors, 
particularly by international comparison (19); the decline 
in natural population growth, coupled with the exhaustion 
of the agricultural surplus population, implying the 
necessity to develop socio-economic mechanisms to speed the 
introduction of new technology and free previously 
underemployed labour (20).
The specific choice of the chemical . industry is well 
explained by both Shilin and Delamotte (21). A s  Delamotte 
points out the aim of the 7th Five Year Plan had been to 
"chemicalise" the economy and to show the importance of
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this sector he quotes Krushchev's addition to Lenin's 
famous dictum,
"If Lenin were alive he would certainly say Communism is 
the power of the Soviets plus the electrification of the 
country plus the chemicalisation of the economy" (22).
The continued development of the chemical industry was 
essential as it provided intermediate inputs for many other 
sectors of the economy plus providing finished products 
that were exported to other socialist states. Perhaps more 
important however, is the relationship between the output 
of the chemical industry and the agricultural sector. 
Reference has already been made to the problems of this 
sector (23) and an increased output of chemical fertilisers 
could potentially increase crop yields, expand the 
cultivated and cultivatable area, increase agricultural 
productivity and output, free labour for more productive 
sectors of the economy and provide more consumables to aid 
the operation of incentive systems, as suggested in Figure 
1 (24). Furthermore, the chemical industry was .in receipt 
of significant amounts of imported plant,- equipment and 
machinery hence the desirability of rationalising labour 
organisation within the chemical industry to utilise more 
efficiently the scarce and costly foreign equipment, 
raising shift coefficients and not allowing this equipment 
to lie idle (25). The intention was presumably, to attempt 
to replicate western manning levels with a hoped for 
knock-on effect to other sectors. How successful this was
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will emerge later. Apart from these latter two points, 
which were perhaps more specific in the case of the
chemical industry, the problems facing the industry were 
broadly similar to other sectors of the economy. Namely, 
labour shortages, lax labour discipline, high unplanned 
labour turnover, under-utilisation of capacity as a
consequence etc.
The choice of the Shchekino plant is also explained by 
Shilin and Delamotte and they both provide a brief history 
of the plant's performance (26) and cite as particular 
reasons the under-utilisation of fixed capital, which makes 
costs of production rise by as much as 50% as a
consequence, levels of labour productivity below that 
planned, and over-manning in comparison with comparable 
western plants. What they do not note is that in the Spring 
of 1967, six months prior to the implementation of the 
experiment, personnel chiefs from Shchekino went to their 
ministry in Moscow to ask for permission to hire an 
additional 400 workers (27). This was not to expand 
production but to simply keep the plant operational and 
attempt to increase the level of capacity utilisation. 
However, in less than a year the plant had effectively 
overcome the need for new labour and begun to shed existing 
labour resources (28). This dramatic turn around
effectively economised 1000 workers in the first twelve 
months of the experiment's operation, the 400 additional 
workers requested plus those actually released in the first 
year. This can be explained by the nature of the experiment
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and its immediate results.
The overall aim of the experiment was to raise labour 
productivity (29) and although theoretically this could be 
achieved by a variety of means, the experiment adopted at 
the Shchekino enterprise marked a novel departure for the 
Soviet economy at this time. The aim of the experiment was 
to tie the remuneration of the Shchekino workforce more 
closely to the enterprise's performance, strengthening the 
weak link between work and rewards already noted (30). This 
in itself was not novel as all previous incentive schemes, 
introducing premiums, bonuses etc., had had this as their 
ultimate objective. The novelty of the Shchekino 
experiment, and its potential importance for the rest of 
the Soviet economy, facing supposed labour shortages, 
stemmed from the source of the material incentives. The 
experiment was based upon the internal rationalisation of 
the plant's labour organisation, the release of surplus 
personnel and use of the economised wage fund for material 
stimulation (31). Tolstikov summarises the experiment as,
" . .,. . . keeping the total wage fund unchanged while reducing 
the number of employees, thus helping to increase the 
earnings of the remaining workforce and thus considerably 
increasing the collective's material stake in increasing 
output and labour productivity."(32).
Therefore, with a wage fund and plan targets stabilised 
until the end of the plan period, the Shchekino enterprise
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committed itself to release 1000 workers in the period from 
October 1st, 1967 to the end of 1970 (33). This is a
significant contrast to the demand for additional workers 
in the Spring of 1967, already noted, and represented 
approximately 12% to 13.3% of the Shchekino workforce (34).
Delamotte has argued that the experiment was based upon 
four essential elements (35); firstly, the 'scientific' 
reorganisation of labour within the enterprise; secondly, 
the stimulation of personal interests via financial 
incentives; thirdly, the raising of worker's qualifications 
and skill levels by a programme of retraining; and finally, 
increased participation. Delamotte argues that these 
features explain the early successes of the experiment, but 
this needs to be re-examined and the contribution of each 
of these elements has to be re-appraised, if the longer 
term experience of the Shchekino enterprise and the fate of 
the experiment generally is to be understood. There are 
grounds to doubt two things; firstly, that all these 
elements contributed equally to the experiment's early 
performance and secondly, that these elements alone are 
sufficient to explain the experiment's progress in this 
initial period.
The basic source for raising labour productivity, in the 
first phase of the experiment, was to come through the 
freeing of surplus labour and the internal re-organisation 
of the workforce. As already noted, the contradictory
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TABLE 24: COMMISSIONS ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT THE
SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT.
1. Central All-Combine Commission - under the direction of 
the enterprise director with a membership including Party, 
Trade Union, management, engineering and ITR 
representatives.
2. Commission to Increase the Volume of Production and 
Improve the Utilisation of Production Funds - headed by the 
plant's Chief Engineer.
3. Commission to Rationalise the Organisation of Energy 
Services and the Repair of Power Equipment - headed by the 
plant's Chief Power Engineer.
4. Commisssion to Rationalise the Organisation of 
Maintenance and Repair Facilities for Control and Measuring 
Instrumentation and Automated Systems - headed by an 
Engineer.
5. Commisssion.to Rationalise the Work of ITR Workers - 
headed by the Chief Combine Engineer.
6. Commission to Rationalise the Organisation of 
Maintenance and Repair Facilities for All Technological 
Equipment - headed by the plant's Chief Mechanical 
Engineer.
7. Commission to Rationalise the Organisation of Control of 
Production of Final Products - headed by the Central 
Factory Laboratory.
8. Commission to Mechanise Manual and Heavy Labour.
9. Commission to Evaluate and Introduce New More 
Progressive Wage Systems.
10. Commission to Improve Working Conditions and Technical 
Safety.
11. Commission to Redeploy Workers and ITR Freed During the 
Course of the Experiment.
12. Commission to Verify the Introduction and Elaboration 
of Norms and to Calculate the Optimum Number of Workers.
Source: I.G.Shilin, op.cit., pp.18-19.
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internal dynamic of the Soviet economy system, leads to 
labour hoarding at the enterprise level, which represents 
management's unpenalised response to uncertainty (36). 
Therefore, the first necessity was to identify the
superfluous workers and it should be noted that over half 
of the internal commissions established, identified in 
Table 24, had the rationalisation and tightening of
internal labour organisation as their objective (37).
For each sub-division of the Shchekino plant and workforce 
the commissions, aided by external scientific research
institutes where necessary, calculated the optimal number 
of workers and produced 'technically substantiated' norms 
based upon that number of workers (38). In 1966, only 17.3% 
of Shchekino workers .worked according to 'technically 
substantiated' norms and by 1967 this figure had only risen 
to 20% (39). However, by 1969 80% of basic workers and 55% 
of auxiliary workers had switched to new norms and by 1970 
the figure reached 95% (40). Shkurko provides a more
detailed breakdown for this early period which is
reproduced in Table 25.
The introduction of technically validated norms and the 
work of the commissions was seen to be both the prime 
method for identifying surplus workers and also raising the 
intensity of the work of those who remained in the plant. 
All commentators agree that the greatest significance came 
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previously either had no norms or very lax norms (41). 
Karpenko in particular, notes that the introduction of 
"technically validated" norms had been impossible to 
achieve, either by moral exhortation or by direct orders, 
prior to the experiment but now appeared to advance
alongside the experiment's progress (42). Given .the
problems of introducing and raising norms this is one of 
the experiment's most attractive features for the ruling 
group. However, one of the potential problems of this 
process was that the norms were developed within the plant 
and not set from branch or inter-branch manuals. Hence, 
even though norms were either raised or introduced for the 
first time, they still reflected the localised trade-off 
between management and the workforce. In this sense the
experiment reflected previous practice rather than changing 
it.
The process of internal re-organisation, also included the 
rationalisation of production. For example, several shops 
producing the same products were amalgamated. The effect of 
this, apart from potential scale economies, was to free 
skilled workers, often with substantial training, skills 
and experience, who had previously been involved with 
lower-level supervisory duties for more directly productive 
work (43). This type of transition was achieved fairly
smoothly because in the case of shop chiefs and foremen 
returning to the job of skilled machine operators, the 
portion of the economised wage fund they received
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compensated for any lost earnings, the differential was not 
great anyway, plus it had the added advantage for them of 
freeing them from the pressures of supervisory work (44).
Coupled with the combination of production facilities was 
the combination of jobs. For example, in both basic and 
auxiliary production rationalisation occurred; where 
previously ten operatives had tended ten machines, but with 
considerable idle time, the labour process was re-organised 
so that six operatives tended the same ten machines and 
four would be released. Also apparently disparate basic 
production work was combined. This occurred particularly, 
in repair and maintenance brigades where, because of the 
nature of the work, considerable slack had developed. Here 
the number of workers was simply cut. The other alternative 
adopted was to combine what had been previously separate 
functions. For example, one repair worker would be 
responsible for both mechanical and electrical repair work 
or basic production workers would take on the repair work 
of their equipment. This produced a situation where two or 
three related occupations per worker was not unusual and in 
some sectors of the plant this even rose to four or five 
occupations per worker (45).
In this early phase of the experiment some attempt was made 
to reduce heavy manual tasks, particularly in loading and 
unloading work by introducing new technology plus attempts 
were made to mechanise repetitive office tasks. In this 
early period this did not contribute greatly to the
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overall numbers released but the intention was that this 
should change in the second phase of the experiment (46).
Rationalisation of repair and maintenance facilities was of 
particular importance to the Shchekino enterprise. The
nature of the technology involved in the chemical industry
demands regular service and maintenance and given the
record of Soviet plant and equipment this also needs
efficient repair. Rather than having individual repair and 
maintenance staffs and equipment tied up in each shop, with 
the consequent problems of idle-time and under-utilised 
capacity, repair facilities were centralised. Furthermore, 
the zone of servicing was extended so that any servicing 
brigade would be responsible for a wider area of plant and 
equipment. This leads to savings in terms of both staff and 
more efficient use of equipment and, as Shilin points out, 
repair functions can be best carried out in centralised 
specialist shops where particular repair skills and 
expertise can be developed (47) . Given the large numbers 
employed in this sector, the high proportion of manual work 
and the consequently low productivity this was not only 
important for Shchekino itself but also had great potential 
for the rest of Soviet industry (48).
A similar exercise was carried out with regard to 
laboratory services. Again the nature of chemical 
production necessitates close scrutiny of product quality, 
both in terms of its final usage and in order to guarantee 
safety within production. Again, instead of a duplication
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of laboratory services in each shop or sub-division of the 
enterprise . they were centralised and furthermore, the 
number of control tests was dramatically reduced and 
parallel tests eliminated (49). For example, the number of 
chemical analyses per shift in the production of ammonia, 
were reduced from 5 or 6 to 2 or 3. This led to a reduction 
in the number of control tests by around 4,000. The wider 
significance of this is explained by Sharov, who points out 
that at this time 40,000 people were employed in control 
services at enterprises within the Ministry of the Chemical 
Industry and because of poor organisation it was estimated 
that 18% of analyses were duplicated. Sharov suggests that
more than 10,000 workers could be released simply by
rationalising these control services (50).
Overmanning was not just a shop-floor phenomeno n *The 
contradictions of the Soviet system are such that an 
enterprise director will also hoard managerial expertise.
The experiment was also directed at the management
structure of the enterprise and sought to rationalise were 
possible, thereby encouraging those who remained to broaden 
the sphere of their responsibilities, combine previously 
disparate tasks and improve their qualifications and skills 
as a consequence. In the first phase of the experiment the 
absolute numbers released from this source were obviously 
not as large as from other sources but this re-organisation 
should not be overlooked. Economic regulation and 
discipline, if it is to perform its essential functions, 
has to apply to both management and to the workforce, as
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already pointed out (51).
Altogether the experiment tightened up the internal 
distribution of labour resources within the enterprise. 
Furthermore, greater control was placed upon the 
utilisation of time and the length of the working day; late 
arrival, early departure, over-long meal breaks and
intra-shift idle time were al1 curtailed (52) . As a result
/
of this rationalisation and tighter organisation it was 
possible to free workers from previous jobs (or perhaps 
more correctly, non-jobs). If production levels could be 
maintained then labour productivity must necessarily rise 
but the aim was to go beyond this and to stimulate an even 
greater increase in both output and productivity via the 
use of the economised wage fund. It should be noted that 
thus far the improvement of the labour and production 
organisation of the plant is the result of the close 
scrutiny of the plant's work by the internal commissions 
and the external bodies that assisted them.
The material incentives dimension to the experiment 
operated in the following manner. The economised portion of 
the wage fund, which arose as a consequence of the release 
of workers with the total fund remaining constant, was 
split into two portions (53).
One half of the amount was left at the disposal of the shop 
chief or foreman responsible for the shop where the saving 
was made and where the additional work was absorbed. This
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individual, after consultation with the relevant internal 
commission, comprising both management and Trade Union 
representatives, could use the economised funds to raise 
the wages of any worker by up to a maximum of 30% of his 
basic wage rate (54) . This was only done if the worker had
increased his work load, or if he had combined what were
formally separate tasks or if he had developed a second (or 
third) skill or occupation, or if he had significantly 
increased the intensity of his work and thereby raised his 
individual productivity. On the shop floor, in basic and 
auxiliary production and in the repair and maintenance 
brigades, this operated in a direct manner, in the previous 
example, if the ten operatives were now reduced to six, 
half of the economised wages of the four workers released 
could be split amongst those who remained, providing the
increment did not exceed 30% of their basic wage. In this
sense those workers could potentially see a direct result 
from the re-organisation of their shop and the release of 
superfluous workers.
However, this needs some qualification as it should be 
remembered that the payments are discretionary and not 
automatic and furthermore,, the 30% increment was the
maximum and not the norm. As Karpenko points out, after 
attending a meeting of the commission that determined 
additional wage payments, the process was not over-generous 
(55). Each request for additional payments was closely 
scrutinised and no claim would be accepted if no economies 
to the wage fund had been made. The payment to the
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individual worker was only made if the commission was
convinced that some real increase in productivity or
responsibility had been achieved. The point is that the 
economised wage fund could not simply be used by shop 
chiefs to ingratiate themselves with their workforce (56). 
If in any year the economised portion of the wage fund was
unutilised for wage increments then under the original
terms of the experiment, the balance could be transfered to 
the material stimulation fund and carried forward to the 
next year for similar use (57).
The other half of the economised funds were passed to a 
centralised fund that was controlled by the enterprise 
director. This could be used by him to increase the basic 
wage rate, again by a maximum of 3 0%, of particular 
categories of personnel (58). This related to managerial, 
technical or administrative staff who increased their 
workload, productivity or responsibility under the terms of 
the experiment. Extra payments could also be made to ITR 
staff whose ideas led to an,increase in productivity. Some 
portion of this economised fund could also be used as 
special incentives for workers detailed to particularly 
important tasks or in areas where norms are difficult to 
apply and work difficult to measure. This relates mainly 
to the maintenance and repair sectors where material 
incentives were thought to be most desirable to encourage 
multiple-jobs, skill and qualification upgrading, etc. 
(59). The fund could also be used to increase the pay of 
lower grade management and foremen who extended the scope
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of their responsibilities (60).
It was argued by Soviet sources, that the implementation of 
the experiment would lead to benefits for everyone 
connected with the enterprise; the workforce remaining at 
the plant would receive additional payments and enhanced 
responsibilities; the enterprise could rationalise its 
operations and increase output and productivity for the 
same wage expenditure; for the ruling group chemical output 
would grow and superfluous workers could be released to be 
redeployed elsewhere. This begs the question of whether the 
interests of those released were enhanced by the 
experiment. This will be considered after the initial 
results of the experiment are reviewed and a different 
explanation for these results is suggested.
In the Soviet Union the release of surplus workers poses 
the immediate problem of what to do with the dismissed 
workers? As previously noted the Soviet constitution and 
labour codes guarantee the worker the right to work and 
even if job security is not absolute on an individual 
level, workers are neverthless relatively secure as a 
social group. However, the novelty of the Shchekino 
experiment was that dismissals were no longer to be solely 
individual and particularly political but were to affect a 
sizeable proportion of the workforce (12% to 13.3% 
initially), potentially cutting across all sections of the 
enterprise's organisational, occupational and hierarchical 
structure. It was the case that these decisions would be
PAGE 18 9
influenced by the individual characteristics of the 
worker s involved. For example, those workers chosen for 
release would be those the shop or enterprise viewed as 
least valuable. Consequently, in any shop an individual 
with a record of labour discipline infractions, (tardiness, 
absenteeism, drunkeness, a record as a "rolling stone" 
etc.) would be most likely to be released. For the first 
time in their working lives, workers in the enterprises 
where the experiment was implemented, saw a connection 
developed between common labour infractions and the 
implementation of an administrative sanction. Previously 
even where sanctions existed they were often unused by 
management, ignored by workers or ineffective. It could be 
expected that under these new circumstances a lesson would 
be learned by those who remained and those who were 
released, leading to a tightening of labour discipline in 
the plant and a modification of industrial behaviour.
The general point to be made is that the intention behind 
the experiment was that it should operate as a 
semi-impersonal force reducing the accepted and usual 
levels of job security enjoyed by the Shchekino workers. 
The language of the experiment conveys this impression very 
clearly with talk of 'rational utilisation of labour 
resources' and the 'scientific organisation of labour' 
implying an irresistible force and logic of modern 
industrial production.
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SECTION 3; AN IDEALISED MODEL OF THE EXPERIMENT'S
OPERATION.
The preceding section of this chapter sought to outline the 
essential features of the Shchekino experiment. In this 
section it is intended to develop a simple model to explain 
the functional relationships underlying an idealised view 
of the operation of the experiment. As well as tracing 
these linkages the model can be used later for evaluating 
the results of the experiment and explaining the problems 
that developed as circumstances changed.
Figure 2 illustrates the original situation at the 
enterprise.
The assumption underlying the model is that current output 
(0X1), is a function of the plant's capital stock (K), the 
level of available technology (T), the size of the plant's 
labour force (L), and the organisational efficiency with 
which these factors are utilised which is reflected by the 
plant's occupational structure (OS). The average labour 
productivity of the plant (aLP), is the total output 
divided by the number of workers (0X1/L) and this provides 
a measure of the intensity of work. The shape of the 
production function reflects diminishing returns to 
additional units of labour and it is assumed that this has 
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labour is equal to zero. (It could in fact be argued that 
marginal productivity becomes negative after this point). 
Ll represents the original size of the labour force and the 
section L*-Ll indicates the level of overmanning at the 
plant in the original time period and reflects the 
enterprise directorate's desire for a "safety factor" of 
hoarded labour and the workforce's negative control over 
their own labour process. The hoarded labour will be 
reflected in the occupational structure of the plant, the 
preponderance of auxiliary, service, repair and maintenance 
workers and this will have a negative influence upon 
indicators like absenteeism, idle-time, and labour 
turnover. This is ultimately reflected in labour 
productivity or work intensity.
The underlying assumption of the experiment is that Ll is 
sub-optimal and the optimum workforce is that which 
achieves the output level 0X1 with the minimum expenditure 
of live labour, ie L*. The freeing of workers will move the 
size of the workforce towards L* and will simultaneously 
cause the average labour productivity to rise. This initial 
achievement will be realised through the activities of the 
internal commissions making reductions in the 
non-productive workforce, re-norming labour and generally 
tightening up the internal distribution of labour.
It should be noted that the initial cuts in the workforce 
need not necessarily lead to the optimum size of workforce.
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Successive rounds of cuts may well move the plant nearer to 
its objective but it should be clear that in the first 
instance these reductions will be based upon rule-of-thumb 
estimations coupled with management's desire not to destroy 
completely their safety factor.
It will be assumed that in the initial period, the current 
level of output 0X1 is also the planned level of output 
OX*. This planned level of output, reflects the 
underestimation of capacity that the negative control 
operated by the plant's workforce, forces upon both plant 
management and the ruling group in the process of plan 
formulation. A central part of the initial period of the 
experiment is the assumption that this planned output level 
remains constant and furthermore, so too does the plant's 
wage fund (W F ).
This latter point is illustrated in Figure 3.
With a fixed wage fund and the right to redistribute the 
economised portion of the wage fund that arises from the 
dismissal of some proportion of the workforce, average 
wages (WF/L) must rise. (The actual distribution of income 
within the plant is ignored here and’ it is assumed that the 
economised wage fund does not distort the previous pattern 
of income distribution and the level of wage increments 
reflects the general pattern of wages). The eventual 
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workforce and any centrally imposed conditions. (For 
example, the 30% maximum increase but as the reduction in 
numbers was approximately 12%-14% we may assume that all 
the economised wage fund could be redistributed). The 
expectation was that rising individual wages would 
stimulate personal commitment to work and individual 
initiative.
The overall expected impact of increasing wages was that 
average productivity (or intensity of work) would rise and 
this is shown in Figure 4.
Average labour productivity is a function of a number of 
elements. Firstly, the capital stock available at the plant 
and the level of technology will determine the eventual 
outcome of particular expenditures of labour time. At the 
Shchekino plant in the short run, these two elements can be 
assumed to be fixed.
Secondly, changes in the average wage ' are intended to 
provide an incentive effect within the plant. If WF/L is 
rising, as the workforce is cut, then the expectation is 
that this will raise productivity. This was particularly 
the case at Shchekino as the wage increases were 
administered in such a way that only those who combined
I jobs, increased their responsibilities or worked more
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impact of this incentive effect however, will depend upon 
the availability of consumer goods and services. 
Consequently, it may be assumed that the wage increases 
will have a diminishing effect upon average labour 
productivity and the gradient of the curve will reflect the 
availability of consumer goods, i.e. the fewer the consumer 
goods, the smaller the incentive effect and the steeper the 
gradient.
Thirdly, according to Soviet sources the only other element 
that will determine average labour productivity is the
level of labour organisation. As the efficiency of 
organisation is improved the curve will shift outwards, so 
that at any wage level the level of average productivity 
will have improved. I would argue that this is only a
partial explanation as the level of labour organisation 
contributes to the degree of employment security and it is 
this that is the determinant of the curve's position. This 
factor will affect the intensity with which work is 
performed and therefore, average labour productivity. In 
Soviet enterprises, pre-Shchekino, this security factor was 
almost total and it was this that had a negative impact 
upon work intensity. Labour indiscipline, idle time,
absenteeism, alcoholism, etc., all reflect the high level
of employment security. However, if employment security is 
reduced it will potentially reduce these problems and 
labour productivity at any wage level will rise. In the
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case of Shchekino, the increase in the average wage was 
directly linked to the reduction in the workforce, which 
suggests that the two processes will occur in tandem. 
(Soviet commentators make no explicit mention of the role 
of this security factor which will be returned to later).
Figure 5 illustrates the overall expected impact of the 
experiment.
The rise of average labour productivity, even with a 
reduction of numbers, will lead the plant to produce in 
excess of the previously planned level. The previously 
planned output, after all accommodated and reflected the 
slack labour organisation and low intensity of work within 
the plant. Note the optimum size of the workforce, in 
relation to available technologies and existing capital 
stock, has changed and reflects the improved level of 
labour organisation and the increasing efficiency of 
capacity utilisation.
Therefore, the expectation is that reducing numbers, 
improving internal organisation and raising average wages 
will lead to an increase in average productivity (work 
intensity) and increasing output. For the ruling group the 
attainment of this, with a constant wage fund, has the 
effect of increasing the socially produced surplus and with 
the increase in plant discipline should guarantee this over 
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bundle of consumer goods then the surplus will increase so 
long as output in the post-experiment period exceeds the 
pre-experiment output.
If the released workers are employed elsewhere and 
contribute to output so much the better. Even if they were 
released and simply paid the minimum wage and did not work, 
the surplus could still rise if the difference in output 
achieved by their release, exceeds the amount of consumer 
goods they can purchase with the minimum wage.



























SECTION 4: THE. INITIAL RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT.
The most obvious immediate results were the changes that 
took place in manning levels at the Shchekino plant. This 
was particularly the case in the first two years of the 
experiment, when the numbers released increased rapidly and 
by mid-1969, 870 workers had been released (61). Shilin 
provides a detailed breakdown of the situation at the plant 
after 15 months of the experiment, as at January 1st 1969, 
by which time 800 had been released (62). The distribution 
of these workers by general occupational category is shown 
in Table 26, and as would be expected 75% of those released 
are workers.
From the available evidence it is difficult to calulate 
what proportion of each category of personnel these figures 
represent but it is plausible to assume that in the initial 
phase they reflect the- plant's overall occupational 
structure (63). The fact that so many workers could be 
released so quickly is further evidence of the level of 
overmanning in Soviet enterprises. A closer examination of 
the occupations of those released, provided in Table 27, 
allows the basis of this overmanning to be identified.
It should be noted that only 27% of the workers released 
were basic production workers and up to 1/10/68 almost the 
same number of workers were released from the three repair 
categories as were released from basic production. This
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TABLE 26
LABOUR RELEASED AT SHCHEKINO UP TO 1/1/1969.
BY
1/10/68
A l l  P e rs o n n e l R e le a s e d  : 5 2 0
o f  Whom,
I . T . R .  1 1 0  (2 1 % )
O f f i c e  W o rk e rs  & E m ployees  21  (4% )
W o rk e rs  3 8 9  (7 5 % )
SOURCE: S h i l i n ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 3 3 .
TABLE 2 7
WORKERS RELEASED AT SHCHEKINO BY OCCUPATION.
1/10/68 
9 7  
4 4
3 2  
58
M ac h in e  O p e ra to rs
M a c h in is ts  & Pump O p e ra to rs
L a b o r a to r y  A s s is ta n ts  & C o n t r o l  
W o rk e rs
M a c h in e  R e p a ir  & M a in te n a n c e
E l e c t r i c a l  E q u ip m e n t R e p a ir  & M a in te n a c e  4 0
In s t r u m e n t  R e p a ir  & M a in te n a n c e  
O th e r s ,
o f  Whom,
D is p a tc h  Leaders  & U n lo a d e rs  
W arehousem en &A s s is ta n ts  
D r iv e r s  o f  E l e c t r i c a l  C ran e s  





1 / 1 / 6 9
8 0 0
159  (20% ) 
3 2  (4% )
6 09  (76% )












SOURCE: — S h i l i n ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 3 3 .
D e la m o t te ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 1 5 5 .
again, is a vivid example of the overmanning in particular 
areas of the occupational structure in Soviet enterprises 
concentrated in the repair and maintenance sectors, 
auxiliary production and service sectors, particularly 
warehouse- work, internal transport and loading and 
unloading. An example of this imbalance is the fact that in 
the period 1968-69, because of increases in the plant's 
productive equipment it would normally have led, prior to 
the experiment, to an increase in repair staff of 20%, 
rather then the reductions that were actually achieved 
(64).
The manner by which these savings in labour were achieved 
is summarised in Table 28. With the exception of the 
penultimate category and the unspecified last category, all 
the savings were achieved as a result of internal 
re-organisation of labour. This accounts for 85% of the 
labour released up until 1/10/68; 81% up until 1/1/69; and 
85% by the end of 1969.
The initial impact of the experiment on production at
Shchekino was impressive and Sharov points out that in the
first two complete years of the experiment output volume
grew by 80% and labour productivity rose by 87% (65). By
January 1970, in comparison with 1966, output had grown by
*•
86.6% and labour productivity had more than doubled and was 
the highest in the whole branch (66). Finally, taking the 
whole period from 1966 to the end of 1970, labour 
productivity rose by 140% (67) and the volume of production
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TABLE 28
THE SOURCE OF PERSONNEL SAVINGS.
U n i t in g  & C o n s o l id a t in g  Shops
U n i t in g  S e r v ic e s  w i t h  P r o d u c t io n
C o m b in in g  O c c u p a tio n s  & W id e n in g  
th e  S e r v ic e  Zone
S tr e n g th e n in g  th e  O r g a n is a t io n  
o f  L a b o u r
R e v is in g  t h e  S c h e d u le  o f  
L a b o r a to r y  W ork
In t r o d u c t io n  o f  T im e Norms & 
T e c h n ic a l ly  S u b s ta n t ia t e d  N orm s.
M e c h a n is a t io n  o f  M a n u a l L a b o u r





























8 00 9 8 7
SOURCES:-  ( 1 )  S h i l i n ,  o p , c i t . ,  p . 3 3 .  ( 2 )  S h k u rk o , o p . c i t . ,  p . 1 2 .
doubled (68). As Shilin points out, the growth of labour 
productivity and average wages, resulting from the 
implementation of the experiment, dramatically exceeded 
their planned levels. By the end of the plan period the 
Shchekino plant had achieved a growth in labour 
productivity more than double the planned level (69).
The economic results therefore, were impressive at the 
Shchekino plant but it should be noted that even though the 
experiment was initiated here, it was closely followed by 
eight other plants. These plants, which followed the 
Shchekino example in 19 68 were not confined to the chemical 
industry but included plants from textiles,
petro-chemicals, and metallurgical sectors of the economy 
(70). The results achieved at these plants are summarised 
in Table 29. Once again the numbers released in such a 
short period of time indicate the level of overmanning, 
(the average reduction being 13.275%) and all the plants 
achieved impressive growth in labour productivity in 
comparison with previously planned levels. It is worth 
noting that in most instances the volume of sales did not 
increase by more than the previously planned level but 
nevertheless this was achieved with a much reduced 
workforce. (This data will be returned to later).
In the following year 1969, the experiment was further 
extended and Shkurko cites two additional groups of 
enterprises; firstly, 25 enterprises in the petro-chemical 
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less than three years shed 11.6% of their workforce; the 
second group comprised 5 enterprises in the textiles sector 
which shed 10% of their workforce. The results achieved by 
these plants were also impressive as labour productivity 
rose on average by 22%, as opposed to the previously 
planned level of 12% (71). Tables 30 and 31 illustrate how 
labour was economised at these two groups of enterprises 
and, as at Shchekino itself, the majority were released as 
a result of tightening internal labour organisation and job 
combination, particularly in the area of service and repair 
work (72). For example at Pyshminsk this took the form of 
metal workers in repair shops taking on electrical welding 
work (73).
By 1970, 60 enterprises were particpating in the experiment 
and in the period 1968-1969, 12,000 workers were released 
(74). By 1971 the number of enterprises operating on 
experimental lines had more than doubled to over 120 (75).
These enterprises employed 700,000 workers and raised their 
labour productivity on average by 22%, 10% more than
envisaged in the plan.
The intention of the experiment was to affect not only 
manning levels, production and productivity but also 
workers' remuneration. Tables 32, 33, and 34, indicate the 
volume of savings made and the uses to which these 




THE REASONS FOR LABOUR RELEASED AT 25 PETRO—CHEMICAL ENTERPRISES.
NO. RELEASED %
C o m b in in g  S k i l l s 7 6 0 11%
W id e n in g  t h e  S e r v ic in g  Zone 3 2 0 0 46%
Im p ro v in g  L a b o u r O r g a n is a t io n 1 4 0 0 2 0 .8 %
S tr e n g th e n in g  C o n t r o l  o v e r  L a b o u r & 
R e d u c in g  t h e  R a t io  o f  T r a n s p o r t  
S e r v ic e s 7 3 5 1 0 .7%
C e n t r a l i s i n g  R e p a ir  & A u x i l i a r y  S e r v ic e s 2 91 4 .2 %
O th e r  M ea su re s 4 8 1
6 ,8 6 7
7 .1%
TABLE 31
THE REASONS FOR LABOUR RELEASED AT 5  TE X TIL E  ENTERPRISES.
NO. RELEASED %
S tr e n g th e n in g  and  W id e n in g  t h e  S e r v ic in g  
Z o n e , C o m b in in g  S k i l l s  &  O th e r  M easu res  
t o  Im p ro v e  L a b o u r O r g a n is a t io n 4 9 0 4 0
B e t t e r  M anagem ent T e c h n iq u e s 2 0 4 17
In t r o d u c t io n  o f  A u to m a tio n 3 7 0 30
O th e r  M ea su re s 1 6 0
1 , 2 2 4
13
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Firstly, the number of people receiving additional payments 
as a result of the experiment, grew steadily over the early 
years but by 1969 only a little over a third of the
workforce remaining at the plant, were in receipt of
additional payments. Furthermore, by the beginning of 19 69 
only a little over 4 0% of the economised wage funds were
actually being re-distributed. As a consequence of these 
two features the average increment per worker receiving 
additional payments was 10.1 roubles.
Secondly, it is clear from Table 33, that even though over 
half of the economised funds went to the centralised
Director's Fund, this was distributed less than the Shop 
Chief's fund (22% as opposed to 36%). The bulk of the 
Director's Fund went to repair workers, as anticipated, but 
their average increment was below the plant average. The 
remaining funds from this source were distributed to ITR 
and employees who on average received above the plant 
average, see Table 34. The distribution of. additional 
payments and their average size at Shchekino, reflects the 
enterprise's pre-experiment employment and wage structure. 
Shkurko suggests that in the main however, workers received 
a larger wage increment, in percentage terms, than their 
ITR counterparts; for example at the five textile plants 
cited workers received on average a 14.6% increment in 
comparison with ITR who received only 11.3% (76). This
effect would eventually distort the pattern of wage 
distribution within the plant and further level wages 
between ITR and workers (77).
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Thirdly, the average additional payment overall at 
Shchekino was 11.85 roubles and this needs to be placed in 
perspective. In 1968 the average wage at Shchekino was 
planned to be 1,497 roubles per annum or 124.75 roubles per 
month. The actual wage was 1,610 roubles per annum or 
134.16 roubles per month. Therefore, the average increment 
represented approximately 9.5% of the planned wage or 8.8% 
of the actual wage. The point is that even when allowing 
for the variations that existed between plants, this is a 
very small percentage increase.
The benefits accruing to the workforce were however, not 
just received in the individualised wage. As previously 
noted, the worker's remuneration although primarily 
received in this way, also consists of social consumption 
determined at both the enterprise and societal level. 
During the early years of the experiment part of the 
economised wage funds were directed towards social 
provision by the enterprise and this is outlined in Table 
35. Clearly the provision of better nursery, ‘hospital, 
clinic, recreational and holiday facilities is potentially 
desirable for all workers in the plant. In this way even 
those workers not receiving any individualised wage 
increment from the experiment's operation have some 
material interest in the experiment. Furthermore, if the 
enterprise's workforce is reduced then the facilities 
available will be allocated amongst a smaller number of 
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economic performance of the enterprise was therefore, 
reflected in improved social provision for those who 
remained (78). In this sense using economised wage funds to 
provide better facilities further increases the insecurity 
of those released who will no longer have access to them as 
this is determined via the worker's relationship to the 
enterprise. Those released therefore, provide the means to 
increase social provision and by their release are 
penalised and excluded from the use of that enhanced 
provision.
Within the plant the experiment had a dual effect upon the 
skill structure. Firstly, the choice of those workers to be 
released was such that the most skilled and experienced 
workers were retained. Hence the average skill level rose 
(79). Secondly, this was further enhanced by the impact of 
combining jobs, extending service zones and increasing 
individual's work responsibilities which made it necessary 
to retrain workers, raise educational levels and increase 
skill and expertise. In the first 18 months of the 
experiment, 1,000 employees mastered a second or related 
occupation and over 4,000 raised their qualifications (80). 
The overall impact of this was that the average wage rate 
category rose from 4.6 in 1967 to 4.9 in 1969 (81).
A further result of the experiment noted by all the 
commentators, was the increased level of labour discipline 
at the enterprise (82). This is illustrated on Table 36. A 
summary of the elements include; a better attitude towards
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work emerged; equipment was more fully and effectively 
utilised; the absentee and idler became a rarity; the ihythm 
of work became more stringent; even though there were fewer 
people in the enterprise the number of overtime hours was 
reduced by one third; idle time both between shifts and 
within shifts was reduced; a widespread acceptance of 
technically validated norms emerged. Furthermore, the level 
of spontaneous labour turnover at the .plant was 
significantly reduced by the experiment (83). Within a year 
of the introduction of the experiment labour turnover fell 
from 17.3% to 10.4% and idle time was cut in half, in the 
same period (84).
A similar pattern emerges from the other plants cited who 
initiated the experiment in this early period. Labour 
discipline generally improved and for example, at Furmanov 
No.2, turnover fell from 22% in 1967 to 15% in 1969 and the 
number of labour discipline infractions was halved. At the 
Bashkir Petro-Chemical Association
(Bashkirneftekhkhimzavod), within 9 months of the
experiment's introduction, labour turnover fell by 25% and 
idle time was reduced by a similar proportion (85).
Finally, as a parallel to the experiment internal
khozraschet mechanisms were strengthened at Shchekino (86). 
This took the form of setting wholesale prices for output, 
on a shop by shop basis and the fulfillment of these value 
criteria became the basis for the payment of wages and 
bonuses. This led, according to Karpenko to a steep rise in
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claims, made by one shop against another (87). This 
economic sanction worked in the following manner; one shop 
suffering losses in production due to the actions of 
another, could be reimbursed with the full cost being met 
by the shop responsible. This economic discipline was 
intended to supplement the impact of increasing labour 
discipline within the plant, by disciplining management 
staff.
But what of the workers released?
As pointed out by Sharov, the Shchekino plant, in the 
initial period, was in a fortunate position and was able to 
absorb a relatively high proportion of the workers 
released. As he explains,
"We did not have to worry about the released personnel 
being without work for a short period. A large plant to
manufacture synthetic fibres is being built near our
combine and several thousand workers were needed" (88).
Therefore, the workers released could be absorbed into the 
immediate locale. This was of great significance for the 
introduction of the experiment as the majority of workers 
chose to change their occupations rather than to change 
their place of residence. If management could at least
offer the possibility of staying in the same locality it 
would ease the uncertainty involved in the experiment's 
implementation and potentially reduce discontent and
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resistance. Delamotte provides a useful breakdown of the 
eventual destination of the workers released which is 
reproduced in Table 37. It should be noted that over 25% of 
those released were not reintegrated into the plant and 
even if only 50 were made redundant, another 100 left of 
their own accord.
As Baranenkova points out, the experiment was implemented 
primarily at enterprises which had undergone expansion and 
required new staff hence this pattern of absorption of 
released labour in the immediate vicinity was replicated at 
the other plants cited (89). For example, at Novomoskovsk 
during the 9th Five Year Plan, 2,000 workers were scheduled 
to be released but an additional 2,034 were required over 
this same period for new shops (90). In the initial year of 
the experiment at Novomoskovsk of the 556 workers released, 
450, almost 80%, were placed at the plant; at Balakovo 70% 
of those released were placed at the plant (91); at the 
Novokuibyshev oil processing plant of the 1,000 workers 
released in 6 months, over 60% were reintegrated into the 
plant (92). This pattern was replicated at a wide range of 
other plants .
The overall experience of the Shchekino plant was broadly 
confirmed by the other enterprises who initiated the 
experiment in this early period. To summarise; a broadly 
similar proportion of workers were released from all the 
plants cited (in the range from 7% to 17% with the average 
around 12%); the structure of the personnel released
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TABLE 3 7
THE PLACEMENT OF THE 800 WORKERS INITIALLY AFFECTED BY THE EXPERIMENT.
ABSORBED AT THE PLACED IN
ENTERPRISE V IC IN IT Y  DEPARTED
WORKERS
T r a n s f e r r e d  t o  V a c a n t  P o s ts  i n  P l a n t  3 3 7  
T r a n s f e r r e d  t o  S y n t h e t ic  F ib r e  P l a n t  101
T r a n s f e r r e d  t o  O th e r  O r g a n is a t io n s  5
L e f t  o f  t h e i r  own A c c o rd  7 6
R ed u n d an t 33
E n te re d  t h e  Army 38
L e f t  t o  C o n t in u e  S tu d ie s  19
3 3 7  1 01  171
I . T . R .  & O FFICE WORKERS
T r a n s f e r r e d  t o  V a c a n t  P o s ts  in  P la n t  1 0 2
T r a n s f e r r e d  t o  S y n th e t ic  F ib r e  P l a n t  31
T r a n s f e r r e d  t o  O th e r  O r g a n is a t io n s  2 0
L e f t  o f  t h e i r  own A c c o rd  20
R ed u n d an t 1 7
R e t i r e d  1
TOTAL -  8 0 0  =  4 3 9  +  1 3 2  +  2 29
T o t a l  A b so rb e d  a t  E n t e r p r is e  & T r a n s f e r r e d  in  V i c i n i t y  =  571
T o t a l  R ed u n d an t = 5 0
T o t a l  L e f t  o f  t h e i r  own A cco rd  = 9 6
SOURCE: D e la :n t> tte , o p . c i t . , p .  1 5 9 .
reflected the overall employment structure with workers in 
the majority; the sources of released labour were similar 
(combining jobs, widening the service zone, improving 
labour organisation, strengthening norms etc); the workers 
released were predominantly auxiliary and repair sector 
workers; the results in terms of output and productivity 
were all positive; labour discipline increased and turnover 
and infractions decreased; average wages rose; social 
provision at the enterprise level improved; the majority of 
the workers released were re-absorbed in thesame 
enterprise, association or locality.
This picture is confirmed by an analysis of 50 enterprises 
operating along Shchekino lines at the beginning of 19 70 
(93). Of the 23,800 workers released; 14,900 (62.5%) were 
reintegrated at their old plants, 4,700 to fill newly 
created vacancies and 10,200 to fill previously vacant 
places. Of the 8,900 who left their enterprise almost half 
chose this course of action themselves. Of the total 
numbers released, 79% were workers, 17% ITR and 4% office 
workers, administrators and management (94).
Generally speaking the experiment was an economic success 
and the impressive results at Shchekino and elsewhere, 
confirm the problems of underemployment, low labour 
productivity, excess capacity due to mal-utilisation of 
existing resources, characteristic of Soviet industrial 
enterprises. If this could be achieved at the experimental 
plants then the generalisation of the experiment to all
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industry would lead to significant advantages for the 
ruling group. A further indication of these possibilities 
emerged from a survey undertaken by the Chemical Industry's 
Bureau for the Scientific Organisation of Labour. After 
analysing 140 enterprises under their auspices, they 
concluded that if the experiment was generalised to all of 
them, then 18% of the existing workforce could be released 
and this would represent sufficient staff for all new 
planned projects for the following five years (95).
The actual successes and the future potential of the 
experiment led the CPSU and the Council of Ministers to 
support the experiment and press for its further extension 
(96). Before considering the attempted generalisation this 
early period needs to be critically reassessed.
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SECTION 5:__ A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE INITIAL RESULTS OF THE
SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT.
The enthusiastic response to the initial results of the 
experiment and the pressure for its generalisation needs to 
be tempered by a closer look at the manner in which the 
results were achieved, the nature of the results themselves 
and the problems implicit in the logic of the experiment. 
The problems that emerged in this initial period relate 
specifically to the implementation of the experiment at 
plant level and the relationship between different plants 
undertaking the experiment. The broader problems involving 
the generalisation of the experiment and the maintenance of 
its impetus at the individual plant level, will be 
considered in the next chapter.
From the outset the enterprise management and the CPSU were 
faced with the problem of explaining to workers, in a 
supposedly socialist society, that they were to be made 
redundant. Soviet commentators stress the initial 
'psychological barriers' that had to be overcome (97). 
These barriers are the inevitable result of more than sixty 
years of political propaganda that contrasts the secure 
position of the Soviet worker, the leading force in the 
planned socialist economy, with the insecure position of 
his counterpart under capitalism, subject to the vagaries 
of the market, with the possibilities of lay-offs, 
redundancies and long-term unemployment. The experiment
PAGE 225
therefore, demanded from the outset a vast amount of 
preparatory work by the party cells in the enterprise. In 
this early period Party, Trade Union, YCL and personnel 
department cadres carried out an extensive educational 
campaign, delivering lectures and answering workers'
questions to alleviate their fears and to reduce these
barriers (98). A.Mokin, the party secretary at Shchekino, 
points out that it was necessary that workers should not 
evaluate their dismissal negatively (99). The reason for 
this* apart from alleviating the problems of any immediate 
discontent was that these same workers were to be 
redeployed elsewhere and a reduction in their morale or 
self-image would presumably affect their attitude to their 
new work and their productivity. Unlike a capitalist firm, 
who can dismiss workers with little concern about their 
ultimate fate or destination, the Shchekino management had 
to re-integrate a considerable number of the workers 
dismissed and ultimately all those released would be
re-employed. Therefore, instead of talk of 'dismissal' or
'redundancy' they spoke of 'releasing' or 'freeing' workers 
and a process of 'resource utilisation' or 'the scientific 
evaluation of work', etc. (100). The process, which for a 
capitalist employer is veiled behind the cloak of commodity 
fetishism, was in the Soviet instance,' shrouded in a 
spurious 'scientism'.
As already noted in this first phase, at Shchekino and the 
other plants cited, the problems of dislocation were 
limited by the absorption of surplus labour in the
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immediate locale. However, as Karpenko points out, workers 
tended to evaluate the experiment in a negative manner and 
workers in the plant talked of their comrades who had
"fallen under the experiment", much in the same way as you
would describe someone falling under a train (101) .
Nevertheless, at Shchekino, of the 515 employees released 
in the first year of the experiment, only 7 appealed to the 
Trade Unions and of these the Trade Unions accepted the 
dismissal of 3 workers. Of these 3 only 1 worker appealed 
to the courts and was eventually reinstated (102).
To ease the problems of potential discontent at the level 
of the enterprise, the plant's personnel department 
attempted to give great consideration to job placement of 
the workers released. The individual worker's skills, 
experience, education, length of service, family situation, 
etc., were all taken into account before he was offered a 
number of alternative jobs with similar work content, 
working conditions and comparable wages (103). However, as 
V.Polikarpov, the plant's personnel chief, admitted, not 
everyone was satisfied (104). It may be assumed that the
figures for complaints, showing such a small number of
claims for redress, minimise the actual level of discontent 
the experiment created. Furthermore, the personnel 
department's degree of success can be gauged from the fact 
that over 100 workers who were released chose to look for 
new jobs on their own and very few took the personnel 
department's advice and transferred to similar occupations
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in other towns (105). It can be inferred from this that 
these workers, judging by their actions, would not be 
wholly satisfied with the experiment nor the official 
options offered to them.
The second aspect of the 'psychological barrier' concerns 
the enterprise management staff who were wary of the 
experiment in the initial period (106). The experiment ran 
counter to their previous experience of the logic of the 
planning process and aimed to discourage them from hoarding 
labour. This generated fear of not being able to cope with 
existing plan targets with a reduced workforce, fear of 
taking on too much additional responsibility and fear of
failure. This led the more conservative to resist the
implementation of the experiment, after all some of their 
number were also to be released and their work reorganised. 
To overcome this, significant retraining of management and 
supervisory staff took place at the plant and this stressed 
the role of economic, 'value' levers in plant management 
(107). It is interesting to note that amidst all the staff
reductions only one group grew in-size and that was the
department of economists at the plant (108).
 ^ .
Management's initial negative response was rational because 
even though the experiment could be viewed as an attempt to 
give them more decentralised control, for example further 
plant level wage differentiation to reward hard work etc., 
it also reduced their room for manoeuvre. As pointed out in 
Chapter 2, the mechanisms of economic regulation also need
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to discipline management if they are to be successful and
the Shchekino experiment, sought to do that by reducing an 
important element of management's safety factor, hoarded 
labour. Karpenko however, points out that this initial 
negative response was only overcome in the medium term, 
when management saw the advantages of reduced absenteeism 
and tightened labour discipline giving rise to a more 
stable, hard-working workforce (109). After all if this can 
be achieved it partially obviates the need for hoarded 
labour. (Their longer term perception of the experiment 
will be considered in the next chapter).
The successful implementation of the experiment can
therefore, only be achieved if correct attention is paid to 
overcoming potential, resistance by 'careful preparation 
(110). Coupled with this is the necessity to mobilise 
resources to train staff remaining at the plant, 
particularly those combining occupations or changing jobs 
completely. For example, at Shchekino a number of
laboratory workers, freed by the revised schedule of tests, 
re-trained as lathe and machine operators (111). This all 
necessitated a huge training programme and at Shchekino 
alone, in the first 18 months of the experiment, 700 
specialists were involved in 'on-the-job' training (112).
The question of careful preparation and adequate training 
was reiterated at a seminar on the experiment at Tula in 
19 70 (113). All the participants stressed the need for 
proper preparation and pointed out the great damage that
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could be done to the aims of the experiment if it were
implemented by administrative pressure or if short cuts
were attempted by bureaucratic bullying of either
enterprises or workers (114). In other words it was
recognised that the experiment could only be implemented 
with at least the acquiescence of the workforce and that 
attempts to impose it could only lead to failure.
The 'psychological barriers' to the implementation of the 
experiment, like the necessity for the experiment itself, 
stems from the peculiar political economy of the USSR. 
Workers, who can only be dismissed in special circumstances 
and who are ideologically supposed to be the leading force 
in the society, are able to exert their negative control 
even over reforms and experiments designed to control them. 
The ruling group needed the experiment to shake out surplus 
labour and to guarantee a usable, predictable and growing 
surplus but even in the process of instituting this reform 
they cannot disregard the workforce's interests which act 
as a form of negative control. The experiment, rather than 
becoming an anonymous, impersonal, external constraint on 
the workforce, like the role played by unemployment under 
capitalism, is forced to partially accommodate worker's 
interests and this gives rise to the need for careful 
preparation, resettlement and training. Clearly if a 
ministry, let alone the whole economy, wished to convert 
all its enterprises to the Shchekino method, it would be 
unlikely to be able to achieve this simultaneously because 
of the resource needs for preparation and training at each
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plant. The transition to the experiment is more likely to 
be piece-meal and relatively slowly accomplished and will 
tend to concentrate on particular enterprises. Ministries 
will allocate resources in the first instance, for
enterprises to make the transition to the method if the 
enterprise is important to the ministry's overall 
performance, if it is in the process of expanding and is
short of workers, if it is a large scale recipient of
foreign technology or if it has particular problems. The 
blanket adoption of the experiment would be impossible for 
the ministry because it would not have sufficient resources 
to do the job properly and the resulting discontent it
would engender if it were forced through, from both workers 
and management, would negate its potential.
The implementation problems at enterprise level may well 
prove difficult, their further significance will be 
examined in the next chapter, but they were obviously 
overcome at Shchekino and the other plants cited. Their 
sucesses however, raise the further question, how were the 
impressive economic results achieved? Soviet commentators 
argue that the harmony of social and individual interests 
created through the material incentives offered by the 
experiment accounted for the success and their western 
counterparts broadly concur (115). It is difficult to 
support this argument for a number of reasons.
Firstly, as already noted, the material incentives offered 
to individual workers were relatively small (116). (See
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Tables 32,33,34). Baranenkova for example, complained that 
the wage increases were in the main a small proportion of 
basic wages for all categories of employees and could 5not 
be expected to fulfil their role as a stimulus for more 
conscientious work (117). For the relatively poorly paid 
repair workers they may have been sufficient to narrow the 
gap between themselves and basic production workers but 
even for them it was a relatively small proportion of their 
wage (118). (See Table 33).
Secondly, not everyone remaining in the enterprise received 
a wage supplement. At Shchekino only approximately 4 0% of 
the workforce received any increase in wages as a result of 
the experiment (119).
Thirdly, of this number a much smaller percentage received 
the maximum additional wage supplement of 30%; for example 
at Shchekino, 1.4%; at Severonikel ', 2.2%; and at Furmansk 
No. 2, 3.8% (120). As already suggested, none of this was 
automatic and had to be argued for in the relevant 
commission, so we may assume that a significant increase in 
effort was necessary to achieve the 30% maximum.
Fourthly, the model of the experiment outlined in section 3 
of this chapter, assumed that the whole of the economised 
wage fund was redistributed. However, this was not the case 
in practice and for example, at Shchekino throughout 1968, 
the percentage of the economised wage fund distributed grew 
slowly and had only reached 39% by the beginning of 1969
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(see Table 32). This obviously has a consequence for the 
potential increase in the average wage, indicated on Figure 
7, which will rise less than possible. These retained funds 
still have an importance for the experiment's operation, 
particularly if it is used for collective provision of 
social services or housing at the plant, but not for the 
individualised reward. The fact that more than half of the 
economised wage funds were not distributed as individual 
wage supplements suggests that whatever effect financial 
changes had they were at least as important on a collective 
basis.
Fifthly, during this period average wages were rising 
anyway as a result of state wage policies and the increment 
from the experiment was not the sole source of bonuses and 
premiums. Wages were also supplemented from the material 
incentives fund and the supplements from the experiment 
were no larger for many categories of workers.
Finally, and § perhaps most importantly, even if wage 
increments were received the perennial problem of consumer 
goods and services minimises the potential incentive 
effects of the experiment. If money does not function as 
the universal equivalent and cannot provide unambiguous 
access to the desired, good quality consumer items then its 
motivational impact will be limited. There is no evidence 
that any additional allocation of consumer goods occurred 
to ease the implementation of the experiment. In terms of 
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increases to increases in work intensity and labour 
productivity is relatively steep. One possible consequence 
of these circumstances is that prices in the private 
peasant market may well have risen as the price of the 
commodities traded there will be sensitive to forces of 
supply and demand. However, it is impossible to provide any 
evidence, one way or another regarding this.
Therefore, the wage increases were small, received by few 
and their impact weak. Nevertheless, productivity and 
output did rise impressively and this raises the question,
what caused these impressive economic results?
I would argue that the initial success of the Shchekino 
experiment cannot be explained solely by the increased 
.material incentives introduced. These new economic stimuli 
were subordinate in their effect to a heightened use of 
more traditional bureaucratic forms of control coupled with 
the newly acquired ingredient of increasing worker 
insecurity. This is particularly true in the initial phase 
of the experiment when the workforce is at its largest and 
the possibility of being released is at its greatest. In 
this period the internal reorganisation of the production 
and labour process was carried out by the internal 
commissions detailed in Table 24. Their role was to
identify internal reserves and eliminate them, rationalise 
production, repair and services and press for the
introduction of norms or raise existing norms. The internal
PAGE 235
commissions, supported by management and the external 
institutes will put the plant's labour practices under the 
microscope and eliminate slack by the administrative 
sanctions available to them, i.e. by suggesting dismissals. 
Labour productivity therefore, will rise in this initial 
period.for a number of reasons.
Firstly, some of the jobs and individuals eliminated will 
be non-jobs and non-workers. They will not have contributed 
to production and simply by their presence will have 
reduced average labour productivity. If these individuals 
are freed average labour productivity must rise. This
particularly will be the case if these workers come from
non-productive sectors like service, repair, maintenance 
and transport, as indeed they did.
Secondly, the emergence of the possibility of release will 
change both managerial control and the remaining labour 
force's attitudes and performance. This is clearly 
indicated in the discipline indicators cited. The reason 
for this is that harder work at the plant, occupation and 
workplace that you know is preferable to the uncertainty 
engendered by change. The hierarchy of uncertainty rises 
from a change in occupation or workplace, through to a
change in plant, to the worst possibility a change in
location. This uncertainty is clearly not unemployment, in 
the same sense as known in the west, but nevertheless, in 
this initial period it performs a similar function (121). 
Increasing worker insecurity provides an explanation of
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increasing work intensity and labour discipline and 
accounts for the increase in production even with a smaller 
workforce.
Worker insecurity is increased not just by releasing 
surplus workers but also by the reorganisation of 
production, the raising and introduction of norms and the 
combination of occupations as all these elements operate 
against established labour practices and increase the 
pressure upon the individual worker. This will be further 
amplified by the use of some proportion of the economised 
funds for collectively provided social services, housing 
etc. These funds will be growing and the benefits will 
only accrue to those remaining at the plant and as they are 
distributed amongst a smaller workforce the possibilities 
for access or allocation will improve. This further 
pressurises the individual worker not to identify himself 
as an individual who should be released (i.e. an idler, 
absentee or drunk).
From the point of view of the model it is suggested that 
the impact of the experiment was achieved by shifting the 
curve, identifying the relationship between average wages 
and the average intensity of work, to the right. Even 
though the curve remains relatively steep, the combined 
impact of improved labour organisation, increased 
discipline and reduced worker security yields a greater 
level of productivity for any given wage level, see Figure
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economised wage fund is undistributed. For obvious 
ideological reasons the notion that increasing worker 
insecurity contributed to the successes of the experiment 
has neither been investigated nor given explicit prominence 
by the Soviet sources.
The argument can be substantiated on two further levels. 
Firstly, the anecdotal evidence already cited, from 
Polikarpov and Karpenko, shows some evidence of worker 
hostility to the experiment. This, and the degree of 
reluctance to move, even to nearby enterprises, further 
supports the general point that the experiment increased 
worker insecurity.
Furthermore, there is evidence from Soviet statistical 
sources that also supports the general argument. This 
suggests that there is a strong correlation between 
increases in labour productivity and the dismissal of 
workers in other branches (122). It has been suggested for 
example, that a 1% increase in labour productivity can be 
achieved by releasing 0.8% of the workforce. Table 38, 
based upon data from studies of the textile industry, 
suggests a series of bands linking changes in labour 
productivity to reductions in manning levels. The limited 
empirical evidence presented in Table 29, provides some 
further justification for this argument with productivity 
increases being more closely correlated to decreasing 










































































































Consequently, what is being suggested is that within the 
framework of the political economy of the USSR the initial
results were achieved by a partial change in the
relationship between the worker and management and between
the worker and his work, via the medium of increasing
insecurity and not solely through material stimuli.
The analysis so far has ignored the question of worker 
participation, which it is suggested by both western and 
Soviet sources, contributed to the success of the
experiment (124). This argument is more complex than the 
simple statement suggests and demands a careful
interpretation of the idea of participation.
Firstly, any participation could only occur after the 
decision to undertake the experiment had been made. 
Participation did not include discussions of the
desirability of the experiment with the enterprise
workforce having the option of rejecting the experiment. 
The ordginal guidelines for the experiment, and indeed the 
later revisions, specify that the enterprise can only be 
transfered to the experiment if the decision of either the 
ministry or enterprise management, is ratified by the 
plant's Trade Union committee. Given the nature of Soviet
Trade Unions it can be assumed that once the management and
party organs have decided to implement the experiment the
ratification of the decision is a formality. As would be
expected, there is no mention in the literature of any
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enterprise rejecting management's decision.
Secondly, participation in the internal commissions leaves 
little scope for influence as the designation of the 
commissions and their remit are pre-determined by 
management. Furthermore, all the commissions were headed by 
management representatives and they simply mirror the 
hierarchical nature of the enterprise (125).
Thirdly, the participation in rationalising labour
organisation can be viewed as participation in increasing 
and refining the worker's own exploitation. As has been 
suggested the workers did not themselves control the 
economised portion of the wage fund at the level of the 
shop, nor did they decide how work was to be combined or 
redistributed. Their suggestions for rationalisation may 
have attracted wage supplemements but the link was not 
direct and cannot be viewed as participatory.
Fourthly, following from the above points, the logic of the 
experiment did not challenge the principle of one-man
management nor the hierarchy of relations within the 
enterprise. The thrust of the experiment was to do the 
opposite and strengthen this principle both for the foreman
and shop chief, at the level of the individual shop and for
enterprise management, within the plant as a whole.
As argued already, the influence of the workforce on the 
experiment was primarily reactive and negative which forced
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adaptation within the experiment and made necessary the 
extensive preparation outlined. Acquiescence was necessary 
but this can hardly be described as participation.
Soviet writers have also argued that multi-occupations, as 
a result of the job-combination promoted by the experiment, 
enhanced worker interest and raised the level of work 
satisfaction (126). This is a repetition of a curious 
notion, that by increasing the number of boring monotonous 
jobs a worker is forced to perform this qualitatively 
enhances work experience. There is little reason to presume 
that the transition from one job to two, or three or indeed 
the rotation between jobs, does more than break monotony 
rather than essentially enrich work experience (127). There 
is no necessary transition from quantity to quality.
It has also been claimed that the raising of educational 
and skill levels, as a result of the experiment's 
implementation leads to enhanced worker satisfaction (128). 
These changes are a necessary by-product of the experiment. 
However, it should be noted that work content does not 
necessarily change and therefore, its overall impact is 
open to doubt. There is little reason to presume that a 
worker who has enhanced his skills or qualifications and is 
employed at the same job as previously, or, as is more 
likely, combining previously disparate tasks, is likely to 
be more satisfied with his work situation. This is 
particularly the case if the material incentives are less 
than anticipated and the new element of worker insecurity
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is introduced.
The general point is that for the workforce as a whole the 
experiment's benefits will be tempered by the nature of the 
work they perform, the new intensity with which it has to 
be performed and the nature of work in the USSR in a 
general sense. The experiment did not fundamentally alter 
either the nature of the specific work nor the general 
nature of work but simply attempted to raise its intensity. 
Claims therefore, for its beneficial impact have to be 
viewed sceptically.
So far the success of the experiment has appeared 
self-evident from the results provided but this needs to be 
qualified. The success has been viewed solely in Soviet 
terms but this also needs to be qualified by international 
comparison. This is notoriously difficult to accomplish by 
means of considering finished product and trying to 
evaluate comparative values of output. However, in the case 
of Shchekino it can be illustrated in a different manner as 
one . year after the implementation of the experiment 
equipment was installed that was similar in design to that 
utilised by both Dutch and Italian Chemical firms. The 
plans for the new processes stipulated that 278 operatives 
and technicians were necessary to operate them 
successfully. However, at Shchekino, even with the 
beneficial impact of the experiment, the staff level was 
806 (129). This again gives some idea of the level of 
overmanning and the degree of negative control exercised by
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the Soviet workforce even after an experiment explicitly 
designed to reduce this. This does not deny that the 
experiment's success warranted its generalisation but 
simply shows that its implementation does not guarantee 
even an approximation to western manning levels.
Furthermore, the release of workers from Shchekino and the 
other plants cited, also illustrates another feature of the 
Soviet labour process and a further problem for the 
experiment's implementation. The percentage of the existing 
workforce released varied in the plants cited, from 7% at 
Chelyabinsk to 17% a^t Novomosovsk and this can be 
interpreted in one of a number of ways.
Firstly, it could be argued that this confirms the view 
advanced in Chapter 2, that the manning level of Soviet 
plants is the result of a localised trade-off between the 
wishes of enterprise management and the negative control of 
the workforce. Pre-experiment economic regulation provides 
no unambiguous measure of overmanning therefore, the 
introduction of a standardised experiment exposes the 
differing degrees of overmanning.
Secondly, it could be argued that the level of overmanning 
at each plant is broadly similar but the differences in the 
numbers released are explained by the more or less rigorous 
application of the experiment. This will be determined by 
the degree of worker resistance or management's risk 
aversion, etc.
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The point is that either, or, a combination of both, of 
these explanations are equally plausible as there was no 
standardisation of the experiment nor was the level of 
overmanning standardised. More importantly the experiment 
itself provided no mechanism for evaluating with any more 
precision than previously the level of overmanning. For 
example, two similar plants ' could release the same 
proportion of their original workforce and one could be 
close to the optimum and the other well away from it 
dependent upon the original level of overmanning. The 
implementation of the experiment will move the plant 
towards the optimum combination but it is impossible to 
evaluate the precise position.
Furthermore, ironically, the logic of the experiment was 
that plants were rewarded for their past negative 
attitudes. Plants that had been most negligent and lax in 
their past control over manning levels could now implement 
the experiment, free apparently impressive percentages of 
their workforce and receive plaudits and .reward's as a 
consequence and still be no more efficient than their 
previously more stringent counterparts who would receive no 
benefits but still might be operating more efficiently. The 
recognition of this contradiction in the logic of the 
experiment coupled with a desire to adapt the experiment, 
led to the implementation of a number of attempted 
variants.
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SECTION 6: EARLY VARIANTS OF THE SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT.
It was recognised soon after the inception of the Shchekino 
experiment, that while in principle it was generally 
applicable, in specific circumstances it would need 
adaptation. One such example is when the experiment is 
applied to an industrial association. The problem is that 
associations comprise previously seperate industrial 
enterprises which were amalgamated as part of the 
organisational reform of industry (130). Within these 
enterprises, manning levels, labour organisation, labour 
productivity, work intensity and labour discipline are not 
necessarily uniform as they are the result of previous 
unco-ordinated allocations, decisions and practices. As a 
result, the implementation of the basic Shchekino 
experiment will have a differentiated effect.
For enterprises that had previously been lax in controlling 
manning levels etc.,. the experiment could be implemented 
with reasonable ease. c. An impressive percentage of the 
superfluous workforce could be shed, thus raising average 
productivity and from the economised portion of the wage 
fund wage supplements could be paid and average wages would 
rise. The appearance of increased work intensity could be 
created while at the same time preserving a significant 
safety factor.
However, for enterprises which had previously been more
PAGE 247
disciplined the implementation of the experiment -would be 
more difficult (131). It would be less easy to shed surplus 
labour, the economised funds available for material 
incentives would be smaller and the eventual safety factor 
retained would be smaller. Within this enterprise work 
intensity will be greater but rewards smaller and the 
degree of managerial vunerability to failure greater, even 
though it is more efficient than the former enterprise. No 
mechanism, automatic or otherwise, exists for equalising 
work intensity nor for providing a dynamic in this 
direction.
From the point of view of the association, at the end of 
this process labour will have been freed, to be re-located 
elsewhere but there is no necessary correspondence between 
work and rewards across the enterprises in the association. 
Indeed, if workers are mobile between enterprises the net 
result may be even more harmful, as workers will tend to 
move from the more efficient, where labour discipline is 
tighter and rewards smaller, to the less efficient were 
discipline is more lax and rewards greater, thus 
undermining the association's performance and the logic of 
the experiment. In order to overcome these problems a 
variant of the Shchekino experiment was implemented, in 
June 1969, at the Bashkirneftekhimzavody (132). The aim of 
the experiment was to recognise from the outset the 
differing levels of capacity utilisation and work intensity 
at the various enterprises in the association and to 
reformulate the experiment to give comparable incentives to
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all enterprises to improve performance.
Prior to the experiment's introduction the association had 
had a chequered history. From 1964, growth rates of labour 
productivity had declined sharply and failed to meet 
planned targets (133). The reasons for this, explained by 
the association's director Petrov, are an interesting 
example of why Soviet management is wary of technological 
change that upgrades plant, product or processes but that 
in the short term, worsens economic performance.
In this period the enterprise had introduced improved 
technology into auxiliary production and introduced new 
large-scale production lines. Much of this was being 
introduced into the USSR for the first time and had serious 
design shortcomings. The overall effect was that labour 
expenditures actually increased rather than decreased and 
output failed to expand as the new plant underwent 
implementation problems that could only be resolved during 
production. It was against this background, not entirely 
dissimilar to that at Shchekino, that the experiment was 
introduced. As Petrov points out, the experiment's 
introduction, disclosed enormous reserves for increasing 
labour productivity (134). Once again this underlines the 
point made previously, that by simply introducing new 
technology there is no automatic increment in labour 
productivity or output as new technology and technique is 
refracted through labour organisation and negative control.
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The form of the experiment was essentially similar to the 
basic Shchekino model; the wage fund was frozen for a 
number of years (at Bashkir for 3 years only); manning 
levels were to be reduced by combining jobs and 
rationalising production and labour organisation; those 
taking on extra responsibilities received wage supplements 
up to 30% of their basic wage or salary rate and so on.
The novelty came however, in the system of material 
stimulation. This recognised the different levels of work 
intensity in existence across the association and the 
consequent differing abilities to free workers. For 
example, Khor'kov cites the possibility of a 13.4% cut in 
the workforce at the Ufa plant within the association 
compared with a potential 4% cut at the Novo Ufa enterprise 
(135). Therefore, in order to go some way towards 
equalising the incentive effects of the experiment it was 
decided to centralise 30% of all the economised wage funds, 
from each enterprise, under the control of the association
director,
This was then utilised in the following manner. The 
individual enterprises would receive a 7% increase in 
their material incentive funds for each 1% increment in 
their labour productivity plan. By the same token, if the 
labour productivity plan was underfulfilled by 1% then the 
material incentive fund was to be reduced by 7%. These 
allocations were then subject to a 'normalisation 
coefficient', that attempted to quantify differences in
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work intensity. For example, at the Novo Ufa plant, where 
work intensity was recognised to be higher than the average 
already existing, it was harder to mobilise further 
reserves and the incentive fund rose by 7.5% for each 1% 
increase in productivity. As a result this enterprise 
received 6,300R more from the centralised fund than it 
contributed through economised wages (136). Elsewhere the 
increment was below 7%. In this way it was intended to 
provide all enterprises in the association with an 
equalised incentive to free labour and raise productivity.
The original intention of the experiment was to raise 
output by 16.6% and labour productivity by 16.4% over, the 
period 1968-1971, thereby achieving indices almost double 
the average for the rest of the branch. This was to be 
achieved with 3,224 less workers and with a 13% increase in 
average wages (137).
In the first six months of the experiment over 1,600
workers were released and this was almost as many as were
 ^ ■ ' 
released in the whole republic as a result of mechanising
and automating production (138); the planned productivity
increase of 5% was exceeded and it actually rose by 9.4%
and output grew by 7.4% (139). From this modest start the
experiment accelerated and by 1971, the end of the first
phase of the experiment, the volume of production had
actually grown by 17.8%, labour productivity had grown by
24.1% and average wages had increased by 17.1% (140).
PAGE 251
So the variant appears to have been as successful as the 
basic experiment but its implementation was not without 
difficulty. Firstly, as at Shchekino, not all the 
economised wage funds were utilised. This was due to 
difficulties experienced in dividing up the economised 
funds within the individual enterprises. The simple course 
of action would have been to divide the economised funds 
equally shop by shop but this 'wage levelling' destroys the 
logic of the experiment as more diligent workers would not 
be rewarded. However, if the funds are distributed on a 
differentiated basis conflicts and resistance arise to the 
experiment from those who feel unfairly treated and ignored 
in the process.
Secondly, Petrov cites the example ’’ of a shop where the 
re-organisation was scheduled to take three years, yet it 
was actually achieved in three months (141). As a 
consequence the shop's Chief should have received the 30% 
wage supplement. However, if this had been initiated then 
his wage would have exceeded the enterprise's Production 
Chief. Therefore, the logic of the experiment can distort 
the internal wage structure of the plant and generate 
internal conflicts to the detriment of production 
’effectiveness. For example in the case cited, if the Shop 
Chief receives the supplement then it is a clear message to 
the higher echelons of the plant's management that even if 
they are not recompensed for taking on additional 
responsibility, their subordinates will be. If he does not 
receive the supplement it is a clear message to other shop
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chiefs that the experiment will be manipulated to maintain 
old wage structures and therefore, why bother to press its 
implementation. Petrov argues that the way around this is 
that enterprise directors should be given more autonomy in 
wage determination but this is problematic also (142).
Thirdly, there was the usual problems with external 
factors. Even though the experiment was successful 
internally it was constrained by the degree of 
interdependence between the individual plants and the rest 
of the economic system. For example, rapid increments in 
output were useless if the rail network could not provide 
sufficient tankers to transport the finished product away 
from the plant. This limited further possibilities for 
growth in output and productivity as no enterprise is 
autarchic.
Once again the experiment rather than altering its external 
environment is subject to its vagaries. The initial 
successes of this variant do not of themselves prove its 
long run viability. The question of the long run experience 
of this variant will be returned to in the next chapter.
A second variant of the experiment was instituted at the 
Perm Electrical Machinery Plant (143). This variant took 
the experiment in a different direction by recognising that 
stable wage funds and plan targets may not in themselves be 
desirable objectives, if the enterprise is producing a 
changing assortment of products with ever changing labour
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inputs (144). At Perm therefore, the intention was to 
reduce the wage expenditures per rouble of finished output 
over a number of years. In 1969 planned wage outlays were 
25.6 kopecks per rouble of output and this was to be 
reduced to 23.6 in 1970, 22.5 in 1971 and 21.3 in 1972. 
Over this same period the plant pledged to increase output 
by 46%, instead of the 33.7% stipulated in the plan targets 
and to reduce the labour force by 1,300, thereby increasing 
labour productivity by 53% (145). As production increased 
with a decreasing workforce, even though wage outlays per 
rouble of output were declining, average wages would rise 
thus stimulating output and efficency. From the ruling 
group's perspective this is desirable as a declining wage 
cost, with increasing output, implies a growth in the 
surplus.
In the four years up until 1972, output actually rose by 
over 58%, labour productivity increased by 53% and average 
wages rose by almost 21 roubles per month. Inexplicably the 
experiment was abandoned in 1972, with the explicit 
agreement of the State Committee on Labour and Wages (146). 
The beneficial effects of the experiment were soon 
dissipated and whilst during the course of the four years 
of the experiment managerial and supervisory staff had been 
cut by 60, in the next four years their number grew by over 
400 (147). Furthermore, without the controlling influence 
of the experiment the wage outlays per rouble of output 
began to accelerate.
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As well as the usual problems faced by Shchekino-like 
initiatives, there are two particular problems that may 
well explain the abandonment of the Perm variant. Firstly, 
if the wage fund is to be determined in relationship to the 
value of finished output or the volume of goods sold, which 
is what is implied in the variant, then it is possible for 
the enterprise to manipulate its wage fund by changing the 
nature of the product. The intention was to raise 
productivity but a similar effect can be achieved by 
embellishing the product, thereby raising the value of 
output even though in a physical sense output may not have 
expanded. Boldyrev cites the example of an enterprise 
previously making a simple glass switching to produce a 
glass with a gold rim (148). The same impact could be 
achieved by manipulating the assortment of output away from 
low value towards higher value output. As the example below 
illustrates the net effect would be to raise average wage 
levels simply by expending more raw materials but not 
necessarily raising labour productivity nor increasing the 
volume of use-values.
Secondly, there is the familiar problem of how the wage 
normative is to be set. If it is developed on the basis of 
past production and wage levels it simply legitimises past 
practices and provides no dynamic towards the - equalisation 




Work Force 100 workers
Wage Outlay 10k per R
Output 100,000 x 1R
Wage Fund 10 , 000R
Average Wage 100R
Intended Outcome.
Cut Workforce to 75 workers 
Cut Wage Outlays to 5k per R 
Raise Output to 200,000 x 1R
Wage Fund 10 , 000R
Average Wage 133.3R
Possible Outcome.
Cut Workforce to 75 workers 
Cut Wage Outlays to 5k per R 
Output 100,000 x 2R
Wage Fund 10 ,000R
Average Wage 133.3R
A further notable variant was undertaken at the Chelyabinsk 
metallurgical plant were the experiment was introduced with 
the usual results and over 200 workers were released in the 
first few months. However, at this plant the nature of the 
previous production and labour organisation necessitated 
changes in the form of wage supplement payments. The 
experiment was utilised as a supplement to the brigade 
system of labour organisation and the wage supplements 
rather than being individualised, were distributed via a 
"collective piece rate" system. The idea behind this was to 
encourage a brigade to take on a specific integrated series 
of tasks and to encourage them to release workers. The net 
result being wage supplements for those who remained (149).
Dramatic results were also recorded by an extended variant 
at the Polotsk chemical combine where labour productivity
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increased by over 42% in one year (150). Here the aim was 
not only to produce more output with fewer workers but to 
increase the effectiveness of all aspects of production
(151). This was achieved by simultaneously renovating and 
reorganising production facilities and rethinking labour 
organisation. This included extensive use of work study 
techniques, photographing workers activity, movements, etc
(152). Coupled to this was the complete centralisation of 
the provision of services and wages were tied directly to 
educational and skill attainments (153). Semin refers to 
this as the "complex-technical" method which eventually led 
to a 25-30% reduction in service personnel, significantly 
improved labour discipline and productivity and eventually 
led to the release of 500 workers (154). The Polotsk 
variant really took the Shchekino experiment to its logical 
conclusion at the enterprise level by effectively 
reorganising the plant from scratch. The obvious problem is 
that whilst this may be feasible at one plant its 
generalisation is much more problematic because of the 
enormous resource requirements.
The Soviet literature cites a number of other variants and 
there is a tendency to see each implementation of the 
experiment as a separate variant (155.). This raises a 
potential problem with the idea of variants. If the 
experiment is adapted to specific conditions and 
circumstances conscientiously then it may well be the case, 
as at Bashkir, that benefits follow. However, the adoption 
of a variant may well be an attempt by plant management to
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create the impression that the experiment has been 
implemented whilst actually accommodating to the prevailing 
conditions. This is precisely the type of problem that 
makes it necessary to establish the experiment in the first 
instance. If there is no unambiguous mechanism of economic 
control then all that can exist is administrative attempts 
to control the surplus extraction process. There is no 
mechanism for the evaluation of the variants which is not 
itself open to manipulation. Nevertheless, the variants 
implemented in this period and cited in this section, were 
all seen as advances in the dissemination of the 
experiment. Their longer term performance will be assessed 
briefly in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: THE ATTEMPTED GENERALISATION OF THE SHCHEKINO
EXPERIMENT.
SECTION 1: THE EXTENSION OF THE EXPERIMENT IN THE EARLY 
YEARS.
The problems involved with the initial implementation of 
the experiment may well have proved difficult but they were 
not insurmountable, as the experience at Shchekino and 
elsewhere indicates. This may be attributed partially to 
the fact that with any such experiment or prestige project, 
there is the potential for a great deal of kudos to be 
attached to the individuals involved with its successful 
implementation and therefore, special efforts will be made 
by the relevant ministries, local party organs and 
especially plant management, to guarantee its initial 
localised success (1). However, it must also be recognised 
that the experiment's initial successes, particularly at a 
range of enterprises in different Ministries and Regions, 
cannot be simply explained as the result of "hot house" 
conditions. Soviet sources explicitly deny that the. success 
of the experiment was created by the provision of an 
unusually favourable environment or the provision of 
special allocations of resources (2). However, the plants 
experiencing initial successes were similar. They were 
characterised by having a combination of existing labour 
shortages, reflected in considerable in-plant vacancies, 
coupled with the need for a growing workforce, either
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because basic capacity was under-utilised or because it was 
in the process of expansion or because new facilities were 
being completed nearby. Without this experiment the new 
capacity would probably not have been manned • (3). This 
combination made it possible to absorb the majority of 
released workers in the locality, hence minimising 
discontent, whilst at the same time providing enterprises 
with the benefits of increased work intensity and 
discipline from the now more insecure workforce remaining 
at the plant.
Furthermore, even if the experiment did not lead to 
completely comparable manning levels at similar plants, nor 
to comparable norms for comparable jobs, it did 
nevertheless, tighten the internal organisation of labour 
at the plants involved and free some surplus labour. The 
variants adopted, in this early period were based upon a 
recognition of the contradictory logic of the experiment in 
some instances or were adaptations to particular 
circumstances and were attempts to stimulate the further 
dissemination and refinement of the experiment. This was 
essential for the ruling group because, however beneficial 
the impact on individual plants, if the vicious circle of 
labour productivity problems outlined in Figure 1 was to be 
broken, the experiment needed to be generalised to all 
enterprises. Quite clearly, the implementation problems 
would be exacerbated if all enterprises attempted to switch 
to the experiment overnight as preparation time, staff for 
retraining etc., would be under great pressure, as already
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noted (4). Nevertheless, generalisation of the experiment 
was clearly the ruling group's intention and this was 
consistent with the logic of the experiment. Furthermore, 
it was necessary to maintain the momentum of the experiment 
at the original enterprises, like Shchekino and Bashkir,' 
the aim being sustained change and not simply one-off 
success.
It could be argued that the results recorded by the 
Shchekino plant during the 9th Five Year Plan indicated 
that the momentum was indeed maintained. As Sharov points 
out,
"In the period 1967-1974 the volume of production grew 2.5 
times. In this same period the number of workers fell by 
1500, the productivity of labour increased by 3.1 times, 
average wages rose by 44%, significant gains were made in 
terms of returns on invested funds and profitability" (5).
By 1975, the volume of production was 34% up on 1970 and 
labour productivity had risen by 46.6%, achieving the 
planned increase for the whole plan period in only four 
years (6). Furthermore, by 19 74, in comparison with 19 66, 
losses in labour time due to absenteeism had fallen by 15 
times; absence with administrative authorisation had fallen 
by 13 times; the hours of overtime had been reduced from 
10,000 to 340 per annum and 4,254 Shchekino workers had by 
this time raised their qualifications (7). The rise in 
educational qualifications was accompanied by a further
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increase in the average skill level. However, this general 
picture of continual advance will be qualified later as it 
obscures a number of underlying problems.
An analysis of 326 industrial enterprises operating along 
Shchekino lines further confirms the picture of progress. 
By 1/11/75 these enterprises had released 47,500 workers, 
4.5% of the total they employed, and between January and 
October 1975 alone, they released almost 15,000 workers 
(8). These enterprises raised their level of labour 
productivity by between 15% and 20% over this period (9) 
and 91.7% of their growth in output was achieved by labour 
productivity increases in comparison with 80.5% in industry 
as a whole (10). In these enterprises 22.4% of the released 
workers were employed in new shops or facilities at the 
same location, 52.4% filled vacant places at the same 
plants and 25.2% went to new enterprises (11).
Discipline indicators also improved, as was the norm with 
the experiment. For example, at Artemovsk (GRES), labour 
turnover was reduced from 17% in 1973 to 8.7% in 1975 and 
at the Angarskom petro-chemical plant losses in labour time 
were reduced to less than 40% of their pre-experiment level 
(12). Also similar changes occurred in the degree of work 
combination and for example, at one plant cited, 250 people 
acquired 4-5 occupations, 550 acquired 3 occupations and 
1,518 acquired 2 occupations (13).
However, even if the level of productivity increases were
PAGE 272
not as impressive as at the plants that originally 
implemented the experiment and the scale of the labour 
released not so large, the general pattern of the 
experiment was being replicated in this period (14). This 
also includes the low level of additional payments as a 
result of the experiment's implementation which were 
estimated at a monthly average of R13 or 7.8% (15).
Nevertheless, even after its initial successes, the 
immediate pressure to generalise the experiment and its 
extension during the 9th Five Year Plan, Soviet 
commentators have continually complained about the slow 
generalisation of the experiment (16). The absolute spread 
of the experiment is detailed in Table 39, which has been 
compiled from the fragmentary sources available, and this 
shows the slow rate of dissemination up to 1977. To give 
some perspective to the figures, the 300 enterprises 
operating on Shchekino lines in 1972, represented less than 
0.5% of the Soviet total (17). Consequently the figure of 
1,200 after ten years of the experiment is probably around 
3% of the total and represents a rate of transfer of 120 
per year or ten per month (18). At this rate, assuming the 
number of enterprises remains fairly constant, it will take 
over 300 years for all Soviet enterprises to transfer to 
the experiment. In fact the majority of the plants that 
initiated the experiment did so in the early years, even 
though they may have taken some time to become operational, 
and by the mid-seventies and the tenth anniversary of the 
experiment the rate of transfer had slowed appreciably
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TABLE 39
THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT.
1 /1 9 6 8  1 2 /1 9 6 8  1 9 6 9  1 9 7 0  1 97 1  1 9 7 2
2 2 2  3 0 3  6 0 4  1 2 0 5 / 1 2 1 6  3 0 0 7
1 9 7 4  1 9 7 5  1 0 /1 9 7 7  1 2 /1 9 7 7
9 10 11 12
2% 3% 1000 1200
1.  B a ra n e n k o v a , o p . c i t ,  p .  5 1 .
2 .  K a rp e n k o , o p . c i t ,  p . 3 .
3 .  S h k u rk o , o p . c i t ,  p . 3 .
4 .  E k o n o m ich e sk ay a  G a z e ta , 1 9 7 0 , N o . 1 0 ,  £ . 1 1 .
5 .  S h k u rk o , o p . c i t ,  p . 3 .
6. P la n o v o e  K h o z y a is tv o ,  1 9 7 1  N o . 8 ,  p . 1 0 .
7 .  B o ld r y e v ,  o p . c i t ,  p . 2 .
8 .  S o n in  & Z h i l t s o v ,  EKO, 1 9 7 4 , N o . 1 ,  p . 1 2 6 .
9 .  T .  K h a c h a tu ro v , P la n o v o e  K h o z y a is tv o ,  1 9 7 4 , N o . 6 .  p . 1 2 .
1 0 .  A g an b eg yan , I z v e s t i a ,  1 / 4 / 7 5 ,  p . 2 .
1 1 . M ir g a le e v ,  o p . c i t ,  p . 1 0 5 .
1 2 .  P r a v d a , 2 9 / 7 / 7 8 ,  p . l .
81
1 9 7 3
7 0 0 8
(19) .
The slow dissemination of the experiment has been 
accompanied by a differential diffusion of the experiment 
between ministries, branches and departments of the 
economy. For example, during the 9th Five Year Plan, 150 
enterprises in the Chemical industry completed the 
transition to the experiment and freed 55,000 workers (20) 
but in some branches, notably for example machine tools, 
civil engineering, road construction and mining, no 
enterprises or work units had instituted the experiment.
Table 40 illustrates the diffusion of the experiment in a 
number of selected ministries. As noted by Ivanov, this 
disparity between ministries in applying the experiment can 
be quite pronounced, as three of the ministries cited in 
Table 40 have over 40% of their enterprises operating on 
Shchekino lines whilst Minchertmet, Mintsvetmet and 
Minenergo only have between 2% and 6% of their enterprises 
on the experiment (21). Furthermore, he notes the disparity 
between machine building and light industry. For example, 
Minkhimmash and Minavtoprom have 10-20% of their 
enterprises on the experiment whilst Minstankoprom,
Minstroidormash, Minpribor and a number of other branches 
have no more than 2% of their enterprises operating on 
experimental lines (22).
Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 41, different 
ministries had differing degrees of success with regard to 
the number of workers released. The figures in Table 41
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the chemical industry, probably the most advanced and 
successful proponent of the experiment and its variants, 
where during the course of the experiment an estimated 18% 
of the original workforce were released (23).
This differential diffusion of the experiment explains the 
substance of the comments about the experiment by
V.Selyunin (24). He argued that it was desirable for the
experiment to spread slowly during this period because its 
implementation had been predominantly in Department 1, 
producer goods industries. The increase in output and 
productivity, even though they are well in excess of wage 
rises and desirable in themselves, had nevertheless, lead 
to increased wages for workers in Department 1 industries 
without a comparable impact in Department 2, consumer goods 
output. Therefore, if the experiment continued to spread in 
this differentiated manner he saw the possibility of these 
disproportions generating inflationary pressures (25). His 
conclusion,, was that a cautious approach to the experiment
was desirable if these problems were to be avoided and
therefore, it should be disseminated slowly. Manevich 
refuted these criticisms and argued that whilst a slowing 
in the spread of the experiment would indeed reduce these 
pressures it would not resolve the underlying problems and 
it was the wrong approach. What was necessary was a more 
rapid dissemination of the experiment, and its beneficial 
effects, into Department 2 enterprises and not allow the 
lack of consumer goods to act as a constraint on the 
generalisation of the experiment (26). Nevertheless, there
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experiment to work. Yet it would appear that-the^expe  the 
experiment is conforming to the traditional bias in Soviet
predominance of Department 1 enterprises (27). This can be 
explained in a preliminary manner, by the traditional 
pressure and attention on this sector and is another 
respect in which the experiment simply conformed to 
previous patterns of Soviet industrial life without 
radically transforming it.
Some Soviet authors have suggested that the experiment is 
simply more appropriate for some industries than others 
(28). However, it should be noted that this argument has 
little official support, as both Party and State bodies 
have continuously pressed for the widest possible 
implementation of the principles of the experiment in all 
areas of, economic life. It was never envisaged for example, 
that the experiment should only be applied to basic 
production. It was thought that the problems experienced by 
the Soviet economy in the transport sector, both with 
regard to raw materials and finished products, could be 
resolved if the experiment were to be introduced. 
Disruptions in the flow of production are often attributed 
to failures in the transport system and in some sectors, as 
already noted, production can be halted if the finished 
product is not expeditiously transported away from the 
plant (29). Delays are a form of waste and poor transport
economic development and further reinforcing the
facilities or their non-availibility especially contributes 
to agricultural problems. Consequently, the Shchekino 
experiment was implemented in some transport depots. As 
Kamzin points out, the role of the experiment was not to
release drivers, who tend to be in very short supply, but
to encourage job combination and to strengthen work 
discipline (30). At the depot cited, during 1972, 736
workers were released, primarily from auxiliary and repair 
sectors, the idle time of trucks was reduced by 11% and 
productivity rose by 12% (31). The major remaining problem 
for this unit was not caused by its internal labour 
organisation but by equipment failures as a result of poor 
construction and the chronic absence of spare parts (32).
The experiment was also successfully extended to the work 
of researchers and designers working in research institutes 
(33). From 1973, the State Chemical Design Institute 
introduced the experiment and over a three year period 
freed 92 members of staff (34). This reduced design costs, 
boosted productivity and raised average wages as the 
economised wage funds were redistributed among those
remaining at the institute. The initial implementation of 
the experiment was a success showing the application of the 
principle of the experiment to the work of ITR and members 
of the intelligentsia. However, the experiment began to 
falter after three years for reasons similar to those 
outlined later in this chapter. The general point is that 
irrespective of the differential dissemination of the 
experiment its wider applicability was deemed both possible
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and desirable.
It should also be noted that during this period the 
experiment was 'exported" to a number of other East
European countries facing similar problems. There are 
references to similar experiments taking place in both
Hungary and Bulgaria. Furthermore, in Czechoslovakia, in 
1972, 21 enterprises employing 116,000 workers implemented 
the experiment with similarly favourable results (35). 
Great interest was also shown in the experiment by the 
chemical industries of the GDR and Poland (36). The 
experiment, with some adaptation, was implemented in a
number of plants with the same favourable results. In the 
GDR chemical industry for example, over a five year period, 
labour productivity grew by 140% as a result of the more 
rational labour and production organisation that the
experiment introduced. At the "Leina Verke" combine, 
production rose by 125% and labour productivity grew by 
128%, as a result of reducing the workforce (37). In Poland 
the experiment, coupled with the introduction of the 
brigade form of labour organisation and "NOT" measures, has 
been further developed (38). Cherednichenko and Gol'din 
argue that the success of the Shchekino experiment both in 
the USSR and elswhere, shows graphically its utility in 
dealing with real socio-economic tasks, particularly in a 
time of rapid technological change ‘when it is necessary to 
redeploy workers and tighten labour organisation. This 
conclusion however, raises a number of questions.
PAGE 281
SECTION 2: SOVIET CRITICISMS OF THE SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT.
Given the dramatic initial successes of the experiment, the 
success of the variants adopted, its partial extension to a 
variety of branches and regions and the virtual absence of 
any fundamental criticism of its underlying logic why 
should the generalisation of the experiment have been so 
slow and uneven and why wasn't the whole of Soviet industry 
radically transformed?
I would argue that the answers to these questions shed 
light on the socio-economic nature of the USSR; allow an 
assessment of the viability of other market-orientated 
reform initiatives and illustrate the vacuity of 
considering the USSR as any variant of capitalism.
The slow dissemination of the experiment cannot be 
explained by indifference or reluctance on the part of the 
ruling group. The analysis outlined in Chapter 2 suggests 
that they above all, had a vested interest in the 
successful generalisation of the experiment. The 
disciplining effects upon both management and workers, the 
shake-out of labour and enhanced productivity and output, 
would all contribute to a sustainable increase in the 
surplus and would eventually lead to a way out of the 
vicious circle of problems identified in Figure 1. In an 
immediate sense the release of workers would ease manpower 
shortages. Brezhnev for example, noted at the 25th Congress
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of the CPSU that,
"the major problem is labour resources, there are no 
possible further additions to the workforce and growth can 
only come through raising labour productivity
........ increasing the efficiency of social production"
(39).
The Central Committee of the CPSU had earlier charged all 
Party, Trade Union, Republican and social organisations 
(e.g. Komsomol) to search out all reserves for growth in 
labour productivity and to raise production with fewer 
numbers (40). The impact of the Shchekino experiment in 
this endeavour was explicitly praised at the 24th Congress 
of the CPSU (41) and the 25th Congress brought further 
pressure to bear for a strengthening and extension of the 
experiment, particularly to branches where it had not been 
implemented previously (42). Brezhnev repeatedly expressed 
support for the experiment but complained about its slow 
generalisation (43).
The ruling group's lack of control over the process of 
surplus extraction made the experiment necessary but this 
same lack of control leads to a qualification of the 
experiment's expected impact. Its slow dissemination is 
evidence of the ruling group's inability to assert control 
over the labour process. The failure of the ruling group to 
generalise the Shchekino experiment, almost immediately 
after calling for this, undermines the naive view that sees
PAGE 283
the USSR as a completely totalitarian, socio-economic 
system. The centralisation of economic decision making is a 
function not of total control, but the reverse. It is the 
lack of a reliable unambiguous form of economic control 
that necessitates the centralisation of decisions and 
simultaneously undermines the possibility of those 
decisions being put into practice. Directives from the 
centre do not become immediate reality but are contested, 
both between enterprise management and the centre, and 
between workers and enterprise management. The end result 
reflects the balance of that conflict not the immediate 
wishes of the ruling group, which are qualified in the 
process. Equally, the non-generalisation of the experiment 
undermines the idea that the USSR is socially homogenous, 
harmoniously developing in a contradiction-free, planned 
manner (44). How is this experience to be explained and 
what are the real forms of the contradictions it reflects?
Perhaps the most appropriate starting point is to consider 
the Soviet criticisms, which largely, though not 
exclusively, concentrate on the failure to generalise the 
experiment. These criticisms emerge in the literature in 
the early 1970s and reach a peak in the period 1976-1977.
Although there was very little fundamental criticism of the 
experiment's methodology or intention, some misgivings did 
arise in the early years. Shkurko for example, whilst 
praising the achievements at Shchekino and elsewhere, noted 
that at a number of plants it was unfortunate that the
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productivity increases could only be achieved by displacing 
workers and producing the same level of output (45). He 
argued that it would be more desirable and efficient if 
Soviet industrial enterprises could stimulate their 
existing workforce to produce more. This would avoid the 
costly disruptions involved in retraining and worker 
movement between plants. Implicit in this argument is the 
view that localised successes or even the partial 
generalisation of the experiment is inadequate. This is 
particularly the case if the released workers are simply 
reabsorbed in other enterprises and work as inefficiently 
as they had previously. The net effect of the experiment 
could in fact be negative if the gains at the enterprise 
undertaking the experiment were offset by productivity 
losses elsewhere. In fact, as a large proportion of the 
released workers were simply reintegrated into their 
present workplace this problem could be reduced. However, 
there is a complementary problem in that the experiment 
could degenerate into a formalistic exercise involving the 
shuffling of workers about the plant with little overall 
positive impact.
Further early criticisms that emerged, pointed out the 
occasional contradictions between the terms of the 
experiment and the broader planning system. For example, as 
a number of authors pointed out, the determination of the 
enterprise material incentive fund, on the basis of the 
absolute size of the workforce is a clear contradiction of 
the.basic Shchekino principles (46). Similarly, calculating
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managerial and administrative salaries on the basis of 
workforce size will militate against the adoption of the 
experiment and will prove counter-productive (47). Soviet 
sources point out that in the past it may well have been 
the case that extensive development of the economy led to a 
correspondence between a large workforce, the scale of 
output and managerial responsibilities thus explaining the 
rationale for this form of wage calculation. However, in 
modern conditions this correspondence is broken as 
increasing mechanisation and automation (and the desire to 
extend their impact) ruptures the link between workforce 
size and managerial responsibility. This renders this form 
of salary calculation obsolete. This is particularly the 
case if the Shchekino experiment has been successfully 
implemented. The reduction in workforce size could lead to 
the downgrading of the enterprise and a consequent 
reduction in managerial salaries.
These problems are the inevitable consequence of grafting 
experimental initiatives onto the bureaucratic complexities 
of the Soviet planning process. Over time administrative 
changes were made in a fragmentary manner which overcame 
these contradictions. However, the possibility of problems 
like these often arose as initiatives in one area, set up 
principles which contradicted practices in another. An 
example of this is the 1973 wage reform (48), which will be 
dealt with later in this section.
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Other early criticisms of the experiment centre on its 
operation and particularly the size of the material 
incentives offered. Baranenkova argues that the incentive 
is too small and Khachaturov criticises the financial 
authorities for being too cautious (49) . These criticisms, 
which are the direct opposite of the comments cited from 
Selyunin (50), are not criticisms of the experiment per s'e 
but are a plea to strengthen its operation. The effect they 
hope for, is that enhanced salaries and bonuses would ease 
the acceptance of the experiment, strengthen its operation 
and that as a consequence this would stimulate its 
dissemination.
It is the question of the generalisation of the experiment 
that attracted most comment and criticism. As early as 
January 1970, at a seminar on the experiment held in Tula 
involving State, Ministry, Party and enterprise officials, 
complaints were raised that the experiment was spreading 
too slowly (51). Participants at the seminar agreed that 
the hasty administrative imposition of the experiment was 
counter-productive and stressed the need for proper 
preparation prior to implementation. Parfenov suggested 
that one of the problems in extending the experiment was 
that some enterprises had oversimplified its methodology 
and saw it simply as a means to remove unwanted staff. As 
they had failed to implement all the elements of the 
experiment it had little overall impact on output or 
productivity as a consequence (52). The press reports also 
suggest that many enterprises were willing to implement the
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experiment but the extension was not taking place. The 
reason for this was that even’ when the preparation was 
conscientiously undertaken there was no guarantee that the 
enterprise would actually be allowed to implement the 
experiment (53). Obviously enterprises would be'unwilling 
to undertake the expensive and time-consuming work involved 
if no such guarantee existed. The seminar participants 
called for closer co-ordination between the ministries and 
their enterprises and the State Committee on Labour and 
Wages to overcome this problem. This is the earliest 
manifestation of a recurrent problem that dogged the 
experiment. That is who exactly is responsible for the 
decision to implement the experiment? At Shchekino itself, 
the decision was clearly taken by the enterprise at the 
behest of the ministry. The Central Committee resolution of 
October 9th 1969, is ambiguous on this issue. It -charges 
ministries to draw up plans for the implementation of the 
experiment and calls for party organisations to 
propagandise for its generalisation, but it does not 
specify actual responsibility (54). In the 1971 regulations 
governing the experiment's implementation, every enterprise 
is given the right to transfer to the experiment but only 
if it has the support of its ministry and the agreement of 
the Trade Union Committee (55).
What this means is that the experiment can only be 
implemented with conscious ministerial support and 
enterprise autonomy is heavily circumscribed because 
without the specification of a stable plan and wage fund
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the experiment will be undermined. Aganbegyan is 
particularly critical of the failure to give enterprises 
real autonomy in implementing the experiment (56). However, 
this works both ways because any ministry wishing to see 
the experiment implemented in a particular enterprise would 
find it impossible to impose it and is therefore, reliant 
upon enterprise acceptance of the experiment. For the 
experiment to be successful both enterprise and ministry 
have to be actively supportative of each other. The 
possibility that one or the other may perceive the 
experiment not to be in their interest is a powerful reason 
for the slow generalisation. This will be taken up in more 
detail later in this chapter.
In Novozhilov's report to the Tula seminar he argued that a 
contributory reason for the non-generalisation of the 
experiment is that the logic of its operation has been 
inadequately theorised (57). His argument is echoed by 
Boldyrev who claimed that although Soviet economists were 
well able to collect empirical data for a number of years 
and then cautiously advance on the basis of this, they were 
unable to theorise and generalise the implications of the 
experiment (58). Parfenov goes even further and indicts not 
only economists but also sociologists, industrial 
psychologists and planning specialists who have failed to 
analyse the experiment and thereby aid its generalisation 
(59) .
As a consequence of these failings Novozhilov points out
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that perhaps the terms of the experiment are too static. 
For example, an enterprise irrespective of its current 
state of labour organisation and production discipline 
receives all the economised wage fund to dispose of in the 
form of wage supplements or for collective consumption 
purposes. This leads to the disparity already noted between 
"advanced" and "backward" collectives (60). The Bashkir 
variant addresses this problem when the enterprises were 
amalgamated in an industrial association but in other cases 
this constitutes a further blockage in the dissemination of 
the experiment. The advanced collective by virtue of its 
past performance and by definition, would be the most 
likely to take up new initiatives but will gain little from 
the implementation of the experiment. The backward 
collective, again by definition and past performance, will 
be unlikely to be innovatory, even though potentially it 
has most to gain. As one type of enterprise has little to 
gain and the other is unlikely to implement it, the 
experiment will falter.
Boldyrev noted two further related problems (61). Firstly, 
the implementation of the experiment in the early seventies 
was predicated upon pledges for increased production. This 
general principle reflects the "resultism" common to many 
areas of Soviet planning (62) and disregards whether 
increased production is either necessary or desirable. For 
example, it may generate disproportions if the product is 
an intermediate element in a complex chain of production.
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He suggested that perhaps enhanced quality or reliability 
would be a more useful basis for the experiment. Secondly, 
Boldyrev noted that the slow dissemination of the
experiment may well be explained by the fact that its
general thrust puts management into a potentially
embarrassing position. During the process of plan
compilation management negotiate with the relevant ministry 
on the basis of scarcity of resources, particularly labour. 
Yet they are now supposed to shed labour and take on 
increased tasks. Management will be wary of exposing their 
hoarded reserves, laying themselves open to criticism and 
hence the experiment's spread will be retarded.
A further general problem for many enterprises, noted by 
Parfenov is the lack of clarity in the instructions-for the 
implementation of the experiment (63). Contradictions in 
the instructions either stop enterprises from adopting the 
experiment or simply dampen their enthusiasm, hence slowing 
its generalisation. Furthermore, Parfenov noted another 
contradiction in the instructions (64). He pointed out that 
the instructions contain the warning that any wage 
supplements introduced, can later be withdrawn if the work 
for which they are granted is changed by either 
technological improvements or rennovation of existing 
capital stock. This implies that the benefits for the 
collective are potentially short term and may be removed 
later as investment decisions are taken elsewhere, outside 
of their control . For Parfenov, this increased uncertainty 
hinders the broader acceptance of the experiment.
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The overall impetus of the experiment was also undermined, 
as previously noted, by the 1973 wage reform. On the basis 
of the success of the experiment all enterprise were to be 
allowed to introduce elements of the financial incentives 
operating at Shchekino without introducing the full 
experiment (65). Therefore, with little preparation, no 
necessary commitment to either increase productivity nor to 
reorganise labour, the incentive elements of the experiment 
could be introduced. From the point of view of the 
enterprise this appears attractive because it avoids the 
necessity to tackle the workforce and at the same time 
holds out the prospect of success. The same is true for the 
ministries. Even those ministries which had been most 
supportative of the experiment halted its systematic 
implementation in the hope that they could achieve its 
intended effect without its full introduction. The 
resultant slowing of the rate of dissemination of the full 
experiment (66) and the continued decline in the rate of 
growth of labour productivity, showed this hope to be 
ill-founded (67).
All these criticisms emerged from the operation of the 
experiment or from the failures to generalise the 
experience. They do not undermine the idea of the
experiment and all the authors cited are fundamentally
supportative of the extension of the experiment. However, 
perhaps the best way to explain the failure to generalise 
the experiment is to consider the experience of the
Shchekino plant itself.
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SECTION 3: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SHCHEKINO ENTERPRISE IN
THE SEVENTIES
After the initial period of dramatic success the experience 
of the Shchekino plant throughout the seventies shows the 
specific problems of maintaining the momentum of the 
experiment. In two important articles, written around the 
tenth anniversary of the experiment, it was reported that 
the Shchekino plant was now one of Tula's lagging 
enterprises and was unlikely to fulfill its current plan 
targets (68). The' problems the enterprise faced cast 
further doubts on the coherence of its internal logic and 
are explicable only in terms of the contradiction between 
the underlying logic of the experiment and the nature of 
Soviet planning. This' in turn reflects the particular 
political economy of the USSR. Furthermore, there is a 
direct link between the problems of maintaining the 
momentum of the experiment and the problems of extending 
its operation and the specific experience at Shchekino 
explains the reluctance on the part of many Soviet 
enterprise managers to embark on the experiment.
In the first instance the point of the experiment is to 
take up "slack" within the enterprise by rationally 
utilising existing resources. In this sense there will be 
an initial once-and-for-all impact, as surplus labour is 
shaken out (69). But as Soviet sources note, this cannot 
account for all the productivity increases achieved nor 
their continuation over time. It does however, explain the
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tendency for productivity increments to occur but at a 
declining rate and this is implicit in the logic of the 
experiment, whichever explanation of its functioning is 
accepted.
For example, if we accept the Soviet view that it is the 
incentive effect of the experiment which explains its 
success, then as the workforce is trimmed the potential for 
further wage increases or for extending the wage 
supplements to new groups of workers, from the economised 
wages of those released, is progressively reduced. 
Furthermore, if it is recognised that money does not 
function as a universal equivalent in the USSR, even if 
there is a short term incentive effect this will be 
dissipated as workers learn over time that increased money 
wages do not necessarily lead to increased access to 
use-values (consumer goods, agricultural products, better 
housing etc).
If however , we accept the argument .presented in Chapter 3, 
Section 5, that the success of the experiment was achieved 
by increasing workers' insecurity this too will have a 
diminishing effect over time. In the initial period, when 
the plant's labour surplus is at its highest, so too will 
be the possibility of release and consequently the level of 
insecurity will be at its highest. In this period the 
salutary effect on labour discipline will be most 
pronounced and productivity gains will be at their highest. 
However, as surplus labour is shed the possibility of
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release will diminish and the security element will rise 
again, with a consequent negative impact on productivity 
gains through increasing work intensity. Therefore, 
whichever explanation is adopted the result is the same, a 
tendency for the rate of growth of productivity increases 
to decline. Table 42, indicates the decline in growth rates 
that took place at Shchekino over this period (70).
Table 43, compiled from a number of sources, shows the time 
period over which labour was released from Shchekino. 
Clearly the major impact was achieved in the initial 27 
months of the experiment when over 1,000 workers were 
released, whilst over the next 8 years only 500 more 
workers were released. For the period 1977-1980, the 
anticipated release of workers was thought to be unlikely 
to exceed 300 (71).
A similar argument, regarding diminishing effectiveness, 
could be applied to management. Their response to the 
experiment, once the original "psychological barriers" were 
overcome was enthusiastic and success, reflected in praise, 
public acknowledgement and rewards, will foster the 
experiment's extension. This enthusiasm will be tempered 
over time, as will be explained in detail below, and will 
diminish the search for internal reserves and no management 
will willingly cut their safety factor to zero. The plant 
will settle into a new routine and implicit in this is a 
tendency for declining effectiveness, no matter how 
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The only way this tendency can be offset is if the plant's 
output and performance can be improved by the renewal of 
plant and equipment, the introduction of new technology, 
the mechanisation of what were previously manual tasks or 
expansion of plant capacity at the current technological 
level. The difficulties involved in this course of action 
for Soviet enterprises have already been noted (72). 
Nevertheless, this had been the intention for the second 
phase of the experiment in the period 1970-1975 (73) and 
prior to the 9th Five Year Plan redevelopment of the 
Shchekino plant was agreed. On the basis of this the 
Shchekino workforce agreed to increase labour productivity 
by 62%, wages were to rise by 23% and a further 9.6% cut in 
the workforce was to take place (74). However, the familiar 
problems of the supply and construction sectors of the 
Soviet economy were compounded by delays at the level of 
the Chemical ministry, which took two years to approve the 
plans for the plant's redevelopment. Construction deadlines 
were consistently missed due to delays in deliveries or 
complete non-appearance of essential materials (75). Even 
when work was carried out it was poorly finished or was not 
completed.
Nevertheless, by even more intensive utilisation of the 
existing resources, the enterprise managed to slightly 
overfulfil its targets for the 9th Five Year Plan but was 
now operating, in its own terms, very near its full 
capacity (76). The result of this was that in the first 
year of r the 10th Five Year Plan the enterprise failed to
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fulfill its planned targets. The specific reason for this 
was that newly completed plant failed; the modernisation of 
one key shop was further delayed and finally, when it was 
opened it shut down after one month. This resulted in wage 
supplements being withdrawn and the 13th month bonus being 
reduced (77). In other words the dynamic of the experiment 
had now come into contact with the usual problems of Soviet 
industrial life. As long as the success of the experiment 
was dependent upon the internal search for reserves its 
momentum could be maintained, but at a declining rate. 
However, it was now constrained by the external environment 
it was supposed to revolutionise and its further success 
was to be determined by the external support it received or 
more correctly, was denied.
This had serious consequences for the Shchekino plant. The 
combination of declining success, with the consequent 
reductions in bonuses and wage supplements, coupled with 
the increasing pressure to achieve plan targets with a 
smaller workforce, led to skilled workers and technicians 
leaving the enterprise. The reduction in bonuses and wages, 
coupled with increased work intensity, could not be offset 
by wage supplements, drawn from economies in the wage fund 
as a result of workers being freed, because the voluntary 
movement out of the plant simply generated labour 
shortages. Skilled workers could choose to move to nearby 
plants with better rewards and potentially less pressure, 
particularly if these plants were not part of the 
experiment. If this is the case the initial effects on
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labour discipline and work intensity will begin to be 
nullified as the plant's management strive to retain 
necessary workers. This is particularly, the case if the 
experiment has not been adopted in all plants in a locality 
and ironically the experiment's previous positive effect on 
labour turnover may be reversed. The possible trade-off 
between increased work intensity and rewards will be broken 
as workers shift to plants with looser controls over work 
intensity. So for the individual plant the duration of the 
experiment will be determined by the degree of 
under-utilised capacity at the outset and once this is 
taken up, (as far as the enterprise management see this as 
desirable), the experiment will falter. Once again it is 
ironic to note that enterprises with the greatest 
unutilised capacity will be able to sustain the experiment 
the longest.
A further problem experienced at Shchekino resulted from 
the combination of the experiment with other central 
initiatives. For example, Shchekino began to receive 
centralised directives for the reduction of management 
personnel, over and above the changes that the experiment 
had engendered. This caused particular problems as the 
enterprise was left with insufficient staff even to 
evaluate operational data. This will act as an impediment 
to the further dissemination of the experiment. This 
problem reflects the administrative nature of the Soviet 
economic mechanism, where centralised instructions are 
often arbitrary and incompatible with other initiatives.
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The experience at Shchekino during this period also 
highlights the contradictory relationship that exists 
between the ministry and enterprise management. It 
highlights the differences in their aims and the ambiguity 
that exists concerning the question of responsibility. This 
relates specifically to the central principles of the 
experiment.
Firstly, the original cornerstone of the experiment was the 
provision of a stable wage fund and the right of the
enterprise to utilise any economised funds to stimulate 
productivity growth, plus the right to transfer any
unutilised balance from one year to the next. This last 
element was lost in the early seventies (78). Furthermore 
at Shchekino in the second phase of the experiment, 
1970-75, 4 million roubles were lost from the wage fund 
(79). As Ivanov points out, in this period the wage fund 
was 'corrected' on seventeen separate occasions (80). From 
as early as 1973 onwards the Shchekino enterprise had to
plead with the ministry for sufficient funds to pay the
wage supplements (81). The dynamic that this developed is 
clearly identified by Slepykh, who points out that up to 
1974 labour productivity had grown by 34% but average wages 
had only increased by 7%. This is far less than the 23% 
originally planned and is explained by the continual 
reductions in the wage fund (82). For Shchekino, this 
problem reached a peak in 1975, when as a result of the
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introduction of new basic wage and salary rates the 
enterprise had to cancel the payment of wage supplements 
for 1,700 workers (83).
This occurred at a number of other plants. Mirgaleev 
points out for example, that the Food Ministry had failed 
to budget the correct wage fund for a number of plants in 
the North Caucasus, even though they had reduced staff by 
500 in two years (84). As a result of this average wages 
fell rather than rose as planned. As he further points out, 
some workers simply do not know their entitlement to wage 
supplements under the terms of the experiment. A further 
common phenomenon, cited by Mirga ieev ls redirection
of the economised portion of the wage fund away from the 
plant making the savings (85). This occurred because the 
responsible ministry has failed to budget for the wages of 
workers at newly opened facilities, either at the same site 
or elsewhere. According to Prokhvatilov, petro-chemical 
enterprises in the Dnepropetrovsk region suffered this fate 
and the implementation of the experiment led to no material 
benefit for the workforce (86).
However limited the real incentive effects of the 
experiment, no one will willingly work more intensively for 
less and instability of the wage fund has an effect, not 
only on the wages of the workforce, but also upon 
management. This type of instability increases uncertainty, 
reduces their room for manoeuvre and will deter them from 
implementing the experiment. The impact of this action is
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similar to the situation described in Figure 7. The major 
difference being that in that instance the economised wage 
fund was not utilised immediately but held over or used for 
collective provision. However, at Shchekino and the other 
plants cited, those funds were taken out of the control of 
the enterprise. Furthermore, the savings made and 
subtracted from the wage fund now became the base figure 
for the next planning period and the wage fund moved 
downwards on this ratchet principle.
The second central element of the experiment's operation 
was the provision of stable plan targets for a specified 
time period after the implementation of the experiment. 
However, this principle was breached quickly. In the 
short-run the Shchekino plant had its production plans 
revised upwards as often as enterprises not operating on 
the experimental lines (87). The same problem is reported 
from a number of other plants operating on the experiment 
(88). Over the longer run, the transition from one plan 
period to the next, the traditional Soviet planning 
principle of "planning from the achieved level" or "ratchet 
planning" re-emerged and was widely criticised. For 
enterprises on the experiment these instabilities pose a 
number of related problems as well as acting as a deterrent 
to enterprises thinking about making the transition to the 
experiment.
Firstly, unstable plan targets will discourage management, 
at enterprises already operating on experimental lines,
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from identifying further spare capacity. At these 
enterprises the whole point of the experiment was to reduce 
the safety factor of hoarded labour by. improving labour 
organisation. However, the degree to which this has been 
achieved, necessarily reduces the enterprises ability to 
respond to short-run plan changes, hence increasing the 
possibility of failure. If plan stability is not maintained 
then the enterprise management will see no advantage in 
further extending the experiment and reducing their room 
for manoeuvre. Furthermore, non-participating enterprises 
will be deterred if the post-experiment situation is no 
better, and perhaps even worse, than the pre-experiment 
period.
This will also apply to ministries who will be reluctant to 
expose their reserves at the range of enterprises under 
their control (89). If ministries are compelled repeatedly 
by planning agencies to increase their output or alter the 
assortment of production this is easier to achieve if the 
plants they control are of the "non-Shchekino" type. For 
those operating on the experiment a change in a single plan 
indicator necessitates a complete revision of the 
committments made in connection with the shift to the 
experiment and this makes the ministry's life even more 
complicated. Ministries will be unable to respond to future 
short-run plan changes if the experiment is extended to all 
the ministry's enterprises and all slack is eliminated. 
Therefore, if the ministry anticipates unstable plans, 
which is the norm, then they have a vested interest in
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retarding the spread of the experiment (90).
Secondly, even if short-run plans are stable and capacity 
utilisation is increased there is still the broader problem 
of ratchet planning, if targets are raised for subsequent 
plan periods. The major criticisms here are that the 
planning system fails to take adequate account of the 
changes the experiment brings and treats the enterprise in 
an arbitrary manner. The almost automatic uprating of plans 
in the pre-experiment period could only be accommodated 
(and justified) either because of the existence of the 
safety factor or because of the possibilities of attracting 
more workers. However, after the implementation of the 
experiment, by definition, these options do not 
exist.Therefore, the adoption of a ratchet planning 
mechanism will deter enterprise management and ministries 
from extending the experiment.
Thirdly, if new plan targets are predicated upon extensions 
to existing capacity or upgraded, rennovated plant 
capacity, which has not been undertaken or has broken down, 
or is of poor quality and design, then the enterprise will 
fail as Shchekino did (91).
Figure 9, basea upon the model developed in Chapter 3, 
seeks to illustrate the problems involved from the 
viewpoint of an individual enterprise.






























o 4-> s -
•H 3 4-3 oc CL 3 Cm
x : 4-> Cl • X
o 3 -u> > ) S-,
0 O 3 4-> o
4-3 O 0 s
0 <M. e 1“ i s cd • s
• 3 X) 3 w U 3
co E • H s o E
•H •H CO •H x: 4-3 •r4
CO X cd X 4-3 O 4-3
cd cd 0 cd cd CL
XI 2 Cm 2 Cm O
it n I I
< r  r o  *  














l o  < r  m  c m  r
X  X  X  X  x
stimulated and output rises. The tightening internal 
organisation of labour shifts the optimal workforce size 
from L*1 towards L*. If plan targets are shifted upwards on 
a ratchet principle from Xpl to Xp4 the possibilities of 
plan fulfillment diminish. We may assume that the maximum 
technically efficient output, X4, with a given capital 
stock and an unchanging technological level, can never be 
obtained. This is partially because this level of output is 
a hypothetical maximum but also because the enterprise 
management will still maintain some degree of safety factor 
of hoarded labour. If the safety factor is L*-L3, then any 
output level in excess of X3 is unattainable. Furthermore, 
without technological change or a shift in the overall 
stock of plant any output above X4/Xp4 is also 
unattainable. What is being suggested is that the continual 
uprating of planned targets coupled with unstable wage 
funds will prompt management to re-establish a safety 
factor thus undermining the experiment's continuation. The 
combination of the implementation of the experiment and 
simultaneously the erosion of its basic terms, will 
ultimately lead to enterprise failure and the reassertion 
of old planning practices.
Aganbegyan cites the problem of shifting plan targets as 
the prime reason for the experiment's slow dissemination. 
In his view enhanced enterprise autonomy is the only way 
simultaneously to free enterprises from this constraint and 
to make more rational use of manpower by extending the 
experiment (92). Ultimately the failure to generalise the
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Shchekino experiment is explained by Aganbegyan, as a 
result of the principle that "initiative is punishable" 
(93). He argues that eventually the internal search for 
reserves is hindered by the dependence upon outside 
agencies and even if a subjective desire for change exists, 
the necessary objective resources are absent. Aganbegyan 
points out that enthusiasm for reform initiatives is often 
"drowned in a sea of paperwork" as increasingly complex 
instructions are set up to overcome each of a variety of 
inconsistencies.
It could be argued therefore, that the experience of the 
Shchekino plant could act as a disincentive to other plants 
contemplating following their initial example. Perhaps 
these problems could be overcome if the experiment could be 
established everywhere simultaneously and this may 
establish a dynamic that could sweep away the bottleknecks 
and blockages. As already noted this is impractical, given 
the form of the experiment, and would cause massive 
implementational problems at the level of the enterprise.
What is being suggested is that implicit in the logic of 
the Shchekino experiment, at enterprise level, is a 
tendency for initial success, which starts at a high point 
and then continuously declines and eventually leads to plan 
under-fulfilment. This negative longer-term experience 
explains the slow generalisation of the experiment. This 
process raises a number of further questions that will be 
taken up in the next two sections . _________ ___________ ___
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SECTION 4; THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS OF
GENERALISING THE EXPERIMENT.
From the viewpoint of the ruling group the slow 
dissemination of the experiment was undesirable and 
attempts were made to reinvigorate its extension (94). In 
order to be able to do this some idea of the blockage 
existing was necessary and it is interesting to note that 
the whole emphasis of their efforts was directed towards 
the regulations for the implementation of the experiment. 
This implies that in their view the failures were solely of 
an administrative or institutional nature. As already 
noted, ambiguities in the instructions was a concern cited 
by a number of authors (95).
As a consequence new instructions for the implementation of 
the experiment were introduced on 27th January, 1977 (96). 
As Cherednichenko and Gol'din point out, the instructions 
had undergone a series of changes already and they pick out
nine essential elements of the operation of the experiment
and show that each of these has been changed between two
and four times up to 1977 (97). Therefore, the aim in the 
1977 proposals was to remove the impediments to the 
experiment's implementation and also to provide a stable 
and rational set of conditions.
The prime problems cited in the introduction to the new
instructions were the incomplete adoption of the experiment 
at enterprise level and the lack of support given to the
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experiment by ministries (98). Therefore, the twofold aim 
was to overcome these problems. The 19 77 regulations 
reaffirmed that the decision to implement the experiment 
rests primarily with the enterprise and at the same time 
charges ministries with the responsibility of compiling 
plans for the further introduction of the experiment. 
Nevertheless, enterprise autonomy is still constrained in 
so far as the responsibility for establishing output norms 
and the level of the wage fund remains with the ministry.
In order to stop the claw back of economised wage funds the
instructions specify that 50% of any unutilised economised
wage funds may be retained by the enterprise. From the
point of view of workers the maximum bonus is retained at 
30% of the basic wage rate. Major changes were made 
regarding the payment of bonuses and the evaluation of 
manning levels prior to and during the experiment and these 
will be considered below.
It was hoped that these new regulations would stimulate the 
extension of the experiment and they were seen as an 
advance in so far as they incorporated some of the previous 
criticisms made by practicioners of the experiment. 
However, there were still problems and the new instructions 
were strongly criticised by a series of Soviet writers, 
particularly those who had practical experience of the 
experiment. V.Slepykh for example, pointed out that the new 
requirement, set up in the 1977 regulations, that labour 
norms have to be set from branch or interbranch m a n u a l s  a s  
a necessary pre-condition for the implementation of the
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experiment, is theoretically correct. (This is desirable to 
overcome the problems already referred to with regard to 
differing initial manning levels in enterprises of the same 
type in the same ministry). However, as these norms do not 
exist in many areas it can only slow down the 
implementation of the experiment (99). As Parfenov and 
Shvetsov point out, even in the chemical industry, the then 
current level of norms was only planned to extend to 70% of 
the workforce by the end of the 10th Five Year Plan (100). 
Therefore the possibilities of further extension of the 
experiment were very limited even in this relatively 
advanced branch. As Selyunin points out, this is almost a 
reversal of past experience (101). In the past the 
introduction of the experiment had prompted the acceptance 
of tighter labour norms. Now however, one of the benefits 
of the experiment is stipulated as a precondition for its 
implementation. Slepykh argues that this undesirable state 
of affairs could be resolved if each enterprise was simply 
given a projected target size of workforce, without 
detailed norms. This may be attractive but it begs the 
question of equalising work intensity and raising the 
degree of labour utilisation.
Furthermore, Selyunin criticises the new instructions 
because they introduced a series of new restrictions. As 
opposed to the previous situation, it was now impossible to 
raise the wage rate of piece rate workers as a result of 
the implementation of the experiment (102). This represents 
a serious impediment particularly in industries were
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piece-rate working predominates.
S.Kossoi points out that the new regulations are
excessively complex and in some instances contradictory
(103). For example, the basic tenet that the enterprise 
makes the decision to implement the experiment is 
contradicted in almost every paragraph as no step in either 
preparation or operation can be undertaken without approval 
from ministry level. This is either a contradiction or the 
recipe for continual delays.
As an example of the complexity and possibilities for 
bureaucratic muddling slowing down the experiment's 
implementation, Parfenov and Shvetsov cite an interview 
with the Minister for the Chemical Industry, L.Kostandov
(104). It was pointed out to Kostandov that parts of a 
document produced by his ministry, specifying the 
conditions under which an enterprise might initiate the 
experiment, were contradictory. The minister admitted that 
he did not fully understand the document and that in order
to do this it was necessary to consult resolutions .from
five different years. As the authors point out, at the
enterprise level access to these resolutions would be 
difficult and the time necessary to comply with all the 
possible restrictions would hinder the experiment's 
implementation.
As P.Basova argues the main intention of the new 
instructions is to encourage more plants to switch to the
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experiment. But for those enterprises well used to 
operating upon Shchekino lines, the new regulations fail to 
say anything on their future development. Basova goes as 
far as to state that the experiment is at a dead end for 
these enterprises (105). He argues that because of the 
ratchet planning principle all the best achievements of the 
experimental enterprises are now set as their base figures 
and at the same time the resources available to them are 
being reduced. He sees this type of arbitrary decision 
undermining the momentum at enterprises already on the 
experiment and further discouraging those enterprises 
thinking of transferring to the experiment.
Mirgaleev, a senior member of the State Committee for 
Labour, responded to these criticisms, particularly that of 
Selyunin (106). He argued that the instructions themselves 
are not the problem but it is the attitudes of both 
ministries and enterprise management that represents the 
major obstacle to the wider dissemination of the 
experiment. He particularly points to the reluctance of 
ministries to establish comprehensive plans for the 
introduction of the experiment as a key problem. The 
successful example of the petro-chemical industry is cited 
to show how close co-operation between the ministry, its 
research institutes and enterprises, in the search for more 
rational labour and production organisation, can ease the 
experiment's implementation. The reticence of other 
ministries to introduce such plans is explained as a result 
of the fact that it is easier to hide inadequacies in
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production if the ministry has surplus workers and capacity 
available. (Just in the same way as it is easier at 
enterprise level). Mirgaleev notes the need to keep to 
agreed wage funds but points out that if wage funds are 
planned annually, based upon current results, there is 
little incentive for enterprises to reduce their workforce. 
What is necessary is a longer term perspective providing 
both stability and incentive. What Mirgaleev is suggesting 
is that ultimately central planners cannot force ministries 
to implement the experiment particularly if they do not 
perceive it to be in their interest.
Denisenko, a planning specialist at Gosplan responded to 
both Selyunin and Mirgaleev's criticism (107). In a sense 
his argument returns to earlier criticism particularly that 
of Shkurko, and he points out that the Shchekino experiment 
is not applicable to all plants. Productivity could be 
raised by producing more with the exisiting workforce but 
the enterprise would not b e •eligible for wage supplements 
under the terms of the exisiting Shchekino instructions 
because no part of the labour force has been freed. He 
points out that in the 10th Five Year Plan period, very few 
enterprises would be in a position to shed workers and he 
cites the Kharkov Tractor Association as a typical example. 
Here the plan provides for a 53% increase in output and a 
50% increase in labour productivity, with no personnel 
reduction. This plant would clearly not be covered by the 
prevailing Shchekino instructions. Denisenko appears to be 
arguing that the level of capacity utilisation at this, and
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similiar plants, reflects tight labour organisation and 
control with little opportunity to shed labour. As a 
consequence he argues that the material stimulation of 
these workforces has to be sponsored in a different way. He 
cites earlier experimental initiatives, at Perm for 
example, where over a longer time period norms for wage 
expenditures per rouble of output were established, as a 
possible way forward (108). The collapse of the Perm
variant of the experiment in the earlier period had been 
caused by the instability of wage norms set by higher 
bodies yet Denisenko argues that the Shchekino instructions 
should be amended to accommodate this normative method. The 
source of the stimulation, at enterprise level, would then 
not only arise from the freeing of surplus workers but also
from enhanced output causing the enterprise wage fund to
rise. As already noted there are a number of problems
involved with this approach (109).
The general point to be drawn from this debate was that the 
1977 instructions were not likely to achieve their 
objective. As early as April 1977, only three months after 
their introduction, V.Lomonosov, the Vice-Chairman of the 
State Committe on Labour and Social Questions, instructed a 
wide reaching study of the logic, method and experience of 
the new instructions with a view to reviewing the 
experiment's dissemination at the end of 1977 (110).
The result of the debate and criticisms, noted above, was 
further changes in the instructions for the implementation
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of the experiment, which were introduced in April 1978 
(1 1 1 ) .
These new regulations explicitly recognised the problems 
associated with the experiment and sought to remove some of 
the instabilities associated with the both the transition 
to the experiment and its operation. It was an attempt to 
restore the confidence of enterprises in the advantages of 
the experiment. This was to be achieved by retaining some 
elements of the 1977 regulations, restoring some elements 
that had been abolished, both in the 1970 and the 1977 
regulations, plus the introduction of some new elements.
For example, the necessity for ministries to provide 
comprehensive plans for the introduction of the experiment, 
introduced in 1977 was retained (112). Furthermore, the
responsibilities of ministries for the implementation of
V
the experiment were extended. They were now obliged to 
establish, for every enterprise under their control, for 
the five year plan period, either normative levels for wage 
expenditures per rouble of output or fixed wage funds 
(113). The intention was to remove the instabilities that 
for example, the Shchekino plant had faced (114). To 
achieve a similar end, the ability to transfer the total 
unutilised wage fund economies to the material incentive 
fund, which had been lost in the early seventies was 
restored. The intention was to provide confidence at 
enterprise level that the results of any savings would 
actually accrue to the enterprise workforce and not be
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clawed back by the ministry for other purposes.
The possibility of paying bonuses to piece-rate workers and 
special bonuses to repair workers, removed in the 1977 
regulations, were reinstalled (115). These bonuses could be 
as high as 60% of either the time rate for the job or the 
piece-rate earnings. Furthermore, the necessity for 
manpower reductions to be assessed in relation to branch 
and inter-branch norms was seen as unrealistic, even if it 
was theoretically desirable, and it was therefore, 
abandoned. However, where workforce reductions were 
achieved not on the basis of these norms then only 70% of 
the economised wage fund could be retained (116) This 
reflects an assumption, which is probably correct, that 
without the existence of these norms manning levels are 
even higher.
Ministries were also given the authority to grant premiums 
and bonuses directly to departmental administrators or 
association managers, who successfully introduced the 
experiment into enterprises under their control.
The idea with these new instructions was to break the 
bottlekneck in the implementation process (117). If 
ministries were compelled to set stable wage funds, 
intermediate officials were to be rewarded for implementing 
the experiment and the level of incentives stabilised then 
it was thought that the last impediments to the 
experiment's generalisation, would be removed (118). The
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1978 instructions mark a shift in emphasis towards the 
recognition that the implementation of the experiment is 
mainly dependent upon the attitudes of ministries and 
association administrations (119). The Pulp and Paper
Ministry is cited as an example of the desirable way 
forward were the ministry had drawn up a special long-term 
programme linking the introduction of the experiment to 
measures to increase technological processes, retrain 
workers and reorganise production units (120).
However, the 1978 regulations for the implementation of the
experiment, operated for only a little over a year before
they were in a sense superceded. In July 1979 a new 
planning resolution came into effect (121). These
regulations were an attempt on the part of the ruling group 
to reinvigorate the economic mechanism and the regulations 
contained a series of measures that draw upon the 
experience of the experimental initiatives introduced in 
the period from the late sixties, including the Shchekino 
experiment. Consequently, the resolution included 
provisions that provide for the retention of economised 
wage funds, with any unutilised funds being transferred to 
the material incentives fund for use in the next year, plus 
a stipulation that they could only be used for their 
designated purpose and could not be clawed back by 
ministries or used for purposes like staffing new 
facilities (122); the resolution stressed the necessity to 
link rewards to work performance and increase labour 
productivity as a consequence, on the basis of long-term
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norms for wages per rouble of output (123); the resolution 
gave all enterprises the right to pay bonuses to workers 
from savings in the wage fund, for enhanced productivity, 
widening their service zone or job combination (124).
Consequently, what were integrated measures designed for 
the implementation of the Shchekino experiment have been 
made available to all enterprises but in a fragmented form. 
This type of approach already had been attempted once, in 
the wage reform of the early seventies, with little 
appreciable success. It was argued then that the Shchekino 
experiment, in so far as it worked, achieved beneficial 
results because of the whole package of measures. The 
impact of the 1979 resolution, which appears to commit the 
same error, will be assessed in the next section. It should 
be noted that by 1980, the regulations for the 
implementation of the Shchekino experiment had been 
ammended no less than seven times, (this does not include 
those other economic measures that have a tangential 
bearing on the experiment) and given the complexity and 
contradictions within the -instructions anyway, these 
instabilities helped little to promote the experiment's 
generalisation (125).
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SECTION 5: THE SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
1979 PLANNING RESOLUTION.
After the introduction of the 1979 planning resolution the 
pressure for the implementation of the Shchekino experiment 
remained. In the mineral fertiliser industry for example, 
the importance of which has already been noted, the planned 
task was to increase output by over 48% in the five year 
plan period (126). However, during the years of the 10th 
plan the industry had seen its workforce grow by almost 24% 
but in the 11th plan period it could only expect the size 
of the workforce to grow by approximately 6%, even though 
it had been estimated that it would require growth of at 
least 17.7% to achieve the planned tasks (127). Hence the 
significance of the further implementation of the 
experiment either to tighten internal labour organisation 
and release surplus workers in this industry or to do the 
same elsewhere and direct the freed workers into this 
industry. This situation was replicated in a host of other 
sectors and as Fil'ev notes what was needed was a 
"socio-economic instrument to rationally utilise labour" 
(128).
At the Shchekino plant itself the experiment was still 
continuing and the summary of results for the period from 
1967 to 1981, still appears impressive, even after the 
difficulties the plant had experienced. The volume of 
production had risen 3.1 times since 1966, labour 
productivity was up 4.1 times and 1,814 personnel had been
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released or 23% of the initial total workforce (129). It is 
significant to note that there is hardly any alteration in 
the sources of labour saving over the whole period, as 
shown on Table 44. A further significant point to note, is 
the small percentage of the workforce released through 
automation and the mechanisation of manual tasks. This 
illustrates both the problems that the Shchekino plant had 
in obtaining' equipment and the more general problem of 
innovation and the provision of equipment to shed labour 
in this manner.
TABLE 44: The Sources of Labour Saving at the Shchekino 
Plant 1967-1980.
Reason for Release. Number %
Job Combination, New
Norms, Widening service 725 54%
Zones.
Mechanising Manual Work 71 5.3%
Automating Processes 67 5.0%
Centralising and
Specialising Auxiliary 198 14.8%
Work
Rationalising Laboratory 154 11.5%
Work
Other Measures 119 8.9%
Total Workers Released 1334
Total ITR Released 466
Source: V.Fil'ev, "0 dalneishem vnedrenii Shchekinskogo
metoda", Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1983, No.2, p.59.
The 466 ITR released represented 37% of the total ITR at
the start of the experiment and were released as a
consequence of rationalising the management structure,
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condensing work and a variety of other measures. Likewise 
at the Bashkir Petro-Chemical Association, mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the experimental variant had been continued 
throughout the 10th Five Year Plan and output had been 
increased by 22%, whilst the workforce had been cut by 
4,600 (130). The experiment was still being introduced, at 
some Soviet enterprises for the first time, with good 
effect. For example at an enterprise cited by Zharikov, the 
introduction of the experiment in 1978 led to the reduction 
of the workforce by 1,500 and labour productivity growth of 
38% (131) .
Furthermore, enterprises leaving the experiment fared 
badly. Aganbegyan cites the example of an enterprise in 
Omsk, where in the early seventies labour productivity had 
been growing at 4% per annum but after switching to the 
experiment this rose to 8% per annum (132). The plant, 
which previously had been 200 workers below its full 
complement, was able, after the introduction of the 
experiment, to release 2,000 workers and still raise 
output. However, in the mid-seventies at the behest of its 
ministry, the enterprise halted the experiment and as a 
consequence over the whole of the 10th Five Year Plan was 
only able to raise labour productivity by 12%. In the first 
two years of the 11th plan this has fallen even further and 
the enterprise has come a complete circle and is now 
experiencing labour shortages (133).
In a more general sense, during the years of the 10th Five
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Year Plan, the experiment had released 968,000 workers, 6% 
of the industrial workforce, and 433,000 of these workers 
had been reintegrated into vacant posts or new shops at the 
same enterprise (134). Over the period from 1978, when the 
new regulations were introduced, a number of ministries 
increased the number of enterprises operating on the full 
experiment, see Table 45.
Table 45: Number of Enterprises Operating on Shchekino 
Experiment.
1978 1981




Minnefteproim 3 5 83
Source: P.Batkaev and S.Semin, "Shchekinskii metod v
usloviyakh sovershenstvovaniya khozyaistvennogo
mekhanizma", Sotsialisticheskii Trud, 1983, No.l, p.44.
However, the effect of the 1979 planning resolution on the
dissemination of the experiment was to establish two types
of enterprise. Firstly, there were those enterprises that
fully implemented the whole package of Shchekino measures.
Secondly, there were those that implemented some parts of
the experiment. By early 1981, Fil"ev suggests that 2,003
enterprises were operating on the full Shchekino experiment
and a further 7,251 enterprises and associations had
implemented elements of the experiment (135). Batkaev and
Semin, suggest that by the end of 1981 the figure had risen
to 11,710 enterprises, employing more- than 21 million
workers. Radov notes that at these enterprises 216,000
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people were released, 205,000 of whom were workers, 40% of 
whom were well qualified workers who filled posts at newly 
commissioned production facilities that otherwise would 
have remained unmanned (136). Clearly the experiment 
remains important for releasing workers (137).
Furthermore, the Shchekino experiment, as previously noted, 
was not intended to be applied solely to the industrial 
labour force. By the early eighties it had also been 
introduced into a number of other sectors of the economy 
with similar beneficial short-run results, although Soviet 
sources remain critical of its uneven distribution (138). 
For example, in 1980 the Shchekino experiment was extended 
to service workers in hotels, which are characterised by 
significant labour shortages (139). Furthermore, the 
experiment was further extended in the transport sector of 
the economy (140). In 1981, it was introduced into both the 
maritime fleet and river transport fleet where, as a result 
of job combination and widening service zones, over 31,000 
workers were released (141). Also by 1981, the experiment 
was operating in 431 Sovkhoz and 230 enterprises of the 
Goskomsel'khoztekhnik (142). This resulted in enhanced 
output, productivity and increased average wages. At one 
Sovkhoz in the Crimea for example, labour productivity had 
increased 2.4 times over the eight years of the 
experiment's operation.
It would appear, because of the further implementation of 
the experiment in industrial branches, its extension to new
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areas and i t s . continuation at plants like Shchekino and 
Bashkir, that the changes in regulations had been 
successful. However, closer inspection yields a series of 
problems that qualify the effectiveness of the experiment 
and still deter enterprises from making the transition to 
it. It should also be noted that the Chemical industry, 
even though it was still one of the most advanced 
proponents of the experiment, was explicitly criticised in 
1980 , for lagging behind the needs of the economy (143) . So 
the experiment was certainly no cure-all even in industries 
where it was conscientiously applied.
Firstly, in the 11,710 enterprises operating on the 
experiment in 1981, in comparison with 1980, labour 
productivity grew by an average of 3.4% whereas in 
non-Shchekino enterprises labour productivity grew by less 
than 1.5% over the same period (144). Obviously the 
Shchekino-like enterprises are doing better than their 
counterparts but the fragmentation of the experiment has 
yielded much lower average productivity gains than were 
achieved in the early days of the-experiment.
Also the material incentive elements of the experiment were 
maintained at a similar level during this period. In 1982 
as a result of the operation of the experiment, the total 
savings to the wages fund was approximately 400 million 
roubles and 1.4 million workers received wage supplements 
(145). But if 21 million workers are in enterprises 
operating on the experiment, this implies that only 6.6%
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are receiving any direct material incentive from the 
experiment. The average wage supplement was a little over 
20 roubles and although for some skilled workers this might 
rise to as much as 35-40 roubles, for the vast majority of 
workers it is an unimpressive material incentive (146).
The scale of the dissemination of the experiment also has 
to be placed in context. Even though the percentage of 
workers employed in enterprises operating on either full or 
partial Shchekino lines has risen, (according to Aper'yan 
this figure reached 70% by the end of 1982 (147)), only 6% 
of the industrial enterprises in the RSFSR are utilising 
the full experiment and in the USSR as a whole the 
proportion is no higher (148). As Grotseskul' has 
commented, the real benefits of the Shchekino experiment 
are only achieved if it is implemented fully in stable 
conditions. The partial implementation of the system does 
little real good, but does serve as a cosmetic change and 
inflates the figures for the experiment's dissemination 
(149). This is a repetition of what occurred in the period 
after the wage reforms in the early seventies. As Mirgaleev 
notes, the opportunity to implement the experiment on a 
partial basis should not be seen as a substitute for full 
implementation where possible. In a study of RSFSR 
enterprises in the year after the 1979 planning resolution 
had been implemented, it was found that the full Shchekino 
system freed 50% more workers than any partial, 
Shchekino-like, changes (150).
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Even though the 1979 resolution demands wage fund and plan 
stability as the basis for the implementation of the 
experiment, this is still not being achieved and is 
bemoaned by virtually all commentators (151) . The Shchekino 
director, Melent'ev, points out that during the 10th Five 
Year Plan, as in the 9th, the wage fund at Shchekino was 
further reduced, this time by 1.3 million roubles (152). 
Even though this action is contrary to the resolution, 
unstable wage funds are still the norm. At the Bashkir
Association whilst productivity had increased by 24% in 5 
years, average wages had only risen by 8% because of wage 
fund instability (153). Ministries effectively ignore the 
advances made by these experimental enterprises. 
Furthermore, in the case of the mineral fertiliser industry 
cited above, its task of increasing productivity and 
overcoming its labour shortage was made more difficult by 
the fact that its overall wage fund was 280 million roubles 
smaller than it should have been (154). This makes it
virtually impossible to implement the Shchekino experiment 
more widely as the ministry is effectively asking for
simultaneous increases in productivity and cuts in wage 
funds from its • subordinate enterprises.
There still remains a degree of arbitrariness in the way 
that the planners determine plans, both for output and for 
subsidiary objectives, like the reduction of managerial and 
administrative staff. This is determined on a flat
percentage basis and as a consequence discriminates against 
enterprises who have already reduced their administrative
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ranks by implementing the Shchekino experiment as they are 
given the same percentage target as enterprises who have 
not (155). Enterprise management can then reasonably argue 
that if the reduction is going to be administered from 
outside why bother with the Shchekino initiative. If they 
do implement the experiment they will be at an immediate 
disadvantage when the targets are imposed. In both respects 
this further slows the introduction of the experiment. It 
has been argued that enterprises implementing the 
experiment should be excluded from the targets for staff 
reduction or alternatively the size of the administrative 
staff should be assessed as a percentage of the total 
workforce and not as a simple flat rate reduction (156). 
This would require a greater degree of sophistication from 
planners as differing production conditions would require a 
different ratio between managerial/administrative staff and 
the total workforce. The point is that in its present form 
this type of planning decision does not help the wider 
dissemination of the experiment.
Similar problems arise because statutes in one area still 
operate to negate initiatives in another. This results from 
the bureaucratic complexity of the Soviet economic 
mechanism. For example, up to the early eighties job 
combination could impair pension rights and hence when 
workers realised this they refused to combine jobs or 
reversed their previous decisions. This was only resolved 
by the new conditions for job combination (157).
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A further problem emerges from the experience of the 
Polimir Association (158) . Here the introduction of the 
Shchekino experiment had encouraged the workers in a number 
of production shops to master all the skills in their shift 
and the consequence had been a reduction of workers per 
shift from 13 to 9. The introduction of computerised 
control mechanisms had reduced the managerial staff and the 
reorganisation of services like internal transport had led 
to further workforce reductions. The net effect had been to 
raise output by a factor of two, productivity by a factor 
of three and significant gains had been made in labour 
discipline. However, this successful enterprise is 
continually dogged by difficulties because the integrated 
technological nature of its production process makes it 
highly dependent upon good quality equipment. A breakdown 
in any section can bring the whole enterprise to a halt 
(159). Consequently, poor reliability and durability of 
equipment, coupled with a lack of spare parts reduces the 
effectiveness of the enterprise. This simple example shows 
that isolated success can easily be negated. This problem 
will remain unresolved until all the enterprises in the 
supply chain switch to the experiment and product quality 
and availability changes dramatically.
All the points noted above, refer to pressures operating 
against the implementation of the experiment at plant level 
which therefore, impedes its generalisation but there is 
another dimension that requires consideration. When the 
experiment is introduced it is implemented by an individual
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enterprise or by a series of enterprises at the behest of 
their ministry but there is no necessary localised linkage 
between these plants. The potential problems this generates 
can be explained by considering the example of the 
Shchekino enterprise itself. In the early period, as 
already noted, a high proportion of the released labour was 
reabsorbed at the plant to fill existing vacancies or to 
man new production facilities. In this sense the experiment 
is concerned with the internal reorganisation of one 
enterprise within one ministry. However, the ultimate aim 
is to bring about a freeing and redistribution of labour in 
a wider sense. One problem, noted previously, is that the 
labour released under the terms of the experiment is, by 
definition, likely to be absorbed into plants where the 
experiment is not in operation and where labour 
organisation is lax. As a consequence no overall gains may 
arise. Furthermore, if the enterprise implementing the 
experiment runs into difficulties, as indeed the Shchekino 
plant did, workers may well leave the enterprise and avoid 
the experiment. In order to overcome this, attempts were 
made to disseminate the experiment to other enterprises 
within the locale. Given that the chain of economic and 
planning control is predominantly vertical through the 
hierarchical structure of ministries, associations and 
enterprises this horizental co-ordination was primarily 
sponsored by the city party Soviet. The former director of 
Shchekino, Sharov, headed a city party committee, which 
spread the experiment to 38 collectives in both industrial 
and agricultural sectors in the area (160). As Grotseskul'
PAGE 3 30
points out, nearly all the enterprises in Shchekino, 
producing 90% of the city's industrial output now operate 
on Shchekino lines (161). Furthermore, the experiment has 
been extended to the service and transport sectors. 
However, even in this context there is a long way to go to 
achieve real control over the utilisation of labour because 
in the province of Tula as a whole there is an acute labour 
shortage which could only be resolved if the experiment was 
generalised even further into the countryside.
What is being suggested by the Soviet sources, is that the 
Shchekino experiment should be extended in two Directions 
Firstly, the experiment should be comprehensively 
implemented in all the enterprises of one ministry. This is 
part of the intention of the economic experiment 
implemented by Andropov from January 1st 1984 (162). The
instructions for the ministries chosen for the experiment 
include all the major elements of the Shchekino experiment 
(16 3 ) .
Secondly, it has been suggested that the experiment should 
be extended not just vertically through a ministry but also 
horizontally through a particular region. This would have 
the advantage of co-ordinating the labour force across the 
boundaries of ministerial responsibility . Grotseskul' 
points out that the Tula province would be ideal for such 
an experiment for a number of reasons (164). Not only was 
it the home of the original experiment but also more than 
half of the province's industrial enterprises are already
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operating on the experiment and this is scheduled to rise 
even further during the 11th Five Year Plan. As the 
province has a severe labour resource problem the 
implementation of a region-wide Shchekino initiative would 
allow greater co-ordination and direction of labour 
resources. Implicit in this is even further controls over, 
the placement of workers released. As Dyker has pointed 
out, more Shchekino without more control is the recipe for 
greater turnover and wastage (165).
There are precedents for this type of initiative. An 
experiment in the agricultural sector was established at 
Abasha in Georgia in 1973 (166). This was an attempt to 
group together, at a raion level, existing kolkhoz, sovkhoz 
and related organisations under one controlling body. This 
then provided a variety of material and financial 
incentives for workers, as'well as a new form of managerial 
co-ordination. As a result of the experiment agricultural 
output grew from 5.3 million roubles in 1974 to 8.3 million 
roubles in 1977. Similar beneficial results were achieved 
in the construction sector which was also co-ordinated in 
the new system (167). The success of the experiment led to 
its adoption by other neighbouring raions and from January 
1st 1982, it was generalised throughout the republic. In 
March 1982 the wider dissemination of the experiment was 
pressed for throughout the whole of the USSR (168).
Attempts were also made to transfer the experiment to an 
urban area at Poti in Georgia (169). This experiment
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illustrates the type of problems a horizontal Shchekino 
experiment might be able to solve and illustrates the 
problems it may face. In Poti there were between 60 and 70 
enterprises under the jurisdiction of 30 different 
ministries. This resulted in poor organisation of resources 
and little local co-ordination between enterprises. Overall 
this resulted in a number of disparities in wages, housing 
and living conditions and levels of capacity utilisation. 
At the local level the municipal authorities are powerless 
as enterprises relate upwards through their ministerial 
hierarchy. What the experiment instituted was a series of 
local linkages via a body known as the Territorial 
Inter-Branch Association, which was responsible for 
co-ordinating economic development in the municipal area. 
For example, a register of the various waste products from 
the different enterprises was set up and attempts were made 
to utilise these for the production of consumer goods, 
needed locally (170). Further initiatives involve setting 
up more enterprises to meet local needs and the possible 
linking of the town with nearby rural areas to extend the 
experiment.
It is an extension of this type of initiative that Sharov, 
Grotseskul' and Melent'ev have called for in the Tula 
province (171). Nevertheless, it is instructive to note 
that almost 18 years after the initial experiment was 
established and after no less than seven changes in the 
regulations for the implementation of the experiment plus 
changes in regulations referring to subsidary elements,
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like job combination, norms, labour turnover etc Soviet 
sources are still complaining about the slow dissemination 
of the experiment and still citing similar reasons for this 
phenomenon, i .e . wage fund and plan instabilities (172 ) . It 
is also instructive to note that the conditions cited as 
necessary to further develop the Shchekino experiment 
involve a familiar list of items; increased technically 
validated norms, technical progress (173), political 
campaigns to explain the importance of the experiment to 
the workforce (174) and ironically better labour discipline 
(175). It has also been suggested that in the years when 
the experiment was most efficient the wage savings were 
allocated through collective consumption, (this supports 
the argumentadvanced in Chapter 3) and calls have been made 
to reassert this form of distribution (176). The inability 
to resolve these problems suggests that the difficulties 
facing the experiment are much deeper than the 
administrative and institutional problems so far identified 
from the Soviet sources. This question is taken up in the 
next section.
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SECTION 6: THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SHCHEKINO EXPERIMENT
AND THE LOGIC OF SOVIET PLANNING
As pointed out in the previous section, the Soviet response 
to the problem of the non-generalisation of the experiment, 
was almost entirely administrative and sought to solve the 
problems by changing the instructions for the 
implementation of the experiment. In the first instance 
however, the non-generalisation is explicable by 
considering the underlying principles of the experiment in 
relationship to the logic of Soviet planning and then 
relating this to the political economy of the USSR. This 
latter task will be undertaken in the final chapter after a 
number of other experimental initiatives have been 
considered.
The paradox is that the Shchekino plant, plus the other 
experimental enterprises, could successfully implement the 
experiment but still fail and this needs to be explained. 
For the individual enterprise, at Shchekino or elsewhere, 
the successful implementation of the experiment did not 
lead to an unambiguous strengthening of their position 
either vis-a-vis their ministry, other enterprises, central 
planning bodies or their workforce.
The Shchekino plant for example, was both successful and a 
well-known prestige project for the chemical industry. 
Nevertheless, this could not be translated by plant 
management into increased access to the necessary resources
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for investment and expansion; it gave the plant little or 
no advantage over other enterprises in the ministerial 
allocative process nor in the attempt to retain or attract 
skilled workers; it led to the eventual loss of sections of 
its workforce because of the removal of bonuses and the 
eventual poor provision of housing etc.; it weakened its 
position in relation to the chemical ministry, making it 
more dependent, as its safety factor had been removed; 
overall it made the enterprise more vunerable to plan
underfulfilment and failure.
In comparison, consider a firm under the capitalist mode of 
production that had managed to introduce an innovatory form 
of work organisation that increased the productivity of the 
labour it employed. The benefits of increased exploitation 
would lead to an increase in the relative surplus value 
extracted and would be reflected in a higher than average 
rate of profit for the firm. This would yield direct 
advantages for the firm and would allow it to increase the 
level of investment, either through the use of retained 
profits or from its ability to attract external funds. In 
other words success in the extraction of relative surplus 
value from the labour employed will be reflected in
improved access to funds in the capital markets.
Furthermore, other firms failing to follow the innovatory
move will find their relative failure also reflected in 
their access to investment funds and the possibility of 
failure will emerge. In other words the dynamic of changes 
in the process of surplus extraction will be an external
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constraint upon all firms. A link exists between the 
efficiency of surplus extraction and the success and 
failure of the firm. This dynamic creates repercussions in 
both labour and capital markets. Labour organisation which 
is successful will be replicated elsewhere and resources 
will shift towards the innovatory enterprise and its 
followers.
With regard to the Shchekino experiment in the USSR, the 
process almost worked in reverse. In so far as investment 
funds are still allocated by an administrative process from 
the centre the successful implementation of the experiment 
gives no direct advantage. Remember savings in the wage 
fund could not be translated into improved access to 
capital equipment or plant only into increasing either 
individual wages or collective consumption at the 
enterprise and over time even this discretion was eroded. 
In so far as the individual plant's safety factor is 
reduced, yet the problems that made it necessary in the 
first instance are not removed from the economy as a whole, 
the enterprise may well be in a worse position than 
previously and may well be more vunerable to failure.
How is this vunerability to be explained? I would argue 
that the ministries simply conform in this respect to the 
logic of the Soviet planning process. If an enterprise is 
successful from the point of view of the ministry it could 
be viewed as a lesser priority than an unsuccessful 
enterprise. Hence it makes sense in the short-run, to
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transfer economised wage funds from a Shchekino-type
enterprise to an enterprise that may be experiencing labour
shortages or to utilise these economised funds for hiring
staff for new production capacity that may be otherwise
unmanned. Given that the option of closing an enterprise
down and transferring its resources from one location to
another is limited, both practically and politically, the
ministry has to nurse along both innovatory and backward
enterprises. It is after all responsible for the entire
output of its. sector. The point being made is that even
though the Shchekino experiment introduced a method that
was successful at some enterprises it did not introduce a
dynamic that unambiguously pressurised those enterprises
that did not implement the experiment into adopting it. It
introduced no mechanism that established penalties for
failure to introduce the experiment. However salutary t i^e
impact of the experiment, its implementation remained at
the discretion of ministries and enterprises, to whom it
did not appear as an unavoidable necessity. As already
noted, it is unlikely that any ministry could implement the
experiment throughout all its enterprises 'simultaneously
given the negative control operated by the workforce, even 
over experimental initiatives. Therefore, plants not 
operating on Shchekino lines would not necessarily suffer 
and may indeed benefit. The experiment did not force 
enterprises to fail. This is clearly different from 
capitalism in general, where enterprises who fail to 
innovate disappear.
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Those who try to argue that the USSR is simply a giant 
statified "capital', competing on the world market attempt 
to draw comparisons with multi-national corporations, 
talking for example of the "USSR Ltd". However, in large 
multi-national, multi-plant firms there are no constraints 
of the sort identified above. The decision to close 
peripheral or branch plants is dictated by the same forces 
that determine whether competitive individual capitals 
survive. The law of value enforces its logic upon all 
firms, whether they are competitive, oligopolistic or 
monopolistic. However, that logic clearly does not 
penetrate the Soviet economy. If it did experiments like 
Shchekino would either work or would be unnecessary in the 
first place.
A further question that needs to be considered is the 
differential diffusion of the experiment. Thus far this has 
been explained as the result of the traditional bias in the 
Soviet planning system towards Department 1 industries. 
This needs further consideration.
Firstly, it could be linked to the simple fact that some 
ministries are more innovative than others and therefore, 
more supportative of the experimental initiatives. This 
explanation rests upon the chance element of staffing and 
personnel at ministry level. As staff changes it would be 
expected that the dissemination of the experiment would 
fluctuate. However, the uneven pattern of diffusion appears 
to remain over time. This does not appear therefore, to be
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a particularly persuasive explanation.
Secondly, perhaps it is more convincing to argue that 
ministries adopt experimental initiatives if they are under 
particular pressure to improve their performance, within 
the overall economic performance. This was certainly the 
case with the chemical industry, which was, and still is, a 
high priority sector. Hence state planning agency, ministry 
and enterprise attention will focus on specific problems 
and from this unity of purpose success will be achieved in 
particular sectors. However, as you move away from these 
priority sectors no similar coincidence of interests exists 
and experimental initiatives will either not be introduced 
or if they are, only in a half-hearted manner. This 
however, cannot be a complete explanation as there are 
problem sectors, like construction and agriculture, which 
in some senses appear tailor-made for the experiment, 
particularly given the labour shedding potential of both 
sectors, yet it was not widely disseminated within either 
of them.
Thirdly, it could be argued that ministries resist the 
implementation of the experiment because it threatens their 
secure existence. As noted, ministries also have a vested 
interest in maintaining a degree of slack, vis-a-vis other 
ministries, as it allows room for manoeuvre. Perhaps 
therefore, low prestige and low priority ministries see the 
implementation of the experiment weakening their already 
weak position and making them even more vunerable. After
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all there is no guarentee that the labour shed from one of 
their enterprises, in the course of tightening labour 
organisation, will be necessarily redeployed into 
enterprises of the same ministry. In fact the ultimate 
logic of the experiment could not provide such a guarantee 
as radical redeployment of surplus workers is precisely its 
eventual aim. Furthermore, ministries may have perceived 
the experiment as an exercise in introducing greater 
enterprise autonomy and this could have increased their 
resistance to its dissemination. In reality these arguments 
are difficult to sustain as the impact of the experiment, 
in those ministries most actively pressing its 
generalisation, was to strengthen the ministry's position 
in relation to its subordinate enterprises, rather than the 
reverse. The enterprises became more dependent upon
ministry level decisions, as their safety factor was cut,
thus increasing their vunerability and the possibilities of 
failure.
I would argue that there is a relationship between the 
dissemination of the experiment and the nature of work
organisation and control in different branches of Soviet 
industry, both the actual forms of control prior to the 
implementation of the experiment and the possibilities of 
control after its implementation. Where direct producers 
had most control over the nature of their work and its 
intensity, in sectors like coal mining and construction for 
example, the experiment was hardly implemented at all.
However, in sectors with a higher degree of technologically
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based production and where work intensities were more 
amenable to technical control, the experiment was 
implemented more successfully. For example, where line 
speeds are in part determined by automated or 
semi-automated production techniques it appears easier to 
implement the experiment. Again the chemical industry is a 
good example. From the point of view of enterprise 
management in these sectors the experiment could be viewed 
as a method of breaching the traditional control exercised 
by the direct producers and thereby allowing the 
introduction of further technically determined work 
patterns and intensities. This could also explain the 
previously noted link between the introduction of the 
experiment and the importation of foreign technology. The 
desire to utilise this as efficiently as possible and to 
imitate manning levels in the countries of origin, would 
forge a link between the incidence of imported technology 
and the introduction of the experiment. This suggests 
therefore, that the differential spread of the experiment 
reflects the possibilities of partially modifying the 
degree of direct producer control over their own labour 
process. This is another example of the way in which the 
experiment accommodated to present Soviet industrial 
realities rather than radically transforming them.
Ultimately, it is very difficult to provide an unambiguous 
answer to the question why the experiment spread in a 
differentiated manner. Similar difficulties are attached to 
the question of why different ministries had different
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degrees of success when the experiment was actually 
implemented. It could be that the experiment was applied 
with differing degrees of intensity in different branches 
or that initial manning levels were very different or 
because of differing degrees of ministry, enterprise 
management or worker resistance to the experiment. The. 
point is however, that the experiment introduced no new 
dynamic to the Soviet planning system that would firstly, 
equalise manning levels between disparate or even similar 
enterprises; secondly, pressurise ministries or enterprises 
into implementing the experiment; thirdly, identify 
unambiguously those enterprises that were failures.
Furthermore, what has been suggested in this section, is 
that there are limits to the potential achievements of the 
experiment that will increase the possibility of failure 
for the individual enterprise, which is the reverse of what 
is desirable. The rational enterprise manager will need to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of implementing the 
experiment. Clearly many recognised the problems of 
increasing vunerability brought about by shifting plan 
targets, reductions in the wage fund, failures to receive 
investment in either new capacity or the renewal of plant 
and equipment, and the fact that if all enterprises did not 
simultaneously implement the experiment then, given the 
apparent labour shortages, labour would simply move to 
plants where work intensity was lower and rewards similar, 
made the experiment a liability. Ultimately, they 
recognised that the success of the enterprise, still the
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key to their own success, would be constrained by the 
external environment which would not necessarily have 
changed. In other words the operation of the planning 
system contradicts the logic of the experiment and will 
ultimately retard its dissemination. This is therefore, an 
argument that suggests that neither at enterprise 
management level nor ministry level was the experiment 
perceived to be unambiguously in their interest and as it 
set up no spontaneous dynamic that forced its 
implementation upon enterprises or ministries, it was 
avoided. This cannot be the final answer to the question as 
it fails to explain why the planning system constrains the 
experiment and why the necessary dynamic is absent. This 
can only be explained after a consideration of other 
experimental initiatives which had similar intentions. The 
broader issue of the political economy of the USSR and all 
of these experimental initiatives will be taken up in more 
detail in Chapter 6.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. This is particularly true of plant management. For 
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was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Hammer and Sickle 
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Year Plan and increasing labour productivity. See Pravda 
13/1/76.
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(Hereafter 1977a). They point out that prior to the 
implementation of the experiment at Shchekino it was found 
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by 200. The experiment was only authorised after these 200 
jobs were removed from the plant's roster.
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shortages. S.G.Semin, "Novye rezervy Shchekinskogo metoda", 
Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 
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chemical industry up to 1975, were sufficient to staff 350 
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4. See Section 5, Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 5: ALTERNATIVE ATTEMPTS TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER THE
LABOUR PROCESS.
The Shchekino experiment and the early variants which 
developed from it and which have already been outlined, 
were not the only attempts at reform that sought to alter 
the ruling group's control over the process of surplus 
extraction. Throughout the 1970 's there were a series of 
experimental initiatives that ran parallel to the Shchekino 
experiment. These were in part derived from it and were 
either responses to the problems it encountered or were
extensions of some of its elements. Some of the initiatives 
were more direct attempts to solve problems that the
Shchekino experiment had only indirectly tackled. For
example, the introduction of technically validated norms 
was an indirect consequence of the introduction of the 
Shchekino experiment but the major aim of the experiments 
initiated at the Aksai and Dinamo plants. All of these 
experiments can be viewed as alternative attempts to 
resolve the problems identified in Figure 1, by tackling 
the central question of control over the labour process.
This chapter cannot cover comprehensively all the 
experimental initiatives but will consider a number of the 
most important that sought to affect changes in the labour 
process (1). The major section of the chapter will consider 
the 'Brigade System' of labour organisation because of its 
importance and the close parallels between this initiative 
and the Shchekino experiment, both in intention and
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experience. It is however, impossible to fully cover such a 
major initiative as this and the chapter will therefore, 
trace out the origins of its major features, its 
development and its similarities with the other 
experimental initiatives only. Secondly, the chapter will 
consider the experimental initiatives concerned with work 
norms and wages at the Aksai Plastics plant, the Dinamo 
plant and the Volga Automobile Plant.
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ZLOBIN BRIGADE SYSTEM IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
The occurrence of labour discipline problems, as already 
suggested, is most acute where labour has greatest control 
over the nature and manner of its work (2). This is 
particularly the case in occupations which are difficult to 
physically supervise and where the pace of work is not 
determined to any great degree by technology. Perhaps the 
best example of this is the construction industry where in 
the early 1970 's two out of every three workers were manual 
workers (3). The USSR has a long history of problems in 
this sector, absenteeism and poor discipline and work 
quality being perennial problems and it is not surprising 
that a major reform initiative was instituted here in 1970 
(4). This was originally known as the 'Zlobin Brigade 
System', and was named after the brigade leader of the 
first brigade to initiate the system but later it became 
better known as the 'Khozraschet', or 'Contract Brigade
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System'. This experiment is an interesting attempt to 
change the process of surplus extraction in an industry 
where the Shchekino system appeared to have had little 
success. The underlying principle of the experiment is a 
recognition that in the Soviet construction industry 
managerial control over the labour process is exceptionally 
difficult. Therefore, the experiment seeks to make the 
workforce, or small groups of workers discipline each 
other. The basic operation of the experiment was that a 
definable sub-section of a particular building project was 
contracted out to a brigade of workers. For example, in the 
initial case of the Zlobin brigade this was the work of 
actually constructing the shell of a building (5). The 
construction administration would contract to supply the 
workers with the necessary resources, tools and 
documentation and a contract would be set for the job and 
agreed with the brigade. Workers would not be paid any 
bonuses but if, in the process of construction, they could 
economise in terms of time, labour expenditures or raw 
materials, 50% of the savings made would accrue to them. 
Effectively the brigade can benefit from any savings it can 
make but by the same token any losses incurred or delays 
would come out of the collective rewards of the brigade 
(6). This was an attempt to stimulate the self-interest of 
brigade members and use this as a mechanism of discipline. 
From the outset Zlobin's brigade pledged to increase labour 
productivity by 25%, reduce the time needed for their 
particular part of the construction process by 40-45 days 
and reduce overall costs by 25-30,000 roubles. In fact the
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initial results were even more dramatic as the job was 
finished 80 days early and labour productivity rose by 36%. 
The Zlobin brigade required only 2.34 man days per square 
metre of construction in comparison with 3.67 man days per 
metre in a traditional brigade (7). For workers in the 
Zlobin brigade bonuses as a result were 50% higher than in 
comparable brigades and as Zlobin himself points out, 
labour and production discipline improved dramatically’(8") . 
Absenteeism, drunkenness at work, overly long smoke breaks 
and general tardiness became a thing of the past in the 
Zlobin brigade, as workers perceived these activities to be 
detrimental to their own interests. Furthermore, when the 
brigade was over-allocated raw materials it refused to 
accept them as they would have to be paid for out of the 
brigades contracted funds and would therefore, have reduced 
their potential profitability. This economising attitude to 
raw materials is in direct comparison to the usual Soviet 
response to this type of situation. Normally, the response 
would be to accept the over-allocation, which would involve 
no financial penalties. The resource would then be 
stockpiled for later use as the enterprise or work team can 
confidently expect later supply problems (9). 
Alternatively, the resources could be utilised for barter 
purposes 'to obtain some other deficit resource (10). After 
their first successes the Zlobin brigade went on to reduce 
even further building time on their next assignment and 
the experiment's apparent success lead to calls for its 
wider dissemination within the construction industry (11).
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However, very early in the life of the experiment 
criticisms emerged, suggesting that the experience was 
atypical. For example, it was pointed out that the real 
originators of the experiment, S.Demestyev and V.Loholin, 
chose Zlobin deliberately because of his past excellent 
record of work organisation (12). Perhaps with lesser 
leadership the experiment would fare less well.
Secondly, and far more importantly, the leader of a rival 
brigade, which worked on the same construction project as 
the Zlobin brigade and was used as a comparison to 
illustrate the advances made by Zlobin's brigade, pointed 
out that the comparison was unrealistic. He argued that 
although the Zlobin brigade did not necessarily receive 
'special' conditions they did nevertheless, get first 
delivery of raw materials. Also when it was realised that 
one portion of the work could be accomplished better with a 
second crane, the Zlobin brigade were able, out of their 
allocated funds, to obtain one. They had to pay for it but 
recognised the advantages in terms of cutting work time and 
making economies and therefore, raising their bonuses. As 
Zlobin's rival commented, this kind of discretion was not 
unfair, even though this option was not available to them, 
but was simply what should be normal practice. However, the 
problem is that ease of supply and access to both 
specialist equipment and basic tools is not 'normal', not 
only for Soviet industry but especially for the 
construction sector. Novokshonov points out that even the 
provision of basic tools, costing 20 roubles, can double
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labour productivity but only between a fifth and a seventh 
of the normed number of tools are actually supplied (13). 
The point is that it may be possible to set up isolated 
brigades of workers who can achieve impressive results but 
this is predicated upon the failures of other brigades to 
receive adequate support. Eventually this is irrelevant to 
the problems facing the Soviet ruling group unless it is 
possible to generalise the experience and simultaneously 
change all work teams (14).
By early 19 71 20 collectives in the Moscow area had
initiated the experiment and the Construction industry, 
convinced of its potential, pressed for its extension. By 
the end of 1972, approximately 800 brigades were operating 
on Zlobin lines, 83 of which were in Moscow alone but this 
was a minute proportion of the total number possible (15). 
This slow dissemination is explicable by a number of 
further problems that emerged which either undermined the 
logic of the experiment or made it unattractive to workers 
and management alike.
Firstly, from the point of view of management there is a 
problem setting the experiment up. It has to be a clearly 
defined section of work with the correct documentation, 
financing and tooling. A clear idea of the schedule of work 
and a reasonable completion date are also essential. So too 
is some idea of the brigade's capacity and in the absence 
of branch or interbranch norms, past performance is not 
necessarily a good indicator. Furthermore, the original
PAGE 361
conception envisaged the brigade not to be responsible for 
site preparation although some management took the short 
cut of including this in the contract and allowed the
brigade to commence from an unprepared site. Given the
potential problems of site preparation and the necessity 
for specialist equipment this deterred workers from 
switching to the system. All these pre-conditions were 
essential if the contract was to be concluded and problems 
with any element destroys the acceptability of the 
experiment to the workforce and overlong preparation 
destroys the attractiveness of the system for management.
Secondly, there was a problem about who is responsible and 
for how much? The logic of the experiment is that a brigade 
performing exceptionally badly could be left with 'negative 
bonuses'. However, this contradicts articles of Soviet
labour law that stipulate the degree of financial 
responsibility working people have for their work (16). The 
combination of this ambiguity and the experiment's 
voluntary form further delayed its extension as worker's 
could see the potential financial problems and management 
could envisage themselves being placed in a no-win 
situation.
Thirdly, the logic of the experiment is that if management 
fail to supply the brigades with the necessary materials or 
tools then a penalty should be paid by them to the 
brigades. Given the general difficulties of the
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material-technical supply system this obviously limits the 
enthusiasm of management for an experiment, the conditions 
of which they will almost certainly not be able to control 
and which by its operation may lead to automatic bonuses 
for the brigades.
Fourthly, the material incentives that emerged from the 
system are not that attractive. This is partially for the 
reasons already noted, that money does not have a strong 
incentive effect as it is not the universal equivalent. 
Nevertheless, the wage supplements that were paid were 
relatively small. Consider for example, the first two 
buildings constructed by the Zlobin brigade. The first was 
built in 155 days and resulted in average daily wages of 
11.29 roubles; the second builing was constructed in only 
82 days but the average daily wage only rose to 11.85 
roubles (17). This is hardly a worthwhile incentive as a 
major increase in work intensity, cutting work time by 47%, 
lead to an increment in wages less than 5%.
In this early period there was also some criticism of the 
underlying ethos of the experiment. It was thought that it 
would stimulate greed and poor quality work. Zlobin 
however, rejected these arguments by pointing out that the 
underlying principle of payment by results would bring 
benefits to everyone concerned and was not necessarily 
'anti-socialist' (18). For the workforce, apart from any 
material benefit, there was the benefits of release from 
working under the petty tutelage of management thereby
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increasing satisfaction. Payment by results would also 
resolve problems of labour discipline. Zlobin argued that 
what ultimately harms Soviet workers is indiscipline, 
idleness and the opportunity to act in a "non-socialist' 
manner. For management, apart from the obvious benefits of 
enhanced production from a more disciplined workforce, 
there would be freedom from petty supervisory tasks, like 
checking time-keeping and daily production and quality 
supervision, thus freeing trained cadres for more 
productive work. For the state, production projects would 
be completed, in itself a desirable step forward, with 
economies in wages, labour outlays, materials and time.
In order to overcome the potential problems of slipshod 
work it was decided that the brigades eventual share in the 
economised funds should be dependent upon the quality of 
the work performed. This was evaluated on a sliding scale 
so that excellent quality work received the full 50%, good 
quality work 30% and satisfactory work 10% of the potential 
bonus (19).
In the Moscow brigades set up in this early period, 
construction time was reduced by an average of 23.8 days, 
labour outlays were reduced by 28%, labour productivity 
rose by 21.9% and wage fund savings averaged 6% (20). The 
major attractions of this experiment, having the workforce 
discipline itself and saving funds and materials in the 
process, was clearly recognised by the decree generalising 
the experiment (21).
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By the end of 1972, 564 trusts and construction combines 
had switched to the new system and about 2000 brigade 
contracts were in operation, achieving an average reduction 
in construction time of between 13% and 16% (22). However, 
over the same time period the rate of unfinished 
construction projects continued to rise and pressure to 
resolve the industry's problems via the further 
generalisation of the brigade system, increased (23). By 
early 1973 in the construction ministry only 351 out of an 
approximate total of 20,000 brigades were operating on the 
Zlobin system. In the Ministry for the Construction of 
Heavy Industrial Enterprises only 358 brigades, out of a 
comparable potential number, were operating on the system 
(24). This represents a rate of transfer of less than 2%. 
In the Ministry of Rural Construction the percentage was 
even lower at around 1.5%. There was also a noted regional 
variation as most brigades making the transition to the 
experiment were either in, or close to, major urban 
centres, particularly Moscow and Leningrad.
This again raises the interesting question of why an 
experimental initiative, after initial successes and 
ministerial and state support, failed to be generalised. 
Part of the explanation for this failure is resistance to 
the experiment on the part of enterprise management and 
ministries. This is the result of the problems connected 
with its initial implementation, which have already been 
noted (25). Resistance to change at all levels of
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management is perhaps a rational, if short term view, 
particularly if the change engenders the possibility of 
failure. However, more significant problems can also be 
identified.
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SECTION 2: PROBLEMS IN THE GENERALISATION OF THE ZLOBIN
SYSTEM. THE KALUGA AND OREL VARIANTS
The major difficulty with the original conception of the 
brigade system is that no work unit or economic unit, 
whether as small as a brigade or as large as an industry, 
operates in isolation from everyone else. In integrated 
production processes a wide variety of work units 
necessarily interrelate and the performance of the 
individual unit is always constrained by other units and 
the performance of the economy as a whole. However, the 
brigade system rests upon the principle that the brigade is 
rewarded or sanctioned for its own work, the conditions of 
which they cannot totally control. This problem has two 
dimensions.
Firstly, the major problem is the question of supply. The 
contract entered into, by brigade and management is 
predicated upon expected future supply. The job's 
specification, the order of work and completion date and 
the workers' acceptance of the contract is all undertaken 
on the assumption that the necessary supplies of raw 
materials, tools, energy, plans and blueprints and whatever 
else the job requires will actually be delivered and 
delivered on time. If any of these elements are breached, 
no matter how hard the brigade works, their efforts will be 
irrelevant as completion dates will be missed and the share 
in economised funds will be foregone as a consequence. In
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Lvov, for example out of 18 brigades switching to the 
system, 10 failed to meet their contracts and returned to 
the old way of working, not because of failings in their 
work but because of supply difficulties (26). In Kursk in 
1975, only 32 out of 70 brigades successfully completed 
their contracts because of supply difficulties, and even in 
the best brigades supply conditions were described as 
chaotic (27). Similar examples are cited by a variety of 
sources (28).
In the face of these supply difficulties one other 
possibility is that brigades will turn to their own 
production of either intermediate products or tools. This 
type of do-it-yourself activity is self-defeating as it is 
wasteful of the brigade's time, leads to poor quality work 
and non-standardised items which are eventually more costly 
to produce in this individual form (29). Non-delivery is 
not the only problem because late delivery can destroy work 
patterns and lead to arhythmic working which then disrupts 
the brigade's efforts. Without stability in supply workers 
will be reluctant to accept brigade contract working 
because it makes their wages/bonuses dependent upon forces 
which ultimately they cannot control. Far better to accept 
a slightly lower, yet guaranteed wage, (particularly if the 
material incentives are small and weak due to the nature of 
money and the lack of consumer goods) and allow the 
headaches involved in supply failures to pass to lower 
level management (30). There is really no incentive for 
workers to become involved with responsibilities that have
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traditionally fallen on someone else.
Secondly, the original conception of the experiment 
identified one section of an otherwise integrated 
construction project and set up a contract for its 
completion. In the case of Zlobin's brigade, as noted, they 
were responsible for the erection of the building's 
external shell and then other work teams of plasterers, 
electricians and finishers would complete the building. 
This sets up the obvious problem of dislocations between 
the work teams. For example, Zlobin's brigade constructed 
their portion of an apartment building 100 days early but 
the building remained unoccupied for a similar length of 
time because of shortages of finishing workers (31). This 
again indicates that these experimental initiatives are 
irrelevant unless generalised, in the first instance around 
a particular construction site or in a particular region.
Just as problems in the operation of the Shchekino 
experiment gave rise to variants, the same thing happened 
with the brigade system. In order to overcome the 
difficulty of dislocations between brigades, a variant of 
the Zlobin system was established by L.Senatov at Kaluga 
(32). The organisation of work here was different in that 
all the brigades within the combine simultaneously 
transferred' to the contract system and individual brigade 
success was now dependent upon the success of all brigades. 
This, inevitably, produced greater demands for correct 
phasing and pace of work. In order to maintain cohesion
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and discipline the brigades at Kaluga were co-ordinated by 
an elected council of brigade leaders (33). At Kaluga the 
initial experience was promising with construction time 
falling from 105 to 75 days, costs per square metre were 
cut, the quality of work improved and average wages rose. 
Furthermore, the Kaluga collective weeded out drifters, 
loafers and drunks throughout all the brigades and 
substantially improved labour discipline and cut labour 
turnover. This new collective form of contract appears very 
desirable as it reduces the problems of integration but it 
also generates different problems, concerned with the size 
and co-ordination of brigades, that will be examined later 
in this chapter.
A further problem, concerning the time horizon over which 
planning decisions are made, gave rise to both a further 
variant or addition to the Zlobin system and an attempt to 
reorganise construction at a city or regional level. This 
was initiated at Orel in April 1973 and was known as the 
Orel Continuous Planning System (34). The basic principle 
behind the system was the recognition that at a local level 
construction projects were the responsibility of a large 
number of clients. In Krasnodar in the mid-seventies, for 
example, there were 98 seperate construction clients (35). 
This leads to the spreading of resources, needless 
duplication and little co-ordination between the different 
ministries eventually contributing to the high levels of 
incomplete construction projects (36). Therefore, the 
intention at Orel was to reorganise the administration of
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construction and place it under a unified body, in this 
instance the City Soviet Committee for Capital 
Construction. This would then provide continuous planning 
of the city's construction projects and continous flow 
construction with unified design and construction 
responsibilities. The idea was to plan construction 
projects over a rolling or continuous period, in order to 
concentrate resources in the short term and actually 
complete projects and provide continuity into the future 
(37).
It was suggested that the introduction of this system would 
reduce the number of building sites by between 33-40%, with 
a consequent reduction in the labour shortage and achieve 
cuts in construction time of between 15-20% (38).
Continuous planning would assist in the reduction of 
idle-time generally by cutting the period between projects 
and it was estimated that a 50% cut in this could result in 
an increase in the value of construction amounting to 2.5 
billion roubles per annum (39).
Implicit in this scheme is better labour organisation 
provided by the brigade system. However, the intention was 
that the system of continuous planning should be applied 
directly to the brigades themselves. The reason for this is 
that it is counter-productive if brigades complete 
contracts with great speed only to find there is no further 
scheduled work for them. Therefore the intention was to 
apply continuous planning to brigades and provide them with
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plans stretching into the future perhaps two to five years 
(40).
In fact attempts to generalise the Orel system, on both 
levels of operation, have proceeded very slowly for two 
major reasons. Firstly, the narrow departmentalism of 
ministries has led to reluctance on their part to surrender 
control over building projects to any unified body. 
Secondly, continuous planning has proved very difficult to 
implement at any level. This is due in part to the sheer 
complexity of the task but this is compounded by the 
all-pervasive uncertainty brought about by plan instability 
from above (41). The problems involved with coordination 
and experiments across ministries will also be returned to 
later.
Further problems can be identified that affect both the 
workers, who have to be encouraged to adopt this system, 
and management, who are resposible for establishing the 
conditions for transfer , and these retard the experiment's 
dissemination. Sevastyanov suggests that 30-4 0% of the 
reluctance can be attributed to the workforce, who are 
dubious about the advantages for them. The balance is due 
to managerial reluctance because of the integrated nature 
of construction and therefore the difficulty in setting up 
and defining brigade contracts plus their fear of failure 
(42).
There are problems regarding the status of the brigades
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themselves. Their initial status was both temporary and 
voluntary and the choice of making the transition would be 
determined by localised circumstances. This added to the 
instability of existant brigades and added no impetus to 
the establishment of new brigades and the generalisation of 
the system. Furthermore, as with other experimental 
initiatives, complaints were raised regarding the 
complexity of the paperwork necessary for the transition to 
the experiment. As Turbanov points out,it could take an 
official up to 40 days to process the necessary papers to 
transfer a brigade onto a contract and it was not 
inconceivable that the task assigned could be completed 
before the paperwork (43). Another source suggests that it 
could take two specialists up to a month filling in the 24 
forms necessary to transfer to the contract system (44).
However, perhaps the major problem, as brigades actually 
t r a n s f e r r i n g  to the system have complained, is that the 
experiment was not carried out in sufficiently stable 
conditions either for all the benefits to emerge or for 
other brigades to be encouraged to follow their example and 
transfer to the contract system. This has a number of 
aspects.
Firstly, successful brigades were often not allowed to 
complete the project they were working on but were shifted, 
by management, from project to project and used almost as 
construction 'trouble-shooters'. This may make sense from 
management's point of view, using a cohesive, well
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disciplined brigade to cover problems, particularly as 
management are concerned with overall plan fulfilment and 
not just isolated success in one or two brigades, but it 
destroys the logic of the experiment and will deter 
brigades from changing to this form of working (45).
Secondly, even when a brigade is allowed to finish a 
particular project there is no guarantee that the next 
project will be a contract of the same type. For example, 
Zlobin's brigade was switched from the construction of 
apartments to school building to house construction and so 
on, thereby losing any advantages to be gained from 
specialisation (46).
/
Thirdly, there was no guarantee that norms would remain 
constant and for Zlobin's brigade they were continually 
revised upwards until eventually average wages began to 
fall as contract time periods became tighter (47). Once 
again a contradiction emerges between the operation of an 
experiment and the logic of Soviet planning practice and 
this requires some explanation.
The logic of this experiment, like the Shchekino 
experiment, is to expose slack labour organisation and 
indiscipline, but here the novelty is to pass the onus for 
controlling this onto the workforce itself. In the case of 
Zlobin's brigade the original contract was set up without 
technically validated branch or inter-branch norms (48). 
The original calculation was based upon past practice and
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'rules of thumb'. The brigades'actual performance would 
allow management to evaluate the accuracy of the original 
contract because any time saving could only emerge on the 
basis of management's mis-estimation of the brigades' 
capacity. However, this sets management a considerable 
dilemma. Logically once this slack is identified they 
should set the brigade a new contract for the same job 
which reflects the new tighter work organisation. This 
would have the dual attraction from management's viewpoint 
of encouraging specialisation and further moving the 
brigade towards its actual capacity by raising work 
intensity. From the brigade's point of view as management's 
assessment of their capacity becomes more accurate the 
potentiality for easy bonuses diminishes and only by 
increasing their work intensity even further can bonuses be 
earned. Clearly workers will resist contracts for the same 
job which demand an ever increasing work intensity with 
diminishing possiblities for rewards. This may well explain 
why management shift successful brigades from one type of 
work to another. In this way they can capitalise on the 
increased organisation and tighter labour discipline and at 
the same time disguise the increasing intensity of work 
they are demanding. The cost of this strategy for 
management is the loss .of the advantages of specialisation. 
It should be remembered that both workers and management 
will learn from their experience and the net effect will be 
a growing reluctance on the part of the workforce to accept 
more restrictive contractual terms. As with the operation 
of the Shchekino experiment, eventually a ceiling will be
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reached and the possibility of further success will not 
come from internal factors but from outside the immediate 
control of the brigade, for example, re-tooling, 
technological change etc.
Whatever strategy management adopt the overall result will 
be that the experiment will have diminishing success. 
Planning from the achieved level may well be necessary but 
it will ultimately destroy the will to implement the 
contract brigade form of organisation and the in-built 
slowing of its momentum will discourage those brigades that 
have transferred to the system. Once again stable plans and 
norms are essential in order to maintain the momentum of 
the experiment and to encourage its generalisation. 
However, central planners and ministries can neither 
provide these conditions nor allow lower echelons of 
management the degree of autonomy necessary to allow them 
to establish them.
By the middle of 1973 6,000 brigades had transferred to the 
Zlobin method of working. These brigades were achieving 
labour productivity figures approximately 20% above 
comparable brigades and had cut construction times by 
between 13% and 16% (49). Although this appears an
impressive number it should be noted that they represented 
only 2.4% of the 250,000 brigades operating in the 
construction industry (50). Furthermore, Soviet 
commentators have noted that these figures are misleading 
as many of the brigades had transferred in name alone and
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that in reality both the ministry and local management were 
resisting the implementation of the system (51).
As a consequence of the problems that had emerged and the 
criticisms levelled at the experiment, new regulations for 
the transfer of brigades to the system were introduced
(52). The major thrust of the new regulations was to 
introduce an extension of the Kaluga variant, which made it 
necessary for all brigades working on a particular project, 
to transfer to the contract system. The intention of this 
was to stem the problems of dislocation between contract 
and non-contract brigades. The hope was that if all 
brigades were operating on the same system then all wages 
and bonuses would be linked to the completion of the 
project and all round economies in time, labour and 
materials would be achieved. It should however, be noted 
that this condition raises a number of problems. Firstly, 
it increases the complexity of management's task in setting 
up the contracts. Secondly, the possibility of failure for 
both management and the individual brigades is increased as 
all the brigades are now dependent upon one another. 
Formerly local management could assist the contract brigade 
by giving them priority and switching resources to them at 
the expense of the non-contract brigades. Management would 
do this because the success of these brigades would reflect 
favourably on them. Also the contract brigades could be 
used for special projects and by keeping the workers in 
these brigades within the terms of the contract, management 
would be able to retain them. (Remember it is likely that
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the 'best' brigades would be transferred to the system 
first). The remuneration of workers in non-contract 
brigades would not necessarily be impaired by this action. 
This would no longer be possible however, if the new 
regulations were strictly adhered to, as all brigades would 
have . to transfer to the contract system and therefore, all 
brigades would find their rewards linked to performance. 
This raises a series of pressures on managment from 
below. All brigades would now demand the opportunity to 
fulfil contracts and if any brigades were discriminated 
against, in terms of access to resources, then these 
workers would find their rewards reduced, even though their 
work intensity may well have increased (at least in periods 
when resources were available). These workers would then be 
encouraged to move to different enterprises where work 
intensity was not so high. Furthermore, the new 
instructions also increased the pressure on management from 
above, as ministries were now given the task of 
constructing plans for the conversion of all the brigades 
under their jurisdiction, onto a khozraschet basis. 
Management's response was to increase the introduction of 
the brigade form but in a formal and often empty manner.
For example, in 1976 at the North Caucasus Construction 
Administration Trust No.5, local management under pressure 
from above, introduced 21 contract brigades out of a total 
of 69 brigades. Only two of these brigades fulfilled their 
plan and only then when their targets had been reduced
(53). The reason for this is a good illustration of the
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problems. The trust's plan for 19 76 was 51% up on 1975, 
there was a labour shortage of 1,000 workers and only 70% 
of planned supplies were actually delivered during the year
(54). By introducing brigades but failing to undertake the 
necessary preparation, management were able to formally 
satisfy ministerial pressure but unable to reap the 
benefits of the system. By the late seventies over 30% of 
brigade failures were attributed to failures in supply (55) 
and as Bunich points out, in 1977 300 brigades reverted to 
the old form of working because of the lack of external 
support (56). Table 46, indicates that the pressure from 
above led to a rapid increase in at least the nominal 
dissemination of the experiment (57).
TABLE 46: Brigades in the Construction Industry Operating
on the Zlobin System.
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
200 9,000 16,000 40,000 43,000
Source; V.Sevast'yanov, Kommunist, 19 77, No.7, pp.37-46 .
Nevertheless, in 1976, Soviet authors assessing the six 
year period over which the experiment had operated, 
concluded that the experiment was a success and that in the 
contract brigades construction time had been reduced by 
17-20%, overall costs were down by 3-4%, and labour 
productivity had been increased by 4% (58). Clearly the
advantages of the system, notwithstanding the problems 
outlined above, had been maintained but at a declining 
rate. Gonchanov points out, that in Volgograd province for
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example, the transition to the brigade contract system was 
moving ahead rapidly but only on paper as construction 
plans are still unfulfilled (59). Furthermore, many of the 
brigades are very small, leading to large numbers of 
brigades with complex co-ordination problems but very 
little positive economic effect (60).
From the point of view of workers the transition to the
contract system was not necessarily reflected in material
rewards. In 1978, Grinko calculates that contract brigades 
exceeded the average output of ordinary brigades by 30% but 
their average earnings were only 2.5% above the rest (61).
Another significant feature that needs explanation was the 
differentiated diffusion of the system between different 
branches of construction. For example, over the course of 
the 10th Five Year Plan it was expected that 70-80% of all 
housing construction would be completed by brigades but 
only 20-30% of industrial construction (62). This feature 
and the factors that gave rise to it, are an interesting 
precursor of problems that were to develop later when 
attempts were made to generalise the experiment throughout 
industry. The different degrees of diffusion can be
explained by the nature of work itself in the housing and
industrial construction sectors.
In house construction the work tasks are relatively simple 
and tend to involve small work groups. Even if the overall 
project is large, for example the construction of a number
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of apartment buildings on the same site, the total 
workforce can be easily separated into coherent, parallel 
work teams. This can be achieved either by grouping workers 
horizontally across a particular skill group, for example 
all plumbers, all electricians etc. Or it can be achieved, 
as in the Kaluga variant, by grouping workers laterally. 
For example, all the different skilled workers operating on 
a particular building would form one work brigade and this 
would comprise plasterers, plumbers, electricians etc. In 
this way the introduction of brigade contracts and the 
coherent definition of brigades, is relatively easy for 
management and easily identifiable for the workforce. (This 
of course is not to minimise the problems already noted in 
the operation of these brigades once established).
However, on an industrial construction project the total 
number of workers is liable to be relatively larger. 
Secondly, the complexity and specialist nature of 
industrial construction, is likely to involve a wider 
variety of skilled workers and specialisms. This will lead 
to a high degree of integration and interdependence between 
workers on the whole project (63). Identifiable tasks 
suitable for brigade contracts will be more difficult for 
management to define and workers will be reluctant to 
accept that their remuneration should be based upon tasks 
heavily dependent upon the performance of others. The only 
possible way forward for management is to incorporate into 
the brigade all the members of the construction project but 
this then leads to problems regarding the size of the
PAGE 3 81
brigade that defeats its object of providing closer control 
over the activities of workers and linking their rewards to 
effort. These peculiarities of industrial construction 
explain the relatively slower dissemination of the 
experiment in this sector and provide a background for 
assessing the fate of the experiment when attempts where 
made to generalise it throughout the whole of Soviet 
industry.
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SECTION 3: THE EXTENSION OF THE BRIGADE SYSTEM TO INDUSTRY.
In the early seventies the apparent success of the brigade 
system in construction, coupled with the similar experience 
of brigades in agriculture (64), encouraged the ruling 
group to extend the initiative to industry. Even if the 
experiment had its own problems and had not been, as yet, 
fully generalised within construction, it nevertheless 
offered the possibility of improving industrial labour 
discipline and, as a consequence, labour productivity. As 
early as 19 73 the brigade form was introduced mainly into 
machine building enterprises (65). By the mid-seventies the 
system had been introduced into a variety of industries. 
For example, it was introduced into the Timber industry in 
August 1974, were it was used specifically to encourage 
workers to be less wasteful by giving bonuses for good 
quality work completed on time (66). The result was that 
labour discipline indicators improved and wastage fell from 
an average 10% to 1.2% per shift (67).
However, in some respects this industrial example is 
atypical. As well as the more general problems already 
noted in this chapter, the transfer of the brigade system 
into industry posed a series of specific problems, that 
were similarly grounded to the problems in industrial 
construction. These problems however, were more pronounced 
because of the nature of the Soviet industrial labour 
process.
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Firstly, the degree of integration of work activities, both 
within a particular enterprise and between enterprises, 
exceeds that in the construction sector. The production of 
almost any industrial product is the culmination of an 
integrated and mutually interdependent chain of work 
processes involving a large number of people. In flow 
production plants the integrated activities of hundreds of 
people produce the final product and it is almost 
impossible to seperate out specific work tasks that can 
then form the basis of the brigade contract. Even if this 
is possible the success or failure of a particular brigade 
will be totally dependent upon the success or failure of 
the brigade performing the immediately preceding task. In 
these conditions we may expect the workforce to be 
reluctant to transfer to the brigade system. Management 
will find the difficulty of the task of identifying and 
setting up coherent contracts will act as a disincentive to 
the introduction of the system. Furthermore, the transition 
may well be eased if the work team carry out a standardised 
section of the production process perpetually. However, if' 
their work is contingent on the needs of other sectors and 
changes, perhaps on a daily basis, either because of small 
batch production or because of the uncertainties of repair 
work etc, then it will be very difficult to implement the 
system.
Secondly, linked to the first point, industrial production 
in the USSR takes place in enterprises and plants, which
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are large. They are bigger ^or example, than their western 
counterparts (68). The sheer size of the workforce can 
militate against the implementation of the brigade system 
because a choice has to be made either to set up a large 
number of brigades, with the consequent problems of 
co-ordination and contract specification, or brigades will 
have to be very large and thereby sacrifice the 
self-disciplining benefits of the system.
Thirdly, industrial production takes place in a physical 
environment that is more amenable to control hence the 
existence of shift working as the norm. This raises a 
further problem of co-ordination of brigades over time. 
Should seperate shifts, operating with the same plant and 
equipment, constitute seperate brigades with seperate 
contracts or should the brigade and its contract be defined 
across shifts making them part of the same brigade? The 
former option heightens the degree of dependence between 
the two shifts whilst the latter option raises again the 
question of co-ordination.
Fourthly, the composition of the industrial workforce 
comprises not only basic production workers but also 
significant numbers of auxiliary and repair and service 
workers (69). The question then arises how are these 
workers to be integrated into the system? Should they be 
part of basic production brigades, as they contribute, 
however indirectly, to the finished product or should 
separate brigades be established for them? Is the
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composition of brigades to be vertical through occupations 
or horizontal through production?
Given the integrated nature of industrial production, 
described above, a formal structure of brigade 
oraganisation has emerged that reflects plant and 
association structures. In the first instance the decision 
to change to the brigade system comes from a shop floor 
workers meeting and has to be ratified by the shop's chief 
and trade union committee (70 ) . The brigade is eventually 
established by the enterprise director and the enterprise 
trade union committee. The brigade leader is appointed by 
the shop chief on the recommendation of the shop foreman. 
Hence the brigade leader, although not a member of 
management is indirectly, their ^appointee. Each brigade 
then elects a council usually of about ten members, which 
must comprise a production foreman and party and trade 
union representatives, with the brigade leader as chairman 
(71). The balance of the membership comprises top 
production workers. The role of this council is to review 
output norms, to enforce labour discipline, to supervise 
product quality and to ensure the fulfillment of output and 
productivity plans. The brigade council is also responsible 
for the calculation of the coefficient of labour 
participation (Koeffitsient trudovogo uchastiya) or KTU 
which is used to calculate the individual worker's bonuses 
and is explained in more detail below. The brigade council 
is also responsible for co-ordination with other brigades, 
organising socialist competition and the appointment of
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mentors for young workers. Furthermore, the brigade council 
is responsible for the allocation of labour within the
brigade and had the right to accept or dismiss workers and 
to regrade them as they either upgraded their skills or 
undertook multiple functions (72).
Above the individual brigade council is a council of 
brigade leaders that is responsible for the co-ordination 
of brigades within a particular shop or plant (73). The 
responsibilities of this layer is to oversee the work
within the whole shop or plant and to co-ordinate the
brigades accordingly. It also considers plans for future 
production and retooling or rennovation of the shop.
Where brigades are operating in Associations then two 
higher level bodies are established. The Association's 
Brigade Leaders Council comprises the chairmen of all the 
shop or plant Brigade Leaders Councils and this elects a 
presidium that deals with daily matters. Both the chairmen 
of the highest body and the presidium have to be approved 
by the enterprise director. These higher bodies are 
responsible for the overall co-ordination of the brigades 
and deal with any inter-brigade conflicts. Meetings at this 
level are closely integrated with plant management and the 
enterprise director participates directly and once 
decisions are made -they become applied to the whole 
Association (74). This integration of brigades into 
enterprise management is claimed to represent a 
democratisation of the planning and production process but
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the claims for this are an e x a g g e r a t i o n  given that all the 
participants are either directly or indirectly management 
appointees and the range of their deliberations is 
strictly delineated.
What was the impact of this new form of organisation in 
industry?
Burenkov, describing the 80 or more brigades established in 
machine building plants in the Sumy region in the period 
1974-1976, points out that they were originally based upon 
single occupations (75). However, over time it was found 
necessary to merge these brigades into all-purpose or 
integrated brigades, the average size of which rose as a 
consequence, from approximately 15 to 75 workers (76). At 
the Kaluga Turbine Plant over a broadly similar period, 
contract brigades were also introduced to replace the 
individual piece-work system that had operated previously
(77). The contract system, in both examples, operated in 
much the same way as it had in construction. A contract was 
defined with managemnent that specified the total value of 
the work, a completion date and targets for economising on 
materials and tools. Management committed itself to provide 
the necessary raw materials and tools and 50% of any 
savings accrue to the brigade as bonuses, with higher 
bonuses for high quality work.
Consequently the brigade was paid on the basis of the final 
results it achieved collectively but this should not be
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seen as an egalitarian experiment designed to level wages, 
even within the individual brigade. The overall intention 
of the brigade system is to link work performance more 
closely with rewards and the collective discipline of the 
brigade is seen as the mechanism to achieve this. Centrally 
determined wage normatives, however 'scientifically' 
derived are viewed by Soviet economists as being too 
inflexible and far removed from actual work performance, to 
act as either an incentive or as a disciplining mechanism
(78). Consequently, the brigade form of organisation 
provides a desirable intermediate administrative link that 
provides a discipline mechanism over production, 
absenteeism, etc but also a potential means of establishing 
a closer linkage between work and rewards.
The way this was to be achieved was that workers in 
brigades would find their wages calculated on the basis of 
three elements; firstly, their skill grading or wage 
category; secondly, the number of hours they worked; 
finally, their coefficient of labour participation, the KTU 
mentioned above (79).
For each brigade working on a contracted task a collective 
bonus fund is established and the KTU is used to distribute 
these funds amongst the brigade members (80). The KTU for 
each worker is established by the Brigade Council and is a 
reflection of the individual's contribution to the work of 
the brigade over the month. The minimum value of the KTU is 
zero, which means the worker receives nothing but the base
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wage. Any value above zero, up to a maximum of two, 
reflects the workers contribution either through job 
combination or high quality work etc. The intention is 
therefore, that centrally determined wage categories will 
determine the basic wage but over and above that work 
performance, evaluated by those most able - the brigade, 
will be determinant of wage supplements (81). As Parfenov 
points out, without the use of the KTU the loafer will be 
paid the same as the diligent brigade member and the 
incentive and disciplining effects of the brigade system 
will be lost (82).
As Mokin points out, with regard to a machine building
plant in Yurga which transferred to the brigade form of 
organisation, the operation of the system will lead to the 
number of workers in the brigade being adjusted downwards. 
Once the overall wage is calculated and the job specified 
it is in the brigades self-interest to reduce their numbers 
and thereby increase their average wage (83). The brigade 
system operates in this respect as a shop-floor level,
Shchekino-like, initiative but with the onus being passed 
directly to the workforce itself to reduce the numbers
involved in any contracted task. For example, Baranenkova 's
analysis of ten contract brigades at the Gomesel'mash 
Production Association showed that in the first quarter of 
1979, compared with the same period in 1978, the size of 
the workforce had been reduced by 9.1% but output per 
worker had risen by 13.2% (84). Gavrilov, calculated that 
if the engineering industry could increase the proportion
PAGE 390
of workers on the brigade system from 39% in 1979 to 75% in 
1985, then 100,000 workers could be released in engineering 
alone (85). Furthermore, if the system allowed a 
streamlining or removal of some managerial functions, like 
norming, quality control, etc, then even more management 
staff could be released.
The brigade system, like the Shchekino experiment, also 
encourages workers within the brigade to master second or 
third occupations. At the Yurga plant for example, over 300 
workers acquired second or third skills which enabled them 
to cover potential gaps in the brigade's labour supply and 
assists in the completion of contracts on time (86).
The operation of the experiment over this early period, in 
the three examples cited, led to favourable increases in 
output and labour productivity and labour discipline 
indicators showed similar improvements. At the Kaluga plant 
the introduction of the brigade system lead to annual 
labour productivity increases of 10%, labour turnover was 
reduced to a quarter of its former level and from 19 76 to 
1980 the number of counter-plans generated in the plant 
rose from 186 to 300 (87). At the Frunze bicycle plant, 
after the implementation of the brigade system, labour 
turnover was reduced and labour discipline infractions fell 
from 30-40 a day in 1975 to 3-4 a day, in 1980 (88). One of 
the ways this was achieved was that the Brigade council 
closely vets job applications, particularly from former 
employees and they are only started if they are accepted by
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a specific brigade. The consequence is that at the Yurga 
plant in 1970, it took 850 norm hours to produce one 
loader/excavator yet by 1976, as a result of the tightened 
labour organisation this had been reduced to 108 norm hours 
(89).
The experiment was not only introduced to basic production 
but also, for example, at the ship repair yards at 
Astrakhan (90). Here the brigade system was specifically 
introduced in an attempt to increase work capacity, as the 
yard's planned output was increased from the repair of four 
tankers to the repair of seven tankers with no increment to 
manpower. The workforce was split into two portions. The 
first comprising 23 workers organised into two brigades 
completed 41% of the work. The second portion of the 
workforce comprising 47 workers completed 59% of the work. 
The positive results of the brigade system can be seen in 
the comparison and are attributed particularly to multiple 
jobs in the brigades and eventually the whole task was 
completed in 4.9 months instead of 5.5 (91).
These examples of the successful implementation of the 
experiment in the period up to 1977/78 led to approximately 
160 industrial enterprises organising on the basis of the 
brigade system (92). However, these early successes need to 
be qualified. The usual problems of supply disruptions, 
plan instability and poor preparation for the experiment 
are bemoaned even in these successful instances. However, 
new problems also emerged. For piece-rate workers the
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introduction of the experiment marked a transition away 
from the old system of 'profitable' and 'unprofitable' work 
(93). In the new circumstances all work became necessary 
and equally important because bonuses would only be paid if 
the whole brigade fulfilled its collective obligations 
within the contracted time period. For some experienced 
piece-rate workers this represented a levelling down of 
wages and they resisted the implementation of the scheme. 
As a consequence of these difficulties the system was 
spreading slowly. For example, a survey of 200 Industrial 
enterprises in Minsk and Vitebsk showed that in 1975, only 
28% of the workforce was organised in brigades but by 19 77 
this figure had only risen to 33% (94). Furthermore, at a 
fifth of these enterprises there were no brigades at all 
(95).
Nevertheless, the desirability of the brigade contract 
system and the intention of the ruling group to speed up 
its extension it was confirmed by the planning resolution 
of July 29th, 1979 (96). As already noted, this resolution 
formally drew together a number of measures, drawn from the 
experience of a number of experimental initiatives. In this 
resolution ministries, departments, associations and 
enterprises were all instructed to develop and implement 
the brigade form of labour organisation and it was intended 
that this would become the basic form of labour 
organisation during the period of the 11th Five Year Plan 
(97).
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The resolution also formalised the role of the brigade
council, giving them the right to determine wages and
bonuses on the basis of the brigade's collective work
results and an evaluation of the individual worker's / »
contribution. They were also given the right to upgrade or 
change the wages of any worker who undertook a combination 
of previously separate jobs, who improved their skills, 
who learned additional skills or who consistently produced 
high quality work (98). The overall aim was to encourage 
the wider introduction of the system and thereby reap the 
benefits of improved labour discipline and productivity.
By the end of 1980, eighteen months after the
implementation of the planning resolution, 1.2 million 
brigades had been formed, encompassing 12 million workers 
and it was hoped that the number of brigades would have
risen to 1.5 million by the end of 1982 (99). However, as
Table 47 illustrates, the rate of dissemination has not 
been as rapid as was hoped. By 1982 the total number of 
brigades operating in industry was 1.37 million and 
although more than 15 million workers were organised in 
brigades the statistics are misleading and need
considerable qualification.
Although the number of brigades in operation is a useful 
index of the dissemination of the system there are also 
qualitative aspects to be considered. The experience 
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suggests that if the maximum benefits are to be attained 
from the system, the optimum brigade form is that of a 
complex integrated brigade, where workers of differing 
specialisms are combined across two or three shifts, to 
complete from start to finish some section of the 
manufacturing process (100). The brigade should be big 
enough to accomplish this end, without being over large. 
Ideally the brigade should be working solely on a single 
identifiable task on a khozraschet * basis and the whole 
brigade's performance should be linked to final results 
(101). Individual remuneration should be based upon the 
individual's work performance reflected in the KTU (102). 
In this way the brigade is both encouraged and able to 
reduce both inter-shift and intra-shift idle time and this 
leads as a consequence, to the full utilisation of the 
plant and equipment at their disposition. Furthermore, it 
will encourage workers to master and combine additional 
skills and the brigade need never experience disruptions 
because of shortages of the necessary skills. The net 
result should be increased labour discipline, output and 
productivity.
However, in reality the 'actually existing' brigades fall 
short of this ideal type and the system has been 
implemented with considerable unevenness. Firstly, the size 
of brigades has varied widely and there has been concern 
expressed that 32% of brigades have five or fewer members 
(103) and 70% have ten or fewer members (104). At the other
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extreme there are plants were the average brigade size is 
one hundred or more workers and where the brigade is simply 
all the members of a shop or a shift (105). Whilst it is 
recognised that specific production conditions will 
determine the precise size of the brigades, Soviet sources 
agree that these extremes are undesirable. The small 
brigades fail to obtain any of the advantages from 
increased machine utilisation or job combination and 
because of their necessarily large number, cause 
co-ordination problems and this increases the likelihood of 
failure. The large brigades are unwieldy and are not 
cohesive internally and therefore they represent hardly any 
change from the previous situation. Estimates have 
suggested that the optimum size is somewhere between 40 and 
60 workers (106). However, as the figures in Table 47 
indicate the average size of brigades is much smaller and 
only rising slowly from 10.78 in 1981 to 11.18 in 1982.
The balance between specialised, single shift brigades and 
complex, integrated brigades has also been changing slowly. 
In 1980 for example, at the Kaluga plant 63% of the 
workforce were operating in specialist brigades (107) and 
in industry as a whole they predominated (108). By 1982, as 
Table 47 indicates, integrated brigades, although smaller 
in absolute numbers, encompassed a larger proportion of the 
workforce. This is as would be expected, but it should be 
noted that their average size is still very small, at only 
13.6 workers.
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Furthermore, there have been continual complaints in the 
Soviet literature that many of the brigades that have been 
created are brigades in name only (109). For example, one 
study of the brigade system in enterprises of a variety of 
ministries, showed that they had overfulilled their plans 
for the creation of new brigades but labour productivity 
had only risen by between 0.5% and 1.2% as a consequence
(110). This seems to cast considerable doubt on the 
efficacy of the brigade system but the real reason for this 
type of result emerges from a further study of brigades in 
the machine building ministries, where only a third of the 
brigades were actually paid according to final results
(111). In ship building and repair the figure is slightly 
higher at 50% (112). Consequently, the introduction of 
brigades in these two sectors, in the majority of 
instances, has brought about no significant change. 
According to the information in Table 47, in 1982, less 
than 13% of the brigades were operating on khozraschet 
principles. As Soviet sources argue, this pro-forma 
adoption is inadequate.
This has a further dimension that is amply illustrated by 
the situation in Magnitogorsk. Out of the 2,272 brigades 
operating there, which account for 62% of the workforce, 
only 900 brigades are paid on the basis of final results 
but more significantly, only 238 brigades utilise the KTU 
to calculate the individual worker's bonuses (113). If all 
the brigades are approximately the same size this implies 
that the full system only operates for a little over 10% of
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the workforce. Furthermore, at enterprises of the machine 
building ministries the collective bonus is distributed to 
brigade members by use of the KTU for only 16% of workers 
(114). Even more extreme is the example of the Lipetsk 
tractor plant where there are 600 brigades in operation but 
not one is operating on khozraschet principles and in fact 
all workers are paid individually, on exactly the same 
basis as previously (115).
What is being suggested is that the figures presented on 
the creation of brigades are misleading and in fact the 
adoption of the brigade system may well mean little more 
than cosmetic changes to plant labour organisation. This 
then explains the limited impact on productivity and output 
figures over this period when apparently significant 
changes were taking place (116).
There are further problems because the experiment has been 
disseminated disproportionally between basic production 
work and auxiliary work, as illustrated in Table 47. It is 
to be expected that the brigade system will be easier to 
introduce to basic production work than to auxiliary, 
service and repair work. The reason for this is that basic 
production tasks are more amenable to coherent definition 
into brigade tasks, unlike repair work which by its nature, 
is more uncertain. Nevertheless, it is in the auxiliary 
sector that the brigade system is most needed to resolve 
the problems noted earlier (117). Specialist auxiliary, 
service and repair brigades have been set up at a number of
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plants. The Togliatti car plant and the Volga Automotive 
Plants are the best known examples, where the
centralisation of repair and service facilities has led to 
dramatic improvements in productivity etc (118). In the
shipbuilding industry the introduction of multi-purpose, 
auxiliary brigades has led to 20%-30% increases in the 
productivity of auxiliary workers and the downtime of
malfunctioning equipment has been reduced by 30%-35% (119). 
It is interesting to note that while the shipbuilding 
industry intends to have 88% of its basic production
workers organised in the brigade system by the end of the 
eleventh five year plan, the comparable figure for 
auxiliary workers is only 60% (120). However, generally 
even where specialist auxiliary brigades have been set up 
the proportion operating on khozraschet^ is much lower than 
the overall industrial average. Furthermore, the 
introduction of the brigade system has not been uniform 
across all industrial branches, reflecting differing 
degrees of support and planning at ministry level (121).
More significantly, even where brigades are fully operating 
on the khozraschet system, concern has been expressed 
regarding the preparations for implementing the system, the 
manner in which contracts are established and the internal 
organisation and management of the brigades. This has a 
number of aspects.
Firstly, as already noted, to obtain the optimum results 
the brigade requires a stable plan of assignments over a
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period of time, ideally five years but at least two years. 
Apart from the operational desirability of this, in cutting 
idle time, it also contributes to the cohesion and 
stability of the brigade. However, approximately two thirds 
of the brigades do not even have an annual plan (122). As a 
consequence it is unsurprising to find that brigades only 
work on contract work for an average of 60% of the time, 
the balance is either idle time or due to management 
redirecting them to other tasks (123).
Secondly, short term planning and organisation is also a 
problem. Lanshin has pointed out that the internal 
organisation of brigades is often chaotic and during time 
spent on contracted work no work schedules exist. This has 
two repurcussions. Firstly, if the brigade is inadequately 
organised internally the KTU becomes meaningless because 
without adequate records and work schedules it is 
impossible to measure or record individual particpation in 
the brigade's tasks. Secondly, if the KTU is non-operable 
the remuneration of the brigade will be based either upon 
allocation of the collective bonus on egalitarian grounds 
or it will be allocated on the basis of some other 
indicator. For example, the wage category or skill grouping 
used for basic wages will be applied' to the collective 
bonus as well. If either of these two eventualities arise 
then the intention of tying work and rewards through the 
brigade system is undermined (124). What it degenerates 
into is a form of perpetual storming by the brigade's 
conscientious workers, where workers will take on
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additional tasks to complete work. This situation cannot be 
sustained over time and the brigade will disband and revert 
to the old form of working. Furthermore, there is often 
haphazard co-ordination between brigade members and the 
work assignments with skilled workers carrying out manual 
tasks simply to get them done (125). This represents a 
misuse of skilled labour.
Thirdly, the establishment of contracts is often carried 
out in considerable ignorance and uncertainty which leads 
to meaningless contracts and almost certain failure for the 
brigade, demoralisation and return to the old system (126). 
This action amounts to little more than management 
attempting to shift responsibility onto the workforce. 
Lanshin points out, that out of 40 enterprises 
investigated, 30%-50% of the necessary documentation, 
blueprints, designs etc., were absent and the delivery 
schedules for 30%-40% of the necessary equipment was 
unknown (127). Neverthless, contracts had been established 
and failure to fulfil them, in most instances ascribed to 
supply failures or plan instabilities after the . contract 
was determined, undermines brigade confidence and slows the 
dissemination of the system.
Fourthly, problems can be identified within the leadership 
of brigades themselves. Initially brigades were headed by 
exceptional production workers (cf. Zlobin), but if the 
experiment is to be generalised then the necessity arises 
for many more brigade leaders. At some plants, particularly
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where a whole shift or shop has been turned in a
formalistic way into a brigade, it has been suggested that 
foremen should become brigade leaders (128). This has the 
disadvantage that it destroys the foreman's function as 
managerial representative on the shop-floor (129). The 
responsibilities of the brigade leader function involve 
technical, economic and engineering skills and the calibre 
of brigade leaders has caused concern. Lanshin points out 
that the proportion of brigade leaders with secondary 
education has risen from 27% to 37%, over the period from 
the mid-seventies, but only approximately 10% of the rest 
are studying to upgrade their qualifications (130). 
Kalandrov points out that it was difficult to recruit the
right kind of worker for the brigade leadership function 
because the rights and duties were ill-defined and, 
particularly in khozraschet brigades, the rewards are 
inadequate for the additional responsibilities (131). This 
is a critical problem because the brigade leader in this 
system has a pivotal role in terms of both the plant's 
overall organisation and in controlling production. 
Furthermore, as brigade leaders point out, whilst they are 
subject to discipline from above, and complaint from below, 
they have very little sanction over the actions of their 
superiors (132). Therefore, it is a role with considerable
responsibility but little power or reward.
A further related problem is the relationship between 
management and the brigade leader, the Brigade Council and 
the Brigade Leader's Council. In the plants that have
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successfully implemented the system there is a degree of 
overlap between managerial and brigade council functions. 
Also between Trade Union and Brigade Council functions. 
Furthermore, the addition of the Brigade Councils and the 
Brigade Leader's Council, although it is claimed to 
streamline some aspects of production administration, does 
add another tier of bureaucracy alongside the management, 
party and trade union hierarchies within the plant. The 
implementation of the system also begins a process of 
reorganisation of the relationship between management and 
the workforce, as management now have to negotiate with the 
brigades rather than simple giving them orders (133). How 
far this has brought real change is dubious because, as 
noted above, few brigades operate on the full system.
Overall, management tend to resist the full implementation 
of the system because in the last analysis, it increases 
both their workload and its' complexity, it increases the 
possibilities of failure and potentially disrupts their 
relationship with the workforce with very few guaranteed 
benefits. Far better to formally fulfill the plan for 
creating brigades whilst actually continuing to work in the 
same manner, after all supply difficulties will continually 
frustrate the operation of the system anyway. Ratchet 
planning and the inability to transform productivity gains 
into additional investment funds operate to counter this 
experiment in the same way as they were seen to undermine 
the Shchekino experiment. In conditions of labour shortage 
the disciplinary power of the brigade council is little
PAGE 4 04
stronger than that of the management and while consumer goods 
are in short supply the incentive effects are dubious. From 
the worker's point of view the brigade system is recognised 
as an attempt to further discipline and control their 
activities. Soviet sources have reported that in some 
instances, when workers are transfered to a khozraschet 
brigade they have left the factory to work elsewhere (134). 
In other instances, for example at a works meeting at the 
Vladimir tractor plant, no one voted for the transition to 
the system partially because of uncertainty about the nature 
of the system (135). The basis of worker's antipathy to the 
brigade system emerges from a survey of readers letters to 
Literaturnaya Gazeta (136). This article shows that whilst 
correspondents are opposed to wage-levelling, which they 
argue is unfair to conscientious workers, they also recognise 
that it is supported by management. The reason for this is 
that it is in management's interest, as it gives them a quiet 
life and saves them actually identifying good and bad 
workers. However, the correspondents are also dubious about 
the impact of the brigade system. Some argue that the 
implementation of the system will cause an irrational 
redistribution of workers towards plants with the most modern 
equipment because here the possibilities of bonus are 
enhanced. Others suggest that the major problem with the 
system is that it replaces objectively set centralised norms 
(based on skill, experience etc) by localised subjectively 
based norms. This fear captures exactly the aim of the 
system, eventually introducing greater differentiation of 
workers' wages. Ultimately workers'
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opposition to the brigade system is grounded on the 
knowledge that the benefits that may accrue to them, and 
remember that given endemic supply problems and plan 
instability these benefits are not guaranteed, will be 
small.
Brezhnev, speaking at the 17th Trade Union Congress in 
March 1982, was critical of the slow dissemination of the 
full Brigade system (137). He also criticised the 
disbanding of brigades, which he argued was caused by 
management failing to accept their responsibilities and 
provide brigades with the necessary conditions for success. 
As already pointed out, this is not necessarily within 
management's power. It would seem that at this time the 
impetus for the extension of the brigade system within 
industry was beginning to flag. Furthermore, even within 
those plants that had established the full system, the 
enhancement of productivity occurred at a declining rate. 
The initial results of the implementation of the system may 
well provide spectacular success but after the first year 
or two the productivity increments begin to decline to 
around 5% per annum (138).
Furthermore, the original' successes of the brigade system 
in construction proved difficult to sustain and the brigade 
system was certainly not the solution to all that sector's 
problems. Even though in the early 1980's Soviet writers 
were still writing about the benefits of the brigade system 
for construction (139), as Zotov points out, by 1982 all
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the major construction ministries failed to fulfil their 
production targets and the level of machine idle time had 
begun to rise (140). This is precisely the opposite 
performance than that expected of a sector where the 
brigade system had become widely implemented. Over 40% of 
the brigades working in construction were supposed to be 
operating on khozraschet, almost three times the
percentage in industry, but in reality the number was far 
fewer (141).
As Nikitin points out, even apparently successful brigades 
can run into difficulties (142) . He cites the example of a 
Murmansk Industrial Building Trust which had over the 
period 1974-1979, raised its production by 72%, reduced its 
workforce by 33%, had a reputation for good quality work 
and had always completed projects either on time or ahead 
of time, as a result of introducing the brigade system. 
However, this Trust had overspent its wage allocations as a 
result of the reduction of the wage fund on a ratchet basis* 
and therefore, any further extension of the brigade system 
was halted. Once again planning from the achieved .level 
retards the momentum of an experimental initiative.
The example of the Orel Construction Administration 
illustrates the problems that still arose in the 
construction sector (143). In 1979 more than 12,000 man 
days were lost through absenteeism, which usually occurred 
on Mondays and as noted previously, this is usually
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drink-related (144). The net effect of this was to severely 
disrupt the rhythmof work. The aim of the brigade system 
had been to overcome precisely this type of problem and the 
reasons why it didn't are instructive of the broader 
problems even when the experiment is introduced.
The brigade council, charged with resolving these problems 
fared little better than management had done previously. 
When punishment was meted out to labour discipline 
violators they simply left the collective. As the 
Administration was already 1,500 workers below the planned 
complement it could ill-afford to lose workers. The usual 
problems of supply difficulties and plan instability, 
coupled with poor supervision of poorly motivated young 
workers compounded the difficulties and showed that in 
these circumstances the brigade system offers no more of a 
constraint upon labour indiscipline than the previous mode 
of organisation.
The Soviet response to these problems was to seek 
administrative change and the adoption of a new resolution 
on the implementation of brigades (145). This sought to 
deal with a number of the problems enumerated in this 
chapter; attempts were made to improve the preparation for 
and the transition to the brigade form; to provide longer 
term and more stable plans for brigades;pressure was 
brought to extend integrated complex brigades working on 
khozraschet; improvements were called for in both the 
training and remuneration of brigade leaders; calls were
PAGE 408
made for the increase of party activity within brigades 
etc. The argument developed in this chapter suggests that 
such changes will have a minimal effect on the 
dissemination of the system. This question will be returned 
to briefly in the final chapter.
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SECTION 4: EXPERIMENTAL ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF
WORK NORMS.
This section will briefly review a number of other 
experimental initiatives concerned with the vexed question 
of work norms. The necessity for work norms in the USSR has 
already been explained as the result of the absence of the 
operation of the law of value in a social system still 
characterised by exploitative social relations of 
production. As concrete labour in the USSR is not reduced 
to abstract labour and equilibriated through the mechanism 
of competition and the market, this process is achieved by 
administrative mechanisms. However, the contradictions 
inherent in the process of setting, upgrading and operating 
work norms make this highly imperfect. Given the centrality 
of this problem it is not surprising that experimental 
initiatives were introduced in an attempt to resolve these 
problems. Specifically it had been long recognised that 
Soviet workers would strive not to overfulfil their 
individual assignments because overfulfilment would mean 
the uprating of work norms (146). This would leave the 
worker with no material advantage, only increased work 
intensity for the same return. Planning from the achieved 
level has a similar result for the individual as it does 
for the enterprise. This means' that the operation of the 
economic mechanism posits a ceiling on potential labour 
productivity advances and leads to perpetual hidden 
reserves and it is in the interests of both the worker and
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the management to evade their uprating.
In order to break this logic of the planning process an 
experiment was introduced at the Aksai plastics factory in 
Rostov (147). The aim of the experiment was to give 
piece-rate workers an incentive to raise their work 
intensity by upgrading their work norms. If a worker, on 
his own initiative, increased his work norm by 10%, half of 
the savings obtained as a result over the next three 
months, would be paid to him as a lump sum bonus. If the 
norm was raised by 15-2 0% then the worker would receive a 
lump-sum bonus equivalent to half of the resulting savings 
over a six month period (148). These payments were to be 
made prior to the implementation of the new norms and prior 
to the results being achieved. Furthermore, if the norms to 
be upgraded referred to the work of a brigade or work team 
of any size this could only be undertaken if everyone in 
the brigade agreed. In any case all changes in norms could 
only be carried out if ratified by the plant's trade union 
committee.
As an example, Alekseev cites a brigade that agreed to 
increase its production from 50 to 64 units per shift. The 
economic effect of this would have been a saving of 1,030 
roubles in the 6 month period hence the brigade received an 
immediate bonus of 515 roubles (149). The balance of any 
savings made were transferred to a centralised fund that 
could be used to pay further bonuses for high quality work.
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Furthermore, it was agreed that the Aksai plant management 
would only have the right to increase work norms if the 
conditions of production were changed. For example, if 
plant and equipment was rennovated or if new technology was 
introduced, it was recognised that this would effect work 
capacity and therefore norms would have to be raised but 
otherwise the initiative must come from below.
The initial results from the experiment were impressive. In 
each of the first five years of the system's operation at 
the Aksai plant, half of the plants piece-rate workers 
filed requests to upgrade their norms. Over this period 733 
people actually raised their norms, saving 200,000 norm 
hours, or the equivalent of 400 additional workers. This 
saved 220,000 roubles, half of which was paid to workers 
who as a consequence produced an additional 2,125,000 
roubles worth of output (150). In the period 1968-72 the 
plant achieved average labour productivity growth of 29.5% 
per annum and wage outlays fell from 27 kopecks to 17 
kopecks per rouble of finished output (151). These positive 
results were maintained over the first decade but at a 
diminishing rate, as labour productivity growth by 1978 was 
averaging 14% per annum, three times the industry average 
(152). Over the whole period labour productivity grew by a 
factor of six and average wages by a factor of three. The 
plant also made significant gains as labour discipline was 
improved. Labour turnover for example, fell from 30% in 
1968 to only 6% in 1978 (153 ) .
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The obvious attraction of this experiment from the 
viewpoint of the ruling group is that norm setting and 
revision is no longer decided from above and therefore 
manipulated and/or resisted by the workforce but is 
determined either by the individual piece-rate worker or by 
the primary work unit, the brigade (154). This represents 
an attempt to get the Soviet workforce to heighten its own 
work intensity and take up the slack in production and 
labour organisation by introducing some degree of 
self-interest. As previously argued, the worker at the 
point of production is the only person who can truly 
regulate and maintain the intensity of his own labour at 
the optimum level and see the potentialities for savings in 
time, materials and labour. From the viewpoint of the 
ruling group the payment of lump sum bonuses will be 
recouped many times over from the enhanced production into 
the indefinite future. Consequently, it was decided to 
generalise the experiment.
In the Rostov region, 205 enterprises transferred to t i^e 
system, involving 21,000 workers increasing their norms, 
amounting to the equivalent of 3,500 new production workers 
and saving almost 2.4 million roubles in the process (155). 
However, as Aganbegyan complains, beyond this the 
experiment was not widely disseminated, even though the 
experiment appears applicable to any plant where
piece-rates or collective brigade norms are in operation. 
(156). The reasons for the failure to generalise the 
experiment comprises a catalogue of familiar problems.
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Firstly, enterprises were lukewarm in their acceptance of 
the experiment and approached it in a formalistic and 
superficial manner. Often complaints were raised that 
enterprise management failed to abide by the terms of the 
experiment and arbitrarily disregarded time periods or 
attempted to uprate norms. They tended to treat the 
experiment as 'just another campaign' to be formally 
adhered to as long as it was topical and then dropped as 
soon as convenient or when pressure from above necessitated 
a hike in work norms. Furthermore, from management's point 
of view the instructions for the adoption of the system 
were vague and the ambiguities caused reluctance to adopt 
the experiment.
Secondly, management's lack of enthusiasm was reinforced in 
some instances when there was no surplus funds to pay the 
initial lump-sum bonuses (157). This potentially meant 
withdrawing funds from elsewhere which could cause 
immediate problems even if the experiment delivered the 
enhanced production in the future. Given the relatively 
short time horizQns where Soviet managerial decision making 
is concerned, it is likely that Soviet managers would be 
averse to such a potentially risky manoeuvre. Furthermore, 
the 'profitability' of such a scheme does not necessarily 
yield specific advantage for plant management as the 
enhanced profitability is dissolved- in the enterprise's 
overall performance and therefore, they do not perceive it 
to be in their direct self-interest.
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Thirdly, if workers accept tighter norms and agree to 
produce more this is predicated upon the provision of 
conditions to enable them to meet their commitment (158). 
There has to be a stable supply of raw materials, tools and 
energy supplies. Workers under the conditions of this 
experiment require the correct rhythm production with 
little idle-time, either between or .within shifts, if the 
higher norms are to be achieved. However, the chaotic 
nature of material and technical supply is outside the 
control of the workforce and of the management of the 
experimental plants and their enhanced performance does not 
translate into improved access to either raw materials or 
equipment. This instability deters workers from adopting 
the experiment and furthermore, adds to management's 
scepticism over the benefits of the experiment particularly 
if the lump sum bonuses have been paid and the enhanced 
production is not forthcoming in the short-run. Once again 
it should be noted that the poor frequency of supply leads 
. to arhythmic production cycles with a consequent effect upon 
both the quality and quantity -of output. It leads to the 
abuse and therefore, accelerated depreciation, of fixed 
capacity and poor attention to maintenance and repair. The 
emergence of this destabilised pattern of production sets 
up the need for low norms and labour surpluses in order to 
accommodate supply difficulties and still fulfil the plan. 
Consequently, the vicious circle that it was hoped the 
Aksai system would breach, reasserts itself.
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The Aksai experiment as noted,.refers primarily to the work 
of piece-rate workers but, this is obviously inappropriate 
for time paid workers. In modern industrial plants, 
particularly those based on flow production, time rates 
prevail. Nevertheless, the desire to increase labour 
intensity is no less pressing. This is achieved by 
maintaining a correct rhythm work and gradually
increasing the technically validated normed output. Another 
experimental initiative, begun at the Volga Automotive 
factory (VAZ), is based upon the recognition that in order 
to raise the degree of intensity of work workers need to be 
recompensed (159). The basic intention was to pay time rate 
workers bonuses, up to 40% of their base wage, for the 
fulfilment °f a targeted output level which had been based
upon technically substantiated norms for a partcicular
brigade (160). Furthermore, as the plant had more staff 
than specified in the plan further bonuses, up to 20% of 
the base wage, were payable if the brigades moved towards 
the technically validated complement. These bonuses were 
implemented for a period of time but when the regular
reviews of base wages took place they were integrated into 
the basic wage (161), In a sense they were temporary
bonuses to tighten labour organisation. Bonuses were also 
payable for workers who upgraded their skills and 
qualifications and these elements of the experiment were 
integrated into the 1979 planning resolution (162). Even 
though the VAZ experiment received official support by 
mid-1980 it had only been implemented at just over 50 
enterprises (163).
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Another initiative to increase the level of worker's norms 
was implemented at the Dinamo plant in Moscow (164). The 
experiment implemented here, was based upon the recognition 
that norms do not necessarily reflect the productive 
potential of each worker. Therefore, rather than paying 
bonuses to workers for overfulfilling unrealistically low 
norms the Dinamo plant introduced bonuses for the 
fulfilment of workers personal plans. The idea is that 
using the present overfulfilment as t i^e base, the worker 
adopts a personal plan to increase his output and is paid 
according to this index.
The obvious problem with both of these experimental 
initiatives is why should workers co-operate? If there is a 
labour shortage the option of movement would allow workers 
to avoid these administrative schemes for increasing work 
intensity. Furthermore, the material incentives are small 
and as repeatedly noted, ineffective. The disappointing 
rate of success in generalising these two initiatives 
suggests that both worker resistance and managerial 
reluctance combine to frustrate the experiments.
The alternative attempts to change the Soviet labour 
process, outlined in this chapter, could be extended to 
include a number of other experimental initiatives both in 
industry and agriculture. However, I would argue that 
irrespective of the detail of the experiments, their fate 
has been remarkably similar. The explanation and 
implications of this are taken up in the concluding 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS.
The central proposition developed in this thesis is that 
the antagonistic nature of the social relations of 
production in the USSR create a vicious circle of problems, 
outlined in Figure 1, which explain the current decline in 
economic growth and poor economic performance. It was 
argued in Chapter 1, that the central question relates to 
the extraction, by the ruling group from the direct 
producers, of a socially produced surplus. The Soviet 
ruling group requires a growing, usable surplus to 
stabilise and reproduce its own socio-economic position.
However, the historical origins of the Soviet ruling group 
have produced a particular set of relationships around the 
surplus extraction process which were outlined in Section 2 
of Chapter.2. Unlike the ruling class under the capitalist 
mode of production, the ruling group in the USSR does not 
have its dominance stabilised in property relations. Nor is 
the Soviet workforce "free" in the dual sense identified by 
Marx. Hence the relationship between the worker and the 
ruling group is one of semi-dependency. The absence of the 
controlling mechanisms of unemployment and meaningful wage 
differentiation and incentives means that there is little 
correspondence between work and rewards and the law of 
value does not operate as the principal regulatory 
mechanism. Furthermore, the ruling group does not enjoy the 
unconstrained use of force that was available to the ruling 
group in both feudal and slave societies. The historical
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origins of this situation need to be outlined briefly, in 
order to place the contemporary problems and the fate of 
the experimental initiatives, outlined in Chapters 3, 4 and 
5, into context. This will enable some tentative 
conclusions to be drawn.
The October Revolution removed the law of value as the 
prime economic regulator in the USSR. Even during the 
period of NEP, the law of value only operated in an 
attenuated form because the state monopoly of foreign trade 
removed any spontaneous equivalence with the world market 
and the state control of the commanding heights of the 
economy distorted the internal operation of the law of 
value (1). During the early plan period the task facing the 
ruling group was the basic industrialisation of the economy 
and the creation of a military power capable of 
guaranteeing their survival in a hostile environment. The 
historical legacy of Stalinism was of an economy
transformed, in the most brutal manner, from a largely
agrarian, semi-industrial base to the second largest 
industrial force in the world. However, this transition was 
achieved on the basis of an economic mechanism reliant upon 
direct force and the atomisation of the workforce (2). The 
combination of highly repressive labour codes (3), the 
activity of the secret police, the forced labour of camp 
internees and the destruction of the party and labour
movement, combined to produce a workforce that was
controlled and worked, however chaotic the eventual result 
(4). This form of control was predicated upon the complete
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exclusion of direct producers from either economic or 
political decision-making but in the process of 
de-politicising the workforce the ruling group ceded to 
them indirect negative control over their own labour 
process in the factories (5). This is the logical adjunct 
to the development of terror and atomisation as the prime 
means of economic regulation.
The basic tasks of this period were achieved primarily by 
the extensive expansion of the absolute surplus. That is by 
drawing into social production previously untapped material 
resources and mobilising a workforce which had been 
employed in the household, semi-subsistence sector of the 
economy or; low productivity agriculture. The directly 
coercive forms of control that emerged, were sufficient, 
even if extremely wasteful, for achieving the desired 
results and the USSR, with limited, easily prioritised, 
targets was able to build up Department 1 industries and 
arm itself. Force and fear were the ultimate arbiters in 
the surplus extraction process but as long as the surplus 
could be expanded absolutely, the appearance of growth 
could be maintained and the deterioration of control at the 
enterprise level could be tolerated.
However, in the post-war period the tasks facing the ruling 
group began to change and the objective basis of this form 
of control began to fracture. Both western and Soviet 
sources talk in terms of a change in growth strategy from 
extensive to intensive development (6). However, if labour
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activity is the only source for the production of 
use-values then the change in Soviet growth strategy 
implies changes in the exploitative relationship between 
the ruling group and the direct producers. It would 
therefore, be more precise to characterise this strategic 
change as a transition from the extensive expansion of the 
absolute surplus to attempts to increase intensively the 
relative surplus. The point is that this necessitates a 
change in the forms of control and economic regulation. 
What, was once adequate for one set of tasks was no longer 
adequate. The expansion of the relative surplus depends
upon a different species of control and regulation, that 
needs to be simultaneously more subtle, more all-pervasive, 
and more coercive. Belotserkovsky has argued that this was 
made more difficult because control was partially lost in 
the years immediately following Stalin's death as a result 
of Krushchev's inept attempts to initiate some limited 
de-Stalinisation (7). However, more fundamental changes
were taking place.
Firstly, the possibilities of further extending the growth 
of the absolute surplus had already begun to decline as the 
system itself, because of its wastefulness and
inefficiencies, posited the necessity for a large
agricultural worforce, relative to other developed 
countries. This curtailed the flow of population into the 
industrial sector where it had been absorbed, in 
increasingly large numbers, into the unproductive sectors
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of the economy, like repair, maintenance and auxiliary 
production. The necessity for the growth of these sectors 
was based upon the poor quality of production and the loose 
control exercised by the centre over manning levels but at 
the same time this reduced the possibilities for further 
expansion of the absolute surplus.
Secondly, technological change demanded changes in the form 
of economic regulation. Modern industry is based upon a 
complex technical division of labour which is 
simultaneously subject to two contradictory forces. On one 
hand, it increasingly involves the fragmentation of tasks, 
thereby reducing the area of expertise and responsibility 
of the individual worker. However, simultaneously it
depends upon an ever more complex integration and 
co-operation between these tasks. After all the division of 
labour can integrate the the activities of workers in 
seperate plants, enterprises, regions and countries, both 
in the west and within the CMEA bloc. Production is
therefore, becoming increasingly socialised. Furthermore, 
the' vast outlays of social labour time necessary to
construct the means of production and the R&D necessary for
its continual upgrading, makes it essential that plant is
correctly utilised. It is imperative that production takes 
place at the correct rhythm; that plant is utilised 
continuously and that shift coefficients rise; that the 
quality and timing of maintanance, service and repair are 
adequate; that factor inputs are of adequate quality and 
are used efficiently and economically etc.
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This all implies the necessity for a discipline both within 
the ranks of the direct producers and management that is 
based on more rational grounds than that existing in the 
thirties. Furthermore, the complex integrated nature of 
production gives individuals unprecedented negative control 
potential and autonomy. As the economy becomes more complex 
so the consequences of negative control become more 
far-reaching and the whole chain of linkages can be 
breached by the activities of small groups of workers, ITR 
or management. As a consequence force and atomisation 
cannot be the basis of economic regulation and control over 
the modern industrial workforce as it directly contradicts 
the logic of development of the productive forces.
Thirdly, the process of economic development and 
technological change also changes the nature of the direct 
producers and begins to present the possibility of 
destroying the atomisation characteristic of previous 
periods. The increasingly hereditary nature of the 
workforce, the distance from peasant individualist origins, 
the collective organisation and the integrated nature of 
modern work, the enhancement of educational and skill 
levels plus the rise in material expectations all pose the 
possibility of undermining the old mechanisms of control 
(8 ) .
Hence the objective foundations for both sustained economic 
growth (the extension of the absolute surplus) and the
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methods of control (terror and atomisation) had diminished 
in the post-war period. Consequently, it can be argued that 
the social relations of production and the methods of 
control developed in the previous period, which at one time 
facilitated growth and the transformation of the social 
system, were now in decline and became a fetter upon the 
further development of the productive forces. This does not 
imply absolute decline but the generation of an 
increasingly large gap between production potentialities 
and the actual level of production. This expresses itself 
in the retardation of growth rates.
The preceding argument suggests that the central problem 
for the ruling group, in the absence of the law of value, 
is that there exists no unambiguous regulator of economic 
activity that can provide both discipline and maintain 
their privileged position. In its present form, control and 
regulation arises via the planning process, that is 
inherently conditioned and amenable to manipulation by the 
self-interest of the enterprise management and the negative 
pressure of the workforce. This mechanism is clearly 
inadequate for the task. It necessitates continual 
bureaucratic intervention from the centre, which in turn 
reinforces the problems that made the intervention 
necessary in the first place. Consequently, the Soviet 
ruling group's control over the labour process is more 
tenuous than that of its capitalist counterparts. The 
ruling group and its academic representatives, clearly 
recognise the locus of the problems, in the process of
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surplus extraction, even if the terms they use are not 
these (9). Obviously there can be no return to previous
forms of control, which is not to say that force will not
be used against recalcitrant individuals in the USSR but 
simply acknowledges that it can longer be the prime 
regulator of economic activity, if indeed it ever could. 
This is explicitly acknowledged by Zaslavskaya in the 
Novosibirsk Report (10). The necessity is therefore, to 
move away from extra-economic control and find a new form 
of control, that will neither destabilise the ruling 
group's position, by provokoing popular discontent but 
which will simultaneously increase its control over the 
surplus, allow the incorporation of some sectors of Soviet 
society and thus stabilise its political hegemony. The form 
of control will need to be less overtly coercive but will 
need to be based upon a more subtle form of force.
In present conditions crude attempts to raise the rate of 
exploitation can be expected to produce the same results as 
those that occurred in the early sixties. For example, at 
Novocherkassk in 1962, attempts to impose simultaneous 
price increases for dairy and meat products coupled with an 
increase in the length of shifts in the local enterprises 
precipitated a worker's revolt and the seizure of the town. 
The struggle here and elsewhere in the same period was 
eventually harshly repressed but these events illustrate 
that the transparency of social relations in the USSR is 
such that any action by the ruling group to increase the
rate of exploitation is seen as precisely that (11). In the
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absence of the veil of commodity fetishism, economic 
discipline cannot be imposed, by reference to impersonal, 
immutable and apparently 'natural' forces as it can in the 
west.
The reintroduction of the law of value as the principal’ 
regulatory mechanism would appear the most obvious solution 
for the Soviet ruling group. It could simultaneously 
provide the type of unambiguous regulation that has been 
referred to continuously throughout this thesis, with the 
advantages of disciplining both workforce and management. 
Furthermore, it would allow the coalescence of the ruling 
group into a class because the reintroduction of the law of 
value implies the "freeing" of labour and ultimately the 
formalisation of property rights. For the workforce this 
requires the sale of their labour power and for the ruling 
group, or at least some sections of it, ultimately real 
control and ownership of the means of production. However, 
amongst the many problems of this approach there is one 
fundamental difficulty. The reintroduction of the market 
which would' turn labour power into a commodity and would 
necessitate the reintroduction of unemployment. Politically 
the abandonment of full employment (over-full employment) 
would undermine the hegemony of the ruling group and would 
in an immediate sense politicise factory relations. The 
major benefit of the atomisation of the working class was 
its depoliticisation and the destruction of the direct 
producers as a class. The reintroduction of the law of 
value would bring that class back into being. It would
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undermine the ideological legitimacy of the ruling group 
and sever its links with the revolutionary past. As with 
attempts to increase the rate of exploitation, this would 
be seen as a conscious decision on the part of the ruling 
group. Consequently the direct return to market mechanisms 
is an unlikely course of action, no matter how attractive 
this may appear to some elements within the ruling group.
The attempts by the ruling group to reform the economic 
system since the mid-sixties are their response to these 
problems (12). If the return to overt force is impossible, 
if direct attempts at raising the level of exploitation are 
likely to provoke hostility and if the law of value cannot 
be simply reinstated this provides an explanation for the 
necessity for experimentation. The experimental initiatives 
since the late sixties can be viewed as attempts to find 
new forms of control or to graft onto the basic structure 
of Stalinist planning new techniques for controlling the 
surplus extraction process. They represent a 'bottom up' 
approach to reform and, as the other elements of the 
reforms petered out, the longevity of these experiments is 
a testimony to the centrality of the problems they sought 
to solve (13). The experiments were attempts to resolve 
specific manifestations of the underlying antagonistic 
relationships by administering into existence surrogate 
forms of control derived ultimately from the market but not 
being of the market. It could be argued that the different 
reform initiatives imitate different elements of the law of
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value. For example, the Shchekino experiment itself and the 
pressure for its introduction in both a 'horizontal' and 
'vertical' form is an attempt to replicate the way in which 
the law of value under capitalism operates to regulate 
manning levels both within the individual capitalist firm 
and through industries and regions. In comparison with 
capitalism, where this process appears as spontaneous and 
'natural', in the USSR the mechanism is administered. The 
same could be said of the Aksai, Dinamo and VAZ 
experiments. Therefore, as a consequence the reforms are 
partial and piece-meal attempts to utilise in a technical 
manner some elements of the law of value without 
fundamentally effecting the underlying social relations of 
production. This explains why elements of the experimental 
initiatives sometimes contradict one another. All of the 
initiatives considered, sought to change the relationship 
between the worker and his work. After 18 years of such 
experimentation it should be possible to assess their past 
impact, consider the likely future prospects for reforms of 
this kind and draw theoretical conclusions.
Firstly, on a general level, the problems these initiatives 
addressed have not been resolved nor is there any evidence 
to suggest they will disappear their own volition. On
the contrary, the evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggests 
that the phenomenal forms that the antagonisms produce have 
deteriorated throughout the period of operation of the 
experimental initiatives. For example, growth continues to 
decline, the demographic situation becomes more acute, the
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problems of labour shortages grow, labour discipline 
indicators deteriorate etc. We may conclude therefore, that 
without the limited successes of the experiments these 
indicators would have deteriorated further.
Secondly, the continual appearance over the period of a 
range of experiments and their variants, testify to the 
necessity for change and the search for new forms of 
control on the part of the ruling group. The experiments 
may fulfil the short-term and necessary function of dealing 
with problems in specific sectors; the Shchekino experiment 
in the chemical industry, Zlobin brigades in construction 
and so on, but in the longer term none have been 
successfully generalised. This leads to the important but 
obvious conclusion that in the USSR there is no mechanism 
that promotes spontaneous change. Localised success remains 
precisely that, unless administrative bodies press for its 
extension and even then the results are dissipated. If no 
spontaneous dynamic exists then experimentation is the only 
form that change can take and as experimental change sets 
up no momentum or dynamic of its own, this implies that 
continual experimentation is necessary. Furthermore, the 
packaging of the initiatives as experiments is probably the 
only way to make them acceptable initially to both 
workforce and management, bringing prestige and publicity 
in return for the implementation of the experiment.
Thirdly, the lack of impact of the experiments can also be 
gauged in another way. The planning reform of 1979, which
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after all encompassed elements of all the experimental 
initiatives, had as its intention, the stimulation of 
production and the provision of discipline and regulation 
through the sphere of economic motivation. However, 
Andropov's first act on coming to power was the institution 
of a campaign for labour, plan and production discipline 
(14). That this and the legislative changes regarding the 
workplace (15), were necessary, testifies to the failure of 
the 1979 resolution to achieve its objectives.
What is being argued is that the experimental initiatives 
failed to fulfil their intended role. I believe Rutland is 
wrong in his bland assertions that these initiatives are 
all just examples of the "exchange of experience of leading 
plants" (16). The search for some form of control over the 
workforce and the continual stress on discipline and 
regulation is evidence of the degree of crisis that the 
system faces, that will ultimately jeopardise its own 
reproduction.
This still leaves open the specific question of how to 
evaluate the experimental initiatives. I would argue that 
there are several lessons to be drawn from the experiments. 
The Shchekino experiment and the other experimental 
initiatives have all followed a broadly similar pattern of 
development, (it is perhaps more correct to identify a 
pattern of limited growth and decline);
Firstly, they have all been based upon localised successes
PAGE 438
in sectors of the economy or particular industries or 




Thirdly, after the initial successes party and state 
pressure was exerted, usually in the form of legislative 
changes, for the wider dissemination of the experiments.
Fourthly, resistance arose to the intention of the 
experiments either in the enterprises themselves, causing 
further adaptation to take place, or at ministry level, 
causing their generalisation to be retarded.
Fifthly, where the experiments were now introduced the 
results were less dramatic than at the original locations.
Sixthly, the momentum slows at the original locations as 
the rules of the initiative change either because of 
contradictory objectives at the centre or because of 
contradictions in the initiatives themselves.
Seventhly, complaints arise concerning the slow 
generalisation of the initiatives and the lack of clarity 
regarding responsibilities for the experiments, leading to 
further legislative changes. The instability of the
Secondly, small scale generalisation 
adaptation of the original idea that 
introduction of a range of variants.
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regulations ironically further deters the acceptance of the 
initiatives.
Finally, the appearance is created that the experiments are 
being broadly disseminated, both by enterprises and 
ministries but this obscures the adaptations that have 
taken place along the way (which in some instances destroy 
the logic of the experiments) and the fact that in many 
instances the introduction of the experimental initiatives 
is an illusion that has changed nothing.
Each experimental initiative has originally promised the 
possibility of far-reaching changes in the labour process 
only to be frustrated by the external environment it is 
intended to transform. As long as the success of the 
experiment is determined by internally controllable 
factors, then the appearance of success can be maintained 
but once it confronts the vagaries of Soviet industrial 
life the momentum is lost both specifically and generally. 
Rather than transforming the system the experiment is 
forced to adapt.
This is easily identified from the example of Shchekino 
itself. It is ironic for example, that in a recent article 
on the Shchekino experiment there are a list of complaints 
seeking to explain the poor generalisation of the 
experiment (17). These include unstable plan targets, 
uncertainty about the wage fund, poor material incentives 
and so on. All of these elements were central to the
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experiment's operation at the start in the late sixties; 
their absence was continually bemoaned throughout the 
1970's; they were legislated for in the series of 
regulatory changes in the late 1970's, noted in Chapter 4; 
and they were all included in the planning resolution of 
1979. Nevertheless, they are all still absent and this 
continues to retard the dissemination of the experiment.
This raises the question, if these conditions were present 
could the experiment work and if not, what conditions would 
be necessary?
It is ironic that the only way that the incentive effects 
of the experiment can operate is if the experiment has 
already been comprehensively introduced and is working 
well. The pre-condition for the experiment's implementation 
is the experiment's success at raising'output in Department 
2 industries and forging, as a consequence a closer link 
between work and rewards. The fact that it has proved, 
difficult to generalise the experiment and that it is 
impossible to instantaneously implement it throughout all 
enterprises, ministries and regions, undermines the 
argument that it is the incentives element that will 
provide the way forward. This lends further credence to the 
argument developed in Chapter 3.
If that analysis is correct, it was not the material 
incentives element that accounted for the localised success 
in the first instance. The basic reason for success was the
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increase in worker insecurity that the implementation of 
the experiment introduced at enterprise level. This was 
supplemented by the work of the internal commissions in 
tightening work organisation and norms. However, as noted 
this could only have a declining effect as the degree of 
worker security inevitably rose. This was'the result of 
three things. Firstly, the number of workers released was
bound to be largest at the outset and then diminish.
Secondly, the option to move to other plants in the 
locality meant it was possible to avoid the experiment. 
Thirdly, the raising of planned tasks on a ratchet basis, 
apart from demoralising management at the experimental 
enterprises, meant they had an interest in the re-emergence 
of a safety factor of hoarded labour even if it was at a
lower level than at the outset. Hence the experiment had
its own internal limitations.
From the point of view of management the experience of the 
experiment, although it may have been desirable in the 
first instance, became negative. In the environment of 
ratchet planning, plan and wage fund instability and 
material supply diffficulties, the experiment could only be 
desirable if it gave advantage over other enterprises. This 
it did not do. If anything it brought disadvantage both in 
terms of the tightened internal situation and the problem 
of retaining workers and' the problems of expanding or 
renewing capacity.
What is being suggested therefore, is that the experiment
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could only succeed if it could maintain worker insecurity 
and provide a mechanism whereby enterprise increases in 
productivity could be translated into increased access to 
investment goods. This has implications for the workforce 
and for the relationship between enterprises, ministries 
and planners.
For the latter set of relationships the only way to 
implement the experiment is to set enterprises against one 
another competitively. In other words the enterprises of a 
particular ministry would receive resources in terms of 
competitive tendering on the basis of past performance (and 
by extension a similar type of mechanism would be required 
to operate between ministries to enforce the intention of 
the experiment throughout all economic decisions). This 
would give direct advantage to successful enterprises and 
would install a mechanism whereby enterprises would be 
identified as failures. This would turn the implementation 
of the experiment into an externally coercive force upon 
plant management who would have to replicate the behaviour 
of the most successful in order to survive. Ultimately it 
is being suggested that some form of competitive mechanism 
for investment goods is a necessary concomitant for the 
succesful generalisation of the experiment.
From the point of view of the workforce it would be 
necessary to introduce a situation whereby they could not 
escape the experiment. The experiment would have to be 
simultaneously implemented at all plants. If this were to
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be the case the careful procedures adopted at Shchekino 
could not be replicated elsewhere. Furthermore, the 
intensity of worker insecurity would have to be raised and 
maintained and the differentiation of wages enhanced. 
Popov, for example, suggests that the experiment should be 
amended in the following manner (18). He suggests that the 
enterprise freeing workers should transfer them to some 
local body, the City Soviet for example. The enterprise 
should also transfer from the wage fund to this body the 
minimum wage for each worker, the balance of the wage fund 
being retained by the enterprise for material incentives 
for those remaining at the plant. The City Soviet should 
then be responsible for the placement of these workers and 
if they cannot or will not be placed then the City Soviet 
should find them menial work and pay them the minimum wage. 
Popov argues, that this will have a number of salutary 
effects. Firstly, it will tighten the labour discipline of 
those employed who will not wish to be released to this 
type of work. Secondly, the experience of menial work at 
the minimum wage, will 'educate' those released who in 
their future work will exhibit a more disciplined approach 
(19). Popov's argument is effectively a call for the 
re-introduction of unemployment as a disciplining 
mechanism. I would argue that this is implicit in the logic 
of the Shchekino experiment and that ultimately the failure 
to introduce unemployment leads to the diminishing 
effectiveness of the experiment.
What are the implications to be drawn from this analysis?
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The suggestion is that the Shchekino experiment could only 
begin to work more fully by acting with a degree of 
compulsion on both workers and managers and this implies 
the implementation of parallel reforms to supplement its 
operation. It requires ultimately the reintroduction of a 
competitive market for investment goods.This would act to 
discipline management, by providing an unambiguous 
mechanism for detecting and punishing failure. Furthermore,
unemployment would be necessary to discipline the
workforce. The combination of these two elements would
allow the full generalisation of the experiment and would 
stop its modification and dissipation. As previously 
suggested, the likelihood of this type of reform is remote. 
The widescale reintroduction of unemployment would be 
politically destabilising and to encourage a mechanism that 
unequivocally identifies enterprise failure would be
resisted both by enterprise management, whose precarious 
position would be made more vunerable and by ministries, 
who are ultimately responsible. What is being suggested is 
that even if the ultimate creation of a market socialist 
model in the USSR were in the interests of perhaps the 
majority of enterprise managment and some sectors of the 
workforce (those who are not unemployed or whose intensity 
of work has been increased or who occupy a lowly position 
in the necessarily unequal distribution of income), once it 
exists, the transition towards it, will be resisted because 
potentially it is in no-one's interest. No individual 
manager or worker can be guaranteed that he will not be 
either a failure or unemployed. Therefore, it is more
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rational to maintain the imperfect present situation than 
risk the uncertainties of the future.
Gorbachev's analysis of' the problems, outlined in his early 
speeches, whilst perhaps allowing increasing debate on 
market forms and pressing for greater individual 
responsibility does not appear to include the market 
socialist option (20). The antagonistic social relations of 
production which made the Shchekino experiment necessary 
also make it impossible for it to succeed, either in its 
present form or in a necessarily more radical variant.
Gorbachev has however, pressed for further extension of the 
brigade system (21). Based upon the analysis presented in 
Chapter 5, this is hardly likely to be the cure-all that 
some Soviet sources suggest (22). Firstly, there are doubts 
about the suitability of the system for all areas of 
production. It may well be an appropriate form for 
construction or agriculture but in its full khozraschet 
form it is inapplicable in modern integrated plants. 
Secondly, the introduction of new 'administrative' means of 
control, the hierarchy of brigade leaders etc., alongside 
all the other internal enterprise bodies, appears as a 
duplication and further bureaucratic encumberance. Once 
again in times of technological change what is necessary is 
a form of control that simplifies rather than complicates 
the economic mechanism. Thirdly, to talk of the brigade 
system in terms of democratisation of the workplace is 
simply misleading. The brigade structure and its leadership
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could be viewed as a more comprehensive system of 
'foremanship'. Gorbachev for example, has described brigade 
leaders as 'executives on the shop floor' (23). The brigade 
system is not a mechanism for workers' control but a means 
to more closely control the Soviet workforce. The ultimate 
logic of the brigade system is to further fragment internal 
factory relations, which directly contradicts the logic of 
the development of the productive forces.
Therefore, given the relative failure of the experimental 
initiatives we may expect the emergence of new experiments 
in labour control. This may well be supported by the 
re-promotion of the older initiatives and attempted 
combinations of both new and old forms. The early signs 
from the new leadership are precisely of this type. The 
reform initiatives will probably originate in particular 
problem areas like the Chemical industry, construction, 
machine tools and robotic equipment production etc. It is 
also to be expected that these reform initiatives will be 
supplemented by further legislative changes, in the area of 
labour laws and labour discipline. The logic of what has 
been developed in this thesis suggests that any new 
experiments or re-promotions of old initiatives will lead 
to a similar cycles of growth and decline.
In conclusion the experience of the Shchekino experiment 
and the other experimental initiatives suggests that the 
transition to any market socialist model in the USSR will 
be extremely difficult. The experiments rather than
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establishing any spontaneous dynamic in this direction were 
resisted both by workers and enterprise management. The 
experience suggests that the introduction of partial 
market-based forms of control will fail if the whole 
structure of market relations are not introduced, which in 
return would be resisted by most sectors the Soviet 
population. I would argue that as long as the direct 
producers are excluded from control over their work-time 
and as long as production is not controlled by the needs of 
the direct producers, the possibility of crisis, expressed 
either in 'labour shortage' or 'labour surplus', are the 
only two alternatives open to the Soviet ruling group. 
Labour shortage, based upon the existence of the negative 
control of the workforce, ultimately threatens the 
reproduction of the ruling group. Labour surplus, based 
upon forms of market control, may be more desirable but is 
politically impossible to introduce. This is the nature of 
the impasse that the Soviet ruling group faces.
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APPENDIX A
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 suggests that the 
decline in Soviet economic growth can be explained by 
reference to the antagonistic nature of production 
relations and the absence of any unambiguous form of 
economic regulation. The impact of labour discipline 
problems has been recognised by many of the Soviet sources 
cited and the Soviet leadership but this has been disputed 
by western commentators (1). Hanson for example, suggests 
that increasing labour discipline will not lead to any 
significant improvement in economic performance (2). The 
reason he advances for this is that the effects of labour 
discipline infractions, when they emerge in surveys appear 
relatively small. Hanson's argument is that it is 
imperfections in the planning system that lead to low shift 
coefficients, considerable idle-time and poor utilisation 
of fixed capacity (3). This argument requires closer 
examination.
Given the problems already cited with regard to mechanising 
production it is particularly important that existing 
equipment is fully utilised, especially in Department 1 
industries. This will not only raise output but enable the 
production of more mechanised equipment and lead to the 
freeing of manual workers thereby easing the apparent 
labour shortages. The problems of the machine building 
industry make it desirable to be able to identify causes of 
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survey that Hanson cites is reproduced in part in this 
appendix (4) .
Table Al, identifies the percentage of non-working time for 
metal-working equipment in the machine building industry 
and the relevant shift coefficients. Five points emerge. 
Firstly, the average shift coefficient is 1.33 (out of a 
maximum possible value of 3) which is well below the 1.7 
deemed desirable by Soviet sources. Secondly, the shift 
coefficient is declining over time. In the mid-seventies 
shift coefficients were in the range 1.36 to 1.56, with an 
average of 1.41 (5). Thirdly, as Bunich has pointed out, if 
shift coefficients are so low why are plans fulfilled and 
indeed over-fulfilled (6). Fourthly, the proportion of 
idle-time for each category of equipment is higher in
auxiliary production (15.9% on average) than for basic 
production (14.1% on average) with consequent effects on 
shift coefficients. This supports the point made earlier 
with regard to problems in auxiliary production. Fifthly, 
where automatic lines are identified shift coefficients are 
not appreciably better (in one instance the percentage of 
idle-time is below average and the shift coefficient is
marginally above 1.7). Kulagin argues that with automatic
equipment and lines the shift coeffiient has to approach 3
to justify the expenditures involved (7).
The following three tables identify the reasons for 
idle-time in three categories; Table A 2 , whole day losses; 
Table A3, whole shift losses; Table A 4 , intra-shift losses.
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TABLE A2.
R easons f o r  Id le - T i m e  i n  B a s ic  P r o d u c t io n .  { % )
Q u a n t i t y  o f  E q u ip m e n t I d l e A B C D
f o r  2 4  h o u rs 1 0 0 1 00 1 00 100
P la n n e d  R e p a ir  & M o d e r n is a t io n 1 5 .1 1 8 .6 2 6 .5 1 7 .5
R e s e rv e s  & T e m p o r a r i ly  U n u t i l i s e d 9 . 3 6 .9 1 5 .0 1 2 .8
S u p e r f lu o u s  E q u ip m e n t 3 . 9 2 . 7 2 . 2 3 .1
D e f e c t iv e  & U n p la n n e d  R e p a ir * 1 0 .9 1 4 .0 1 5 .8 1 2 .1
L ac k  o f  P r o d u c t iv e  W o rk * 9 . 3 1 1 .4 7 . 3 1 2 .0
B elow  S t a f f  C o m p lem en t* 2 6 .3 2 3 .1 1 6 .1 2 1 .0
L ac k  o f  W o rk e rs  f o r  A d m in is t r a t iv e ly
S a n c t io n e d  R easons 6 . 7 4 . 9 3 . 4 5 .2
S h i r k in g *  0 . 2  
D e f ic ie n c ie s  i n  Raw M a t e r i a l s , S to c k s ,
0 . 1 0 .1 0 . 2
M ach in e  P a r t s ,  M a t e r i a l s * 9 .1 8 .6 4 . 7 7 .1
D e f ic ie n c ie s  i n  In s t r u m e n t a t io n ,
T e c h n ic a l  D o c u m e n ta tio n , E n e rg y
S o u rc e s , T r a n s p o r t ,  L i f t i n g
E q u ip m en t e t c . * 2 . 2 2 . 9 2 . 5
to•H
D e f ic ie n c ie s  t in  C o m p u tin g  E q u ip m e n t*0 .2
O th e r  W hole  D ay L o s s e s . * 6 . 8 6 . 8 6 . 4 7 . 4
A =  M e t a l  C u t t in g  L a th e s .
B =  F o rg e  P r e s s in g  E q u ip m e n t.
C =  C a s t in g  & M o u ld in g  E q u ip m e n t.
D =  E l e c t r o —W e ld in g  E q u ip m e n t.
TABLE A3.
R easons T o r  Id le - T im e  i n  B a s ic  P r o d u c t io n . ( % )
Q u a n t i t y  o f  E q u ip m e n t A B C D
I d l e  f o r  W hole  S h i f t . 1 0 0 100 100 1 00
P la n n e d  R e p a ir  & M o d e r n is a t io n 7 . 6 9 . 7 1 1 .4 9 . 3
D e f e c t iv e  & U n p la n n e d  R e p a ir * 9 . 8 1 1 .8 1 4 .6 1 0 .5
L a c k  o f  P r o d u c t io n  T a s k s * 1 1 .9 1 3 .0 1 2 .9 1 4 .5
B elow  S t a f f  C om plem ent * 3 9 .5 3 5 .5 2 9 . 9 3 4 .2
A bsence o f  W o rk e rs  w i t h
A d m in is t r a t iv e  S a n c t io n 8 . 5 7 . 0 6 . 5 6 . 8
S h ir k in g *
D e f ic ie n c i ie s L n  Raw M a t e r i a l s .
0 . 3 0 . 2 0 . 7 0 . 2
S to c k s , M a c h in e  P a r t s ,  M a t e r i a l s *  9 . 1  
D e f ic ie n c ie s L n  In s t r u m e n ts ,  T e c h n ic a l
8 . 7 7 . 9 9 . 0
D o c u m e n ta tio n , E n e rg y  S o u rc e s ,
m  ■ « »  • « i  • «  • • w. «  «  ^  ^  ^  »lrutfijpucu 6r l i i  x m g  a q u ip m e m ;.  ^ O . JL
O th e r  W hole S h i f t  L o sses  . * 1 0 .2 1 0 .7 1 3 .2 1 3 .1
A =  M e ta l  C u t t in g  L a th e s .
B =  F o rg e  P r e s s in g  E q u ip m e n t.
C =  C a s t in g  & M o u ld in g  E q u ip m e n t.
D . =  E le c t r o - W e ld in g  E q u ip m e n t.
TABLE A4.
Reasons f o r  I d le - T i m e  i n  B a s ic  P r o d u c t io n .  (%)
A
I n t r a —s h i f t  L o s s e s  1 0 0
D e f e c t iv e  & U n p la n n e d  R e p a ir *  1 6 .9  
A d ju s tm e n t & R e a d ju s tm e n t  o f  
E q u ip m e n t 1 8 .5
D e f ic ie n c e s  i n  Raw M a t e r i a l s *
S to c k s , M a c h in e  P a r t s , e t c , 2 1 .5
D e f ic ie n c e s  i n  In s t r u m e n t a t io n , *
T e c h n ic a l  D o c u m e n ta t io n ,
E n e rg y  S o u rc e s , L i f t i n g  &
T r a n s p o r t  E q u ip m e n t. 7 . 5
1 1 .3  6 . 8
5 . 9  5 .0
1 .1  2 . 3
1 6 .7  1 3 .2
A =  M e t a l  C u t t in g  L a th e s .
B =  F o rg e  P r e s s in g  E q u ip m e n t.
C =  C a s t in g  & M o u ld in g  E q u ip m e n t.
D =  E l e c t r o —W e ld in g  E q u ip m e n t.
D e f ic ie n c e s  i n  P r o d u c t io n  .
T a s k s *  9 .7
Absence o f  W o rk e rs  w i t h
A d m in is t r a t iv e  S a n c t io n  6 . 6
D e f ic ie n c ie s C a u s e d  b y  L a b o u r
*
D i s c i p l i n e  V i o l a t i o n s .  1 .8
*
O th e r  I n t r a s h i f t  L o s s e s . 1 7 .5
B C
100 100
1 6 .9  2 6 .1
2 2 .7  1 5 .6
1 7 .9  2 1 .8











Hanson is formally correct to point out that losses 
directly attributable to infractions of labour discipline 
or shirking are very small; 0.1 to 0.2% on Table A2; 0.2 to
0.7% on Table A3; ■1.1-to 2.3% on Table A 4 . These figures 
are broadly comparable to those cited from Sonin earlier 
but it should be remembered that he argues that these 
under-report losses by as much as 10 times (8).
However, leaving this last point aside, the major reason 
for idle-time clearly emerges on both Table A2 and A3, as 
being as a result of shortages of workers in a variety of 
shops; 16.1 to 26.3% of the idle time on Table A2 and 29.9 
to 39.5% on Table A3. Hanson correctly points out that the 
blame for this cannot be attributed to Soviet mothers for 
not producing sufficient children. However, he explains 
this disparity as being the consequence of inadequacies in 
the planning system. His failure to explain the cause of 
these inadequacies and his narrow conception of labour 
discipline problems results in a technical explanation of a 
socio-economic problem. Presumably for Hanson, these 
problems would be resolved if planning mechanisms were more 
efficient.
However, I would argue that this explanation is inadequate. 
As Section 7, of Chapter 2 sought to explain, the apparent 
labour shortage is the result of the contradictions of the 
socio-economic system and these are reproduced over time 
and are not the result of technical failures. If a broader 
perspective is taken that sets the problems of production 
into the context of the antagonism between the worker and
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the ruling group then a significant proportion of the 
idle-time can be explained as a result of labour discipline 
problems either directly or indirectly.
The lines marked with an asterisk on Tables A2 and A3 
represent problems directly attributable to the 
antagonistic nature of the system. Planned repair is 
excluded as it is a necessary part of any production 
process. Administratively sanctioned absences are also 
excluded although this is more debatable, as suggested in 
Chapter 2 this is often a result of management compensating 
workers for the poor rhythm of production etc.
In the figures produced below, the first figure includes 
the category "other causes" and the second excludes this 
proportion of idle-time. Without more information nothing 
definite can be said about these time losses. If the totals 
are recalculated they read as follows;
Table A2: A = 65%, 58.2%; B = 66. 9%, 60. 1 9- •o ,
C = 52.9%, 46.. 5 %; D = 61. 4%, 54. 0%.
Table A3: A = 83.9%, 73.7%; B == 83 .3%,r 72 .6%;
C = 82.1%, 68..9%; D = 83. 9%, 70. 8%.
A similar situation arises with Table A4, but here the only 
element excluded is the adjustment and resetting of 
equipment. Again this could be questioned on the grounds 
that lack of sufficient specialised equipment and the 
consequent use of general purpose equipment, is a systemic 
failing.
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Table A 4 : A = 81.5%, 64%;
C = 84.4%, 71.2%;
B = 77.3%, 60.6%;
D = 86.5%, 66,1%.
This figures suggest that the responsibility of labour 
discipline infractions for idle-time are much more 
significant than Hanson suggests. It really depends upon
how you view the nature of planning, either as a technical
operation or as a reflection of the political economy of 
the USSR.
There are two further tables in the original article, which 
have not been reproduced here. The first considers the 
level of idle-time across industries and indicates that 
there is little variation with an average of 14.1% idle 
time and a shift coefficient of 1.41 (9). The second table, 
adds a regional dimension to this and shows significant 
regional variations in idle-time, (from a low of 9.8% to a 
high of 32.6%) and shift coefficients (from a high of 1.54 
to a low of 0.82) (10) .
The general point to be drawn from this is that the
contradictory nature of the system leads to 
under-utilisation of fixed capacity in this important 
branch of the economy. The labour shortage and poor
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